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HOWARD L. BOORMAN
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ELLIOT A. ROSEN

Reviews

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regrets the death on February 14, 1966, of

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He honored us by accepting Honorary Membership in The Academy of Political Science.

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Contributors to the June Issue

A former officer of the American Foreign Service who served in China and Hong Kong, HOWARD L. BOORMAN is editing *A Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* at Columbia University. He has written on recent Chinese history, politics, and personalities.

SCOTT A. BOORMAN's interest in Chinese Communist military affairs stems in part from the coincidence that he was born at Peiping on the day that elements of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army entered that city (February 1, 1949).

CHARLES E. GILBERT is associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College, co-author of *Planning Municipal Investment* (1961), and author of articles on local government and politics, political theory, and public administration. His book on suburban government and politics in the Philadelphia area is being prepared for publication.

STAUGHTON LYND is an assistant professor of history at Yale University. His publications include *Antifederalism in Dutchess County, New York* (1962) and *America: A Documentary History* (1966).

RAYMOND L. THURSTON, U. S. Ambassador to the Somali Republic and former U. S. Ambassador to Haiti (1961-63), has had key diplomatic assignments in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Washington. He served recently as State Department adviser to the Commander of the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

ELLIOT A. ROSEN is assistant professor of history at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. He is currently engaged in writing a book on Franklin Roosevelt and the brain trust.

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Chinese Communist Insurgent Warfare, 1935-49

JUL 2 8 1966 INDEXED

HOWARD L. BOORMAN
and
SCOTT A. BOORMAN
Mill River, Massachusetts

In the summer of 1938, Major (later Brigadier General) Evans F. Carlson, USMC, then a member of the staff of the American Naval Attaché in China assigned to observe the initial phase of the Japanese invasion, visited Nankung, a Communist base area in southern Hopei province. Writing later of his first contact with Chinese Communist forces, Carlson stressed the self-confidence of their leaders:

> These men of the Eighth Route Army were sure of themselves. They had thought through the whole problem of social, economic and political relationships during the long years they had fought for existence, and their ideas were definite and clean-cut. Also, they had boundless confidence in their military strategy, and in their ability to apply it.[1]

Although it would be risky to accept as detached and objective the testimony of Major Carlson with respect to Chinese political problems, his emphasis on the self-confidence of the officers and men of the Communist military forces is noteworthy. Fourteen years after the arrival of the first Red Army units in Shensi province in October 1935 at the end of the Long March, the Central People's

[1] Evans Fordyce Carlson, *Twin Stars of China* (New York, 1940), 249.

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Government was established at Peking.[2] If results are taken as a measure of justification, Chinese Communist self-confidence appears to have been warranted.

It is possible in retrospect to delineate several reasons for Communist success. The incompetence, disunity, and inefficiency of many Chinese Nationalist military commanders during the 1935-49 period unquestionably contributed to the victory of the insurgents.[3] During the Sino-Japanese War, which occupied more than half of that period, full-scale Nationalist-Communist hostilities were curtailed by the presence of the Japanese invader, with the result that the Nationalists were unable to exploit superior strategic resources.[4] In essence, however, both of these factors contributing to Communist success were negative and were not of themselves sufficient to ensure insurgent victory.[5] Effective implementation of a protracted revolutionary war against opponents who are technologically, economically, and numerically superior of necessity entails the presence

[2] General treatment of the period is given in F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China* (Princeton, 1956); Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford, 1962); O. Edmund Clubb, *20th Century China* (New York, 1964); and Lionel Max Chassin, *The Communist Conquest of China: a History of the Civil War, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). Ho Kan-chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking, 1959), presents the Chinese Communist version of the period, while American documentation of the frustrations of the postwar interlude appears in U. S. Department of State, *United States Relations with China* (Washington, D. C., 1949), in which Chapter 7, "The Military Picture, 1945-1949," is particularly thought-provoking. Edgar Snow's reportorial classic, *Red Star over China* (New York, 1938), recaptures the atmosphere of the post-Long March period in the Communist regions of China. For scholarly purposes, bibliographical control of some of the basic Chinese sources is provided by Chun-tu Hsueh, *The Chinese Communist Movement, 1937-1949* (Stanford, 1962) and Edward J. M. Rhoads *et al.*, *The Chinese Red Army, 1927-1963: An Annotated Bibliography*, Harvard East Asian Monographs No. 16 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

[3] Even in the clashes which broke out during the Sino-Japanese war, when the Communists and Nationalists were in nominal alliance, Nationalist commanders generally failed to make the greatest possible gains inherent in the situation. An example was the only partially successful Nationalist attack on the Communist units of the New Fourth Army in January 1941.

[4] A concise Japanese history of the conflict is given by Hata Ikuhiko, *Nit-chū sensō-shi* (The Sino-Japanese War) (Tokyo, 1961).

[5] See Harold C. Hinton, "Political Aspects of Military Power and Policy in Communist China," in Harold L. Coles (ed.), *Total War and Cold War* (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), 267, for a different analysis of the reasons for Communist success in China.

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of active catalysts, of impetus deriving from the strength of the insurgent, not from the weakness or lethargy of his foes. It is to such dynamic forces as doctrine and leadership, therefore, that we must turn in order to identify the positive causes of the Chinese Communist triumph in 1949.

Evaluation of the precise roles of military strategy and of military leadership in this group of active catalysts is not easy.[6] Because of the integration of military and political techniques and objectives in the Chinese Communist revolutionary system, Western analysts, in so far as they have dealt with war and warfare in that system, have tended to emphasize political elements to the near exclusion of military aspects.[7] Drawn to the familiar adjective "political" in the term "political warfare," they have in general avoided the forbidding noun "warfare."

Granted the vital role of political techniques and organization among the catalysts of success, Chinese Communist military operations had, however, as significant a revolutionary function. Mao Tse-tung's oft-quoted aphorism that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was the product of long practical experience in

[6] The first and in some respects still the best theoretical analysis is Edward L. Katzenbach Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX (1955), 321-40. See also Katzenbach, "Time, Space, and Will: the Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-tung," in T. N. Greene (ed.), *The Guerrilla—and How to Fight Him* (New York, 1962), 11-21, and Hanrahan, "The Chinese Red Army and Guerrilla Warfare," in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.), *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York, 1962), 159-65.

[7] In addition to the Hinton and Katzenbach-Hanrahan papers cited above, several other specialized studies suggest the trend: Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York, 1960); S. M. Chiu, *Chinese Communist Revolutionary Strategy, 1945-1949*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 13 (Princeton, 1961); Chalmers A. Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," *World Politics*, XIV (1962), 646-61; Ralph L. Powell, *Politico-Military Relationships in Communist China* (Washington, D. C., 1963); Davis B. Bobrow, "Peking's Military Calculus," *World Politics*, XVI (1964), 287-301; Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (1965), 80-99. More generalized treatments include Raymond L. Garthoff, "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (1962), 566-75; Samuel O. Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," introduction to Osanka, xv-xxii; Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War," *History and Theory*, IV (1965), 133-63.

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the pursuit of power. If political activity provided the foundation of Communist military success, it, in turn, depended for successful implementation upon a favorable military environment. In perspective, it seems clear that the success of the Chinese Communist party in gaining nationwide authority stemmed in great part from two strengths of Chinese Communist insurgent warfare: first, effective military strategy, and, second, effective military leadership.[8]

Strategic Objectives

To understand the effectiveness of Chinese Communist military strategy during the pre-1949 period, the first task is to analyze its immediate objectives: those objectives directly attainable through employment—or non-employment—of military forces in the field. Among these aims were survival of the Communist army, territory, and annihilation of enemy military forces.

One key objective of Chinese Communist military strategy during the insurgent period—though one often overlooked in retrospect—was survival. Indeed, during the period between the arrival of the main body of the Communists in northwest China after the Long March and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the primary operational goal was survival. The army, protector of the territorial base, was harder to replace than the base itself. Moreover, the Communist top command, aware of the numerical superiority of National Government forces, recognized that it must conserve the strength of its army if the Communist movement was ever to obtain the positive objectives of territory and annihilation. It was with good reason that Mao Tse-tung in 1938 emphasized that the fundamental law of war is, while destroying the enemy, to preserve oneself.[9] However, after the formation of the new Kuomintang-

[8] The 1935-49 period of the Communist insurgency in China may be subdivided into three strategic stages: the interim Shensi period (1935-37), during which the principal Communist strength centered in parts of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia provinces in northwest China; the Sino-Japanese War period (1937-45), when the principal operations of the Communists were conducted behind Japanese lines in north, central, and east China; and the final civil war period which began with the renewal of Communist-Nationalist hostilities in June 1946 and ended with the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949.

[9] "Problems of Strategy in the Guerrilla War against Japan" (May 1938), *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1963), 153-54. (Hereafter cited as *SMW*.)

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Communist united front in 1937, the "struggle to keep the Red flag flying" eased somewhat as Nationalist pressure on the Communists lessened. By the time of the final civil war against the Nationalists, Communist strength had increased to the point where survival of their own military forces had become almost irrelevant to practical strategic decision-making.

The territorial objective of Chinese Communist military strategy was the preservation and expansion of geographical areas militarily controlled by the Communist army. Emphasis on this goal in strategic planning derived from political concerns. After the Long March, the Communist leaders recognized that the probability of gaining stable political power in China was directly proportional to the amount of active and organized popular support which their movement possessed.[10] However, as the experience of the 1927-35 period had shown, the opponents of the Chinese Communists were both willing and able militarily to disrupt and suppress popular support for the Communists. Unable to conduct effective political operations in a militarily hostile environment, the Communists were forced to exercise military control over those areas in which they wished to develop an extensive mass base.[11] Since the "broad masses" of the population of China were for the most part peasant, Communist military bases were centered in the countryside throughout the period of insurgency from 1935 to 1949.

Precise understanding of the nature of the territorial goal has been complicated by an apparent inconsistency in Chinese Communist military doctrine. While the Communists regarded possession of base areas as a necessary ingredient of revolutionary success, maximum operational flexibility—in a sense, the negation of territorial control—was also considered essential.[12] The paradox may be re-

[10] This point has sometimes been misunderstood. See, for example, Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (New York, 1962), 26-27: "For the purpose of conquering China, civilian indoctrination did not have to be either total or very profound. As long as an elite was won over and the majority of the people maintained a benevolent passivity, all strategic and tactical requirements were fulfilled."

[11] Military force was required essentially to protect, not to coerce, popular support; the role of terrorism in Chinese Communist revolutionary strategy was miniscule.

[12] For typical statements emphasizing the necessity of base areas, see "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" (Dec. 1929), *SMW*, 60, and "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan" (May 1938), *SMW*, 165. Apparently

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solved, however, if it is understood that Communist strategy sought not permanent and inflexible occupation of any specific piece of territory at any given time but eventual control of the maximum amount of territory. In a military situation where the strength-ratio was unfavorable to the insurgents, Chinese Communist doctrine permitted calculated withdrawal, either with the aim of counter-attack and recovery of the lost territory or in the expectation of more advantageous operations elsewhere. For this reason the Chinese Communists were able, with consistency, to form, to consolidate, and to expand territorial bases and at the same time, in order most efficiently to develop such bases, to maintain freedom of action even if it meant temporary and partial disutility.

Historically, the territorial objective may be viewed as passing through two relatively distinct forms whose character derived from the evolution in the size and capabilities of the insurgent forces. During the decade after 1936, Communist-controlled areas in the Chinese countryside were essentially discrete geographical units. An important characteristic of these base areas was their almost complete military and economic—though *not* political—independence from each other. During this phase of insurgency, the Communists generally conducted military operations in relatively small units and expanded zones of control through an amalgam of military action and political organization which might truly be labeled "political warfare." After 1947 they gained military control of the areas between their previously discrete bases in Manchuria and north China and eventually of all of south China, a region in which they had not possessed fixed bases since the Kiangsi period. In this second phase, the territorial objective of Communist strategy became control and expansion of relatively continuous geographical areas. Due to the shift in the power balance in China during this period, final campaigns moved so rapidly that the Communists often gained military hegemony over large regions before they were able to establish political control.

A third objective of Communist military strategy in the pre-1949 period was the annihilation of hostile military units. Although the

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contradictory exhortations to mobile warfare are to be found in "On Protracted War" (May 1938), *SMW*, 193, and in "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (Dec. 1947), *SMW*, 347.

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term "annihilation" is used in official English translations of Chinese Communist texts, that rendition of the Chinese compound *hsiao-mieh* is somewhat imprecise. To the Communist commander, the term *hsiao-mieh* did not necessarily mean the killing of any or all members of an enemy military unit but rather the elimination of that unit as an organized, effective fighting force. The term "annihilation," therefore, embraces two of the three principal aims of war stipulated by Clausewitz: first, destruction of the military power of the enemy and, second, destruction of his will to fight. It was only when all attempts to break the will to fight of a given enemy unit failed that the Chinese Communists heeded the dictum of Clausewitz that the only means in war is "the fight."[13]

The importance of annihilation derived from its role as a means to expansion of Communist territorial control. Annihilation of enemy units reduced the extent of enemy territory, while it increased Communist freedom of action, territory, and—as a final result—capacity for mobilizing popular support.[14]

The operational role of annihilation as a method of gaining and controlling territory increased with the development of Chinese Communist strength. Prior to 1946, annihilation of enemy forces was not a serious strategic objective, since during those years the Communists lacked the ability to destroy strategically significant portions of enemy military forces arrayed against them.[15] As the

[13] General Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Colonel J. J. Graham, new and revised edition by Colonel F. N. Maude (London, 1949), I, 36. (Hereafter cited as *On War*.) Despite the inaccuracies of the Graham-Maude translation, it is cited here as the most convenient English translation available for general use. See the review article by Peter Paret, "Clausewitz: a Bibliographical Survey," *World Politics*, XVII (1965), 272-85, and his chapter, "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century," in Michael Howard (ed.), *The Theory and Practice of War* (London, 1965), 21-41.

[14] Some Western authorities have considered annihilation an objective of Chinese Communist insurgent warfare on a level with, or even more important than, territory. By annihilating enemy forces, however, the Communists increased their degree of territorial control and reduced that of the enemy. Annihilation, therefore, should not be viewed as a direct intervening objective to the goal of maximizing active and organized popular support but as an intervening objective once removed. For justification of this view, see Mao's statement in "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (Dec. 1947), "Holding or seizing a city or place *is the outcome* of wiping out the enemy's effective strength" (italics ours), *SMW*, 347.

[15] One of the notable features of operations during the Sino-Japanese War period was the refusal of the Communists to commit their forces in strategically

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Communists grew stronger, however, large-scale annihilation became the important criterion of military success. The final annihilation campaigns of 1948-49 in southern Manchuria, the Huai-Hai area, and north China definitely turned the strategic balance in China in favor of the Communists.[16]

Defensive Strategy

The military campaigns of the Chinese Communists during the pre-1949 period were carried on within the framework of two general strategic situations related to and deriving from the objectives outlined above. The first situation, which occurred frequently between 1935 and 1946, was that described by the Communists as a "campaign of encirclement and annihilation and the counter-campaign." In that situation, the primary mission of the Communist forces was to defend a base area against attempted hostile military invasion. Offensive operations on the part of the Communist forces were limited in scale and closely coordinated with defensive action. The second strategic situation, which did not occur until about 1947, was that characterized by Communist strategic offensive.

In the first of these two military situations, the problem confronting the Communists was usually an attack in the form of encirclement. In this type of campaign the Communists had three objectives: first, preservation of the base area; second, preservation of the military force defending the base area; and, third (and optimistically), annihilation of all or part of the attacking force. The first two objectives were interrelated. Preservation of the base area depended in great part on preservation of the military force defending it; and preservation of the army was difficult without preservation of the base. The base area was to the army as water is to a fish.

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significant offensive engagements. Even the early battle of Pinghsingkuan in September 1937, when Communist forces under the command of Lin Piao encircled and annihilated a unit of some three thousand Japanese, had more psychological than strategic significance. In general, the Communists formed stable base areas only in regions where Japanese control was weak or non-existent.

[16] Texts of the telegrams detailing plans for these campaigns are found in *SMW* and demonstrate the role of annihilation: 361-66, 367-70, and 375-79, respectively. See also the reviews of Mao Tse-tung's writings of that period by H. Arthur Steiner in *Pacific Affairs*, XXXV (1962-63), 384-90, and in *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXLV (1963), 176-77.

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In order to understand the strategy which the Chinese Communists customarily adopted in a counter-encirclement campaign, it is necessary to appraise the assets and liabilities of the two opponents. The Communist army possessed good commanders, high morale, popular support (at least within the base area), efficient organization, and strict discipline. It was operating on known terrain and had the advantage of being highly mobile because of its light equipment. Intelligence about the enemy was usually accurate and detailed. Despite these advantages, the Communists had no heavy ordnance except mortars, few modern communications facilities, and no modern transport: in short, little or none of the paraphernalia with which the modern army is normally equipped.

The enemy forces, Nationalist or Japanese, usually had more troops in the field and better weapons than the Communists. Often (if Nationalist) and certainly (if Japanese) the attacking units had the equipment of a modern army of the period. On the debit side, in addition to uneven morale and inadequate mobility, enemy units frequently had commanders who were inexperienced in fighting an opponent using unconventional strategy. Popular discontent was often manifest against Nationalist units; hatred, against the Japanese.

Given the assets and liabilities of the opposing forces, a Western officer, if commanding the Communists, might have given up hope of reconciling the seemingly incompatible objectives of defending the base area and also of preserving his forces.[17] He probably would have fought a set-piece battle on the perimeter of the base area in the hope of defeating a tactically superior enemy force, or he would have tried to save his troops by abandoning the base. In either case, the Communists rather than their enemy almost certainly would have been annihilated.

[17] It would, however, be misleading to conclude that deliberate retreat and subsequent counter-offensive is unacceptable to Western military doctrine. See, for example, the article by General Hamilton H. Howze, "Tactical Employment of the Air Assault Division," *Army*, XIV (1963), 35-53. In his analysis of military exercises conducted in South Carolina in 1962, General Howze propounds a policy of measured retreat to a fixed terminus, coordinated with harassing actions, ambushes, and demolition; concentration of a sufficient defensive force; and finally an encircling counter-attack characterized, in the General's words, by establishment of "firm bases of operations in enemy rear areas."

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In accordance with their territorial concept, the Communists adopted neither the strategy of battle nor that of abandonment.[18] Rather they conducted a planned and large-scale retreat into the base area with the enemy in pursuit and then made a decisive counter-attack when conditions for such a move appeared favorable.[19] The theory behind this "indirect approach" was that, while the retreat was in progress and contact with the enemy broken or sporadic, the Communists could maneuver themselves into a favorable position vis-à-vis their opponent. Retreat augmented the strength of the Communists by placing the "fish" in the "water," that is, by moving the army into an area of active and organized popular support. Retreat gave them time for military preparations, especially for concentrating all available armed manpower. In addition, the Communists were in a position to select their own time and place for combat. Moreover, the farther the enemy penetrated into the base area, the longer and more vulnerable were his communications and supply lines; the more easily confused and deceived was his leadership; and the more the morale of his troops dropped as the futility of the pursuit and the hostility of the local populace became evident. Mao Tse-tung has quoted the chief of staff of a unit of the Nationalist forces: "Our stout men have worn themselves thin, and our thin men have worn themselves to death."[20] Eventually, of course, the Communists ended their retreat, and a decisive battle was fought around the terminus.[21] Clausewitz has suggested that the conduct of war is essentially a matter of influencing the probabilities of success in battle.[22] The Communist strategy of retreat sought to manip-

[18] As mentioned above, the Communists would occasionally abandon a base area. For purposes of study of their strategic concepts, however, the theory of finite retreat is considerably more important, and it alone is considered here. A note of caution must be added. In certain instances, especially in Szechwan near the beginning of the period under consideration, the Communist forces under Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien adopted relatively positional methods of defense. See Norman Hanwell, "The Chinese Red Army," *Asia*, XXXVI (1936), 320.

[19] See "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (Dec. 1936), *SMW*, III, 116-17.

[20] *SMW*, 113.

[21] Extensive analysis of the correct direction and terminus of retreat is given by Mao in "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (Dec. 1936), *SMW*, 114-16.

[22] "From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the

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ulate the variables inherent in the given conflict situation and thus to direct its probable outcome.

The character of the Chinese Communist strategy of retreat derived from two basic psychological factors.[23] Perhaps the most important of these factors was Communist refusal to recognize many of the "strategic points," possession of which most Western commanders would have considered vital for either practical or psychological reasons.[24] An excellent example of the application of this Communist doctrine was the abandonment of their wartime capital, Yenan, in 1947.[25] In accordance with the strategic objectives which they endorsed, the Communists believed that the mission of their military forces was not to attack or to defend arbitrary strategic points but rather to control the maximum amount of territory and to annihilate enemy forces. Since their commanders refused to attach importance to strategic points, defense of which might have restricted their mobility, they were free to retreat and to maneuver at will. In contrast, Nationalist commanders during the civil war frequently sacrificed mobility through preoccupation with *Schwerpunkte*.[26]

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law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly." *On War*, I, 11; see also I, 29-31.

[23] It would be challenging, though difficult, to construct a formal model of the Chinese Communist theory of strategic retreat. The process of retreat might be viewed as a modified pursuit-evasion game in which the payoff was the probability of Communist success in the decisive battle. For the current state of pursuit-evasion theory, see Rufus Isaacs, *Differential Games, A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization* (New York, 1965).

[24] This discussion does not imply that the Communists refused to acknowledge the existence of strategic points determined by the nature of the terrain or by strategic relations between the two sides. They did, however, reject points that might be viewed as strategic because of political prestige value, economic potential, or other militarily irrelevant criteria. See Mao's statement in "On Protracted War" (May 1938), *SMW*, 246: "We should have the courage to retreat. . . . In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate action will contest a city or a piece of ground even when the position is obviously and definitely unfavorable; as a result, they lose not only the city or ground but fail to preserve their forces."

[25] See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1961), IV, 129-32; Yang Ping-an, *Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang chan-cheng* (The Chinese people's liberation war) (Shanghai, 1955), 55-56; and *Ti-san-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng ta-shih yueh-piao* (Monthly record of events in the third revolutionary civil war) (Peking, 1961), 36-37.

[26] See Liu, 245, 257, 268.

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A second factor which influenced the Communist strategy of retreat was the concept of initiative. To the Western strategist, initiative is often a kinetic force directly based on offensive action. To the Chinese Communists, initiative was rather a potential force: it was freedom of action, the ability of the army to go where its commander wished it to go.[27] The idea of retreat followed naturally from this definition of initiative. Withdrawal was the only strategy by which the Communists could retain their freedom of movement in the face of a tactically stronger attacker; orderly and limited withdrawal was the only strategy which permitted active defense against the attacker and enabled the Communists eventually to regain the strategic offensive. Therefore, the Communists adopted a strategy of retreat, though not with the intention of permanently relinquishing a base area.

The finite character of Chinese Communist retreat necessitated an eventual decisive battle, or series of battles, upon the outcome of which depended the safety of the base and the preservation of the Communist army.[28] Despite the superficially offensive character of such an engagement, the theory and practice of counter-offensive, like that of strategic retreat, nevertheless falls under the rubric of strategic defensive. The counter-offensive which followed a retreat, as Mao Tse-tung has emphatically pointed out, was prepared for by the retreat and was frequently followed by another phase of withdrawal.

The basic objectives of counter-offensive battles were dual: first,

[27] The theory of flexible initiative is perhaps expressed most clearly in "On Protracted War" (May 1938), *SMW*, 241-42. See also *Sun Tzu, The Art of War*, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, 1963), 98. A German commentator has suggested a link between this passage of Sun Tzu and the Chinese Communist concept of initiative in warfare, since both stress that initiative is possible in defensive as well as in offensive action. See Gerd Stamp, *Mao: Roter Khan der gelben Partisanen* (Boppard, 1963), 78. For a review article discussing the 1963 translation of *Sun Tzu* and other works on Chinese military affairs, see Scott A. and Howard L. Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung and the Art of War," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIV (1964), 129-37.

[28] In "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (Dec. 1936), Mao speaks of *the* decisive battle of the counter-offensive (*SMW*, 121). However, in his later essay of May 1938, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan," he says, "After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another and, by smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack" (*SMW*, 176).

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to eliminate the power of the enemy to remain in the base area; and, second, to break the nerve of the enemy commander, thus causing hurried retreat. A variation of this counter-attack pattern, however, was used in many Communist counter-encirclement campaigns in the first years of the final civil war with the Nationalists from 1946 to 1949. In these campaigns, the stage of retreat was executed much as in earlier years, but the counter-offensive was often not conducted directly against the units occupying the seized part of the base area. Rather the Communist forces attacked in another direction and occupied a vulnerable Nationalist area. This changed strategic policy derived in part from the growing strength of the Communists, which made them less dependent on any single base area.

In the attainment of counter-offensive goals, the general Communist strategic directive was to exploit the increment in their own strength and the decrement in the enemy's strength realized during the phase of retreat. By this exploitation, they seized the offensive and transformed potential superiority into actual advantage. The principal method of the Communists in implementing their strategic directive was the encirclement and annihilation of one or more important enemy units, thus substantiating in practice their belief that encirclement, given sufficient preparation, is the most effective means of strategic annihilation. Because of extensive reliance upon the technique of encirclement, the decisive problem for the Communist commanders in the stage of counter-offensive was not unlike that enunciated by a well-known officer of the United States Army who, in speaking of the training program of the Infantry School at Fort Benning in the early nineteen-thirties, wrote: ". . . the real problem is usually *when* to make a decision and not *what* the decision should be."[29]

Within the conceptual framework outlined, it is, however, impractical to confine the Communist methodology of counter-offensive to a single formula. Mao Tse-tung once said of the counter-offensive that "the struggle at the time of the decisive engagement is the most intense, the most complicated, the most kaleidoscopic, the most difficult, the most trying, and, for a commander, the hardest

[29] See Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York, 1963), 251. Marshall served as assistant commandant directing the training program at Fort Benning from 1927 to 1932.

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juncture in the whole war or campaign."[30] In asserting the incomputability of the offensive method, Mao echoed what Sun Tzu had said over two millennia before in speaking of the principles of command: "These are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand."[31]

Offensive Strategy

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Chinese Communists gradually adopted a more aggressive military strategy as their strength, in relation to that of their Nationalist opponents, increased.[32] When they took the strategic offensive in 1947, the Communists were confronted with strategic problems fundamentally different from those which they had previously met when on the defensive.

In subsequent offensive campaigns—which varied greatly in scale, ranging from multi-division encounters to the massive Huai-Hai battle—the objective of the Communists was to expand their territory by destroying large enemy forces. The Communist offensives were essentially campaigns of encirclement and annihilation in which the previous Communist and Nationalist roles were reversed: the burden of counter-encirclement now rested on the Nationalists. As the Communists anticipated, the Nationalists did not have the popular support and other advantages which the Communists had possessed when they had been on the defensive.

The encirclement and annihilation campaigns from 1946 to 1949 shared a basic pattern. First, the Communists sought to disconnect Nationalist units and strong points. This first phase of the Communist strategic offensive may be termed the phase of disconnection. Success rested upon skillful coordination by Communist commanders of three types of operations: guerrilla disconnection, mobile disconnection, and positional disconnection.[33] The first type of discon-

[30] Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (Peking, 1954), 90.

[31] *Sun Tzu, The Art of War*, 70.

[32] A useful table of the relative manpower strengths of the Nationalist and Communist forces in China in the 1945-49 period is given in Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1965), 374.

[33] This enumeration derives from Mao Tse-tung's classification of the forms of warfare. See *SMW*, 244-48.

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nection entailed disruption of Nationalist communications and coordination through harassment, ambush, or sabotage; the second, maneuvering of Communist regular units between separated Nationalist forces; the third, attacks at weak points in Nationalist defenses. Selection and activation of any one of these techniques depended upon Nationalist and Communist capabilities, dispositions, and objectives. In practice, the Communists generally used guerrilla disconnection when shifting in a given theater from defensive to offensive operations; mobile disconnection when operating against Nationalist forces dispersed to defend strong points; and positional disconnection when operating against long enemy defensive lines.

The second stage of the offensive, that of strategic encirclement, grew out of the first and blended with it. In this phase, the Communists completed their disconnection of Nationalist units from each other and surrounded some of the enemy forces. During the second stage, however, encirclement remained strategic in nature: it was only rough, and the encircling forces were often at some distance from the main enemy concentrations.

The final stage of the Communist offensive was annihilation of isolated Nationalist units by tightening the strategic encirclement of the preceding stage. Here the Communists employed a considerable tactical arsenal to annihilate the encircled forces: short attacks, single- and multi-point attacks, shock attacks.[34] In practice, once Nationalist units were strategically encircled by the Communists, they had little hope of escape. Many Nationalist officers and men recognized their dilemma and, encouraged by favorable Communist terms, surrendered either as organized units or as disorganized individuals; others were physically annihilated.

On the surface, Chinese Communist offensive strategy appears to have contained no radically distinctive elements. Indeed, their military operations during the strategic offensive have often been compared to those used in Western conventional warfare. When, however, a dynamic analysis of the total Chinese Communist military system is related to the insurgent operational strategy, apparent similarities to Western conventional warfare lessen.

[34] A translation of excerpts from Lin Piao's manual on the short attack appears in Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, Penn., 1951), 202-06.

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In warfare, as in mechanics, an essential element of any system is force. It is in the concept and the use of force that we must seek the uniqueness of Chinese Communist insurgent warfare between 1946 and 1949 and differentiate it from Western land warfare in the tradition of Napoleon and Clausewitz. In Western military history, force as applied in battles and campaigns was first embodied in points—zero-dimensional force—and later in lines—one-dimensional force.[35] During the Communist move toward power in China, however, the type of strategic force applied by the insurgents, in contrast to that conventionally applied in land warfare in the West, embraced two dimensions.

In the years before 1946, these dimensions derived, on the one hand, from the sustained emphasis placed by the top command on popular and semi-regular forces and, on the other, from its dispersion of regular forces to establish and to expand base areas. As a result, Chinese Communist strategic force possessed not only length but also depth. When the Communists controlled a region, it was because they possessed, dispersed over the area, a large number of small units which coalesced on the strategic level to form a single force, usually termed a base area. After 1946, when the Communists initiated a strategic offensive, they retained in great part the system of two-dimensional force developed in the base area phase. Since the decisive stage of any war provides the fewest alternatives for correct command decision, the most spectacular stages of the Communist encirclement and annihilation campaigns of this period were also the most conventional. If one- or zero-dimensional force was frequently used by the Communists to realize the decision, that decision, however, had been prepared by and grew out of exploitation by their commanders of their two-dimensional advantage over their Nationalist opponents. Even in the most conventional major engagement of the period, the Huai-Hai battle of November-December 1948, one essential Communist advantage lay in the fact that, in contrast to their Nationalist opponents whose sole strategic force was a line centering on the railroad intersection of Hsuchow, the Communists operated from a two-dimensional base of military control in north and east China.

[35] For a concise statement of the evolution of the strategy of land operations in Western warfare, see General André Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy*, translated by Major-General R. H. Barry (New York, 1965), 58-67.

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Two-dimensional military force requires exploitation of a third dimension of force: the military-political. Since Communist military strategic force was always intended to be political as well as military, in areas where Communist military control predominated, that control was consolidated, or made two-dimensional, by the use of political techniques designed to organize the entire population. In areas not controlled by the Communists, operations in the third dimension provided the key to subversion of the morale of Nationalist military units and often created a decisive adjunct to military operations conducted in the Euclidean plane.

Closely related to, and in part deriving from, the concept of force in any strategic system is the pattern of strategic direction. The most important principle of the Communist operational system after 1947, by which we may evaluate the uniqueness of the offensive strategy and assess its structure, was extensive emphasis on encirclement. In fact, it would not be extravagant to assert that the operational system of Chinese Communist revolutionary warfare between 1947 and 1949 *was* encirclement. Viewing in this light the three-stage pattern already analyzed, disconnection may be viewed merely as a necessary prelude to encirclement; annihilation, as the logical culmination.

Two general observations may be made regarding the nature and use of encirclement in the Chinese Communist strategic system. First, extensive use of encirclement serves as a criterion whereby that system may be distinguished from the pattern of military operations in modern Western warfare. Even though encirclement has naturally been utilized by Western field commanders whenever the opportunity arises, it has not been emphasized by Western theorists and has seldom been a basic characteristic of strategic direction, as it was in the Chinese civil war. Second, the character of encirclement employed by the Communist forces in that conflict was distinctive. In Western military history, encirclement, when carried out, has generally been in the form of outflanking and envelopment: eccentric maneuver from a single point to attack the enemy's flank and rear. In the Chinese Communist system, however, envelopment was seldom used as a means of encirclement. Rather, the Communists often relied on encirclement of a more subtle nature: concentric maneuver which involved skillful coordination of several forces and of base areas in the enemy rear.

The reason for extensive use of encirclement on the offensive was

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much the same as for its use in counter-offensive operations: in a situation in which one side has a dimensional advantage over the other, encirclement is an effective means of annihilation. An additional impetus to the employment of encirclement was given by Nationalist inflexibility and relative immobility, traits admirably illustrated by Chiang Kai-shek's decision to fight the Huai-Hai battle around Hsuchow, a commitment which not surprisingly resulted in a Nationalist debacle.[36] A final reason for extensive use of offensive encirclement lay in the virtually unlimited space in which the Communists operated militarily: true encirclement can seldom materialize in a topographically limited theater of operations.

Despite the advantageous position in which the Chinese Communists found themselves between 1946 and 1949 as a result of their flexible and realistic strategic doctrine and especially of their use of two-dimensional military force, potentiality, as Mao Tse-tung often reminds his readers, is not actuality. Extensive and unconventional use of encirclement was particularly notable because of the ability of the Communist top commanders to realize encirclement in the field as well as on the map. The rareness of that ability is emphasized by Clausewitz in a critique of base-oriented theorists. "The idea of a base is a real necessity," he wrote, "but to make such a use of it is completely inadmissible and could not but lead . . . theorists into a direction opposed to by common sense, namely, to a belief in the decisive effect of the enveloping form of attack."[37] Although Communist superiority in converting theory to practice stemmed in part from the ineptness of their opponents, it was also based upon the professional skill and imaginative leadership of the top Communist military commanders.

Military Leadership

Theory, as every good Marxist-Leninist knows, is not a dogma but a guide to action. The key to action lies in leadership. It is therefore essential to assess the careers and character of the individuals who designed and implemented Communist military strategy in the pre-1949 period in China.

[36] See O. Edmund Clubb, "Chiang Kai-shek's Waterloo: The Battle of the Hwai-Hai," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXV (1956), 389-99.

[37] *On War*, I, 99.

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Although the hierarchy in the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party during the late nineteen-thirties and early forties remains ambiguous, there is little question but that after 1935 Mao Tse-tung was the principal articulator of long-range military policy.[38] Mao's first major statement on military doctrine during the 1935-49 period was "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," delivered as a series of lectures at the Red Army Academy in Shensi in December 1935. Revised and published in December 1936, that essay synthesized the experiences of the Kiangsi period and formulated the basic framework for a cyclical strategy of retreat and counter-offensive. Less than a year after the Japanese invasion of China began in the summer of 1937, Mao produced two important statements on military doctrine, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan" and "On Protracted War." These essays were designed to apply the military and political methodology of the Communists to Chinese national strategy in the Sino-Japanese War. Neither work had significant influence on Nationalist policy or planning, but both were widely circulated in Communist base areas behind Japanese lines. Another work, "'Problems of War and Strategy," released in November 1938, was a brief recapitulation of the other two analyses. While Mao's pronouncements on strategy became briefer and less theoretical after the Japanese surrender in 1945, several nevertheless deserve to be ranked with his major writings dealing with general direction of armies in the field. These include "Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One" (September 1946), the contents of which are revealed by its title; "Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation" (September 1947); and portions of "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (December 1947), which hailed a major turning point in the civil war against the Nationalists.[39]

Mao Tse-tung's contributions to the theory and practice of the art

[38] A concise summary of Mao Tse-tung's pre-1949 career is given by Jerome Ch'en. Howard L. Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung: The Lacquered Image," *The China Quarterly*, No. 16 (Oct.-Dec. 1963), 1-55, includes a brief section on Mao's military thought and cites pertinent bibliography. See also Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York, 1963), especially 193-211.

[39] A convenient handbook summarizing Mao's statements is *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1963), which contains official English translations of twenty-nine important articles, speeches, and directives of the period from October 1928 to April 1949.

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of war must be assessed within the framework of two limiting elements. First, Mao had no professional military training, never commanded troops in the field, and never held military rank.[40] Second, a distinguishing characteristic of Mao's military experience and writing lies in their situational specificity: they were restricted to a Chinese insurgent-counterinsurgent situation with a specifically Chinese structure and environment. For these reasons, Mao's military concepts must be evaluated by criteria different from those used in appraisal of writers on general military theory such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, or others. Given that Mao Tse-tung was neither field commander nor military philosopher, neither tactician nor logician, his genius lay in operational strategy: in approaching military operations from the strategic viewpoint by elucidating the patterns and trends inherent in a given situation and in formulating general lines for its favorable development.

As he came to dominate the top political command of the Chinese Communist party, Mao was also notably successful in maintaining the stability of its top military command. In this regard, he clearly surpassed his principal Chinese antagonist, Chiang Kai-shek, who, despite professional military training and experience, was unable to develop and sustain unity, or even cooperation, among senior Nationalist military commanders. Among Mao's associates, the most generally respected professional soldier was Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communist forces throughout the period from 1935 to 1949.[41] Since Chu Teh, however, did not command troops after about 1938, biographical appraisal of the Communist

[40] Although Mao Tse-tung has been involved with war during most of his adult life, he has remained essentially a civilian. An interesting comparison might be drawn with the case of Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese commander in chief, who is roughly twenty years Mao's junior. See the biographical profile of Giap by Bernard B. Fall in the American facsimile edition of Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York, 1962), xxix-xl and Max Clos, "The Strategist behind the Vietcong," New York *Times Magazine*, Aug. 16, 1964.

[41] Agnes Smedley, *The Great Road: the Life and Times of Chu Teh* (New York, 1956), is an uneven, uncritical, and incomplete biography, based largely on a series of interviews conducted by Miss Smedley in Shensi in 1937. In addition to several statements on guerrilla warfare doctrine in the 1937-38 period, Chu Teh presented the major military report at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1945. An English version is available: *The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas* (Peking, 1952; rev. ed., 1962).

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top command during the pre-1949 period may focus on a small group of immediate subordinates.[42] Two of these, Ch'en Yi and Lin Piao, may be mentioned in brief detail.

Ch'en Yi began life as a student in Szechwan province and was introduced to political radicalism in France, where he spent the years from 1919 to 1921 under a work-study program sponsored by veteran Kuomintang leaders with European connections. Deported from France, he returned to China and went to Peking, where he joined the Communist party and studied for two years at the Sino-French University. After a period at Canton as a political instructor at the Whampoa Military Academy, he participated in the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 as a political officer. After the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Ch'en Yi was one of the early recruits to join the Chu-Mao nucleus in the Kiangsi countryside, where he gained practical military experience. When the main body of the Communist forces began the Long March late in 1934, Ch'en Yi was left behind to cover the retreat and to attempt to develop guerrilla operations. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Communist units under his command were incorporated into the Nationalist forces. After a clash with the Nationalists in January 1941, his forces were reorganized at Yenan's direction as Communist regular divisions and began to carry out programs similar to those conducted by the Eighth Route Army in north China. Between 1941 and 1945 this so-called New Fourth Army developed territorial bases in east and central China that were later of great importance to the Communists. In 1946 Ch'en Yi moved to Shantung, where he was known as a master of quick retreats and surprise reappearances. In late 1948 he exercised general command of the Communist armies committed in the Huai-Hai engagement, which resulted in a major victory for the Communists and opened the way for the advance of his Third Field Army to Shanghai. It is noteworthy that that key battle took place in areas of northern Kiangsu and Anhwei on terrain

[42] Nine individuals may be identified: Ch'en Keng (1903-61), Ch'en Yi (1901-), Ho Lung (1896-), Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien (1902-), Lin Piao (1908-), Liu Po-ch'eng (1892-), Nieh Jung-chen (1899-), P'eng Te-huai (1898-), Su Yu (1908-). On P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, and Ch'en Yi, see Gene Z. Hanrahan, "Red China's Three Top Field Commanders," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XXXVI (1952), 54-61. A later analysis of the background of the high command is given by S. M. Chiu, "Chinese Communist Military Leadership," *Military Review*, XXXIX (1960), 59-66.

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familiar to Ch'en Yi from experience gained during the Japanese war years.[43]

Lin Piao had more military training than Ch'en Yi, though far less than Western general officers normally receive. A keen student at the Whampoa Military Academy headed by Chiang Kai-shek in 1925-26, Lin served while still in his teens as a company commander in the National Revolutionary Army on the Northern Expedition. After the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, he was one of the first trained officers to join the refugee forces of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung in the Kiangsi hinterland. He led the First Army Corps during the Kiangsi soviet period and on the Long March. Named to command the 115th division of the Eighth Route Army in 1937, Lin Piao quickly scored an impressive victory against the invading Japanese in a sharp, well-executed engagement which attracted national attention. Wounded in combat in 1938, he was sent to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. After his return to China in 1942, Lin was assigned to Yenan to supervise the training of Communist infantry commanders. There he was primarily concerned with practical matters: principles of command, movement of troops, weapons doctrine, and the use of weapons, including rifle, bayonet, mortar, and hand grenade. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Lin was immediately ordered to the critical Manchurian theater of operations, where he planned and conducted one of the most decisive campaigns of the Chinese civil war. He built and trained units, in great part recruited locally, into the crack Fourth Field Army, which established Communist control of Manchuria, marched in twelve months across the entire country to occupy south China and Hainan Island, and then withdrew to Manchuria to form the spearhead of Chinese Communist forces committed in the Korean war in 1950. Lin Piao was one of the outstanding Chinese commanders of the period, combining several of the essential attributes of a master of the indirect approach: ability both in planning and in improvisation, skill in strategem, and a personality inspiring confidence.[44]

[43] Ch'en Yi became minister of foreign affairs at Peking in 1958, succeeding Chou En-lai. He has been a member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party since 1956.

[44] Lin Piao was named minister of national defense at Peking in 1959, replacing P'eng Te-huai. Lin is now the top-ranking military figure in Peking. See Ralph L. Powell, "The Military Affairs Committee and Party Control of the Military in China," *Asian Survey*, III (1963), 347-56.

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In summary, analysis of the careers of the senior Communist commanders of the insurgent period indicates that, while there was individuality of style and of operation, the group nevertheless shared several common traits. Notable among these were durability, flexibility, experience, and dedication.

In the pre-1949 period, the nine men enumerated above were all in the prime of life. In 1937 their average age was just over thirty-six. Only two were then over forty: Liu Po-ch'eng, forty-five, and Ho Lung, forty, whereas Lin Piao and Su Yu were only twenty-nine.[45] By their survival, whether of the Nationalist encirclement campaigns in Kiangsi, the Long March, or both, the men had created an aura of personal indestructibility. While the popular legends attributed to individual commanders, notably to Liu Po-ch'eng and Ho Lung, comparing their prowess in battle to that of the dragon or the tiger, were obviously apocryphal, the fact remains that the nine were durable men endowed with the stamina and energy necessary to lead troops in the field and—with the single exception of Ch'en Keng—to survive to the present.[46]

While physical and psychological durability are required to win a protracted war, these characteristics in themselves are insufficient to ensure victory. As important was the distinctive combination of objectivity and flexibility which permitted the Communist commanders to evaluate situations quickly and to act decisively in accordance with their evaluations. In practice, Chinese Communist objectivity often did not conform to conventional Western standards. The rejection of the importance of fixed strategic points, in the sense discussed above, was an instance of Communist pragmatism: strategic points were irrelevant to the realities of insurgent warfare as conceived and waged by the Communist commanders. At the same time, in contrast to their Japanese and Nationalist opponents, the Communists were flexible in the selection of strategies and alert to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. In Manchuria in early 1948, for example, when the Nationalists airlifted troops from Kirin and Changchun to reinforce the defense of the beleaguered city

[45] Colonel George Washington was forty-three when he assumed command of the Continental Army at Cambridge in July 1775.

[46] Ch'en Keng, who later served as deputy commander under P'eng Te-huai of the Chinese Communist forces which fought in Korea from 1950 to 1953, died in March 1961 of a heart ailment.

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of Mukden, Lin Piao reacted smartly to the new situation, shifted his forces northward, and brought Ssupingkai under attack. In the important campaigns of 1947 and 1948, Ch'en Yi, Liu Po-ch'eng, and Ch'en Keng demonstrated great flexibility in maintaining the horizontal band of territory with which the Communists were able effectively to interdict ground communications which might have linked Nationalist units to the north with those in central China. Indeed, during the decisive year 1949, the Communist commanders were forced to show constant flexibility in the face of the unexpectedly rapid collapse of Nationalist resistance and morale.

The ability of the Communist commanders to adapt military operations to circumstances was due in part to their years of practical experience in the Chinese countryside. For most of the commanders listed above, this experience had included long continuity of command locale. Each was thoroughly familiar with the geography, population, and problems of his area: Liu Po-ch'eng and Ch'en Keng in central China north of the Yangtze; Ch'en Yi and Su Yu in the lower Yangtze valley and Shantung; Nieh Jung-chen in north China. This practical experience more than compensated for lack of formal military education. Unfettered by instructions about previous and irrelevant wars, the nine were capable of rational response to existing and evolving circumstances.

In his military writings, Mao Tse-tung has implied that the effectiveness of a military command structure depends not only on the capabilities of its individual members but also on their cohesion. The nine men considered here were dedicated men: to the Chinese Communist party, and to common beliefs, goals, and aspirations. In addition, they were dedicated, unlike some of their Nationalist counterparts, to success as a group. As a result, mutual confidence encouraged maximal use of the talents of each of the nine. Increasingly during the period after 1937, as their own growing power and the ineptness of their opponents spurred Communist confidence, dedication was transmuted into pride, a key element in all group consciousness and an essential ingredient in the functioning of a military organization.

Communist victory, Mao Tse-tung to the contrary, was not inevitable in China. Nor could the stability required for implementation of social theory and national planning have been implemented by

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any political coterie without military force. In the end, Chinese Communist insurgent warfare satisfied the essential requirement of the profession of arms, as discussed by Lieutenant-General Sir John Hackett in his booklet on that subject. It was the Communists who provided "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem."[47] If by 1949 the stage was set for Communist confrontation with China's massive and refractory problems of development, that achievement was due in no small measure to the strategy and to the leadership which, through the years in the countryside, had influenced the "probabilities of success in battle" for Mao Tse-tung's forces.

[47] Lieutenant-General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London, n.d.), 3.

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Policy-Making in Public Welfare: The 1962 Amendments*

CHARLES E. GILBERT
Swarthmore College

The federal welfare amendments of 1962 were hailed by many as a fundamental change. The chief reason for this was their acceptance of social work doctrine about the need for "services" in public assistance. The amendments' history illustrates the difficult substantive issues in that program as well as the effects of its political, governmental, and professional contexts. In the present study the influence of professionalism is emphasized.

Public assistance is affected by several endemic tensions: between central and decentralized control in the federal system; between comprehensive and narrowly categorical programs; between the formal requirements of public administration and the informal tradition of professional social work; between emphasis on personal independence and agency paternalism in eligibility determination and rendering of "services"; and, fundamentally, between stringency and liberality in public attitudes and administrative practices toward the poor. Most of these dilemmas are closely related; none of them is easily resolved.

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Half a century ago public outdoor relief was generally criticized for inefficiency, favoritism, and encouragement of dependency. Later, state "pensions"—the precursors of federal public assistance—were widely resisted in private welfare circles. Stringency-liberality and paternalism-independence were difficult tensions in the Charity Organization Movement, which uneasily balanced discipline and sympathy, Manchester individualism and idealistic philanthropy, class condescension and human understanding.[1] No doubt popular attitudes toward public assistance today reflect still older puritanical and aristocratic attitudes as well as modern status anxieties. But the sheer recency of social welfare's governmental role and its traditional affiliation with the police power surely contribute to its burden of public ambivalence, especially around the issue of a "right" to assistance.

In legal perspective the "right" to assistance is strictly nonexistent. The statutory "fair hearing" provision does not require judicial review, and the doctrine of "privilege" together with the police power philosophy temper judicial intervention.[2] Yet some social work scholars have promoted the notion of a right to assistance because they have supposed it would diminish psychological dependency and stimulate more adequate grants.[3] The idea of a "right to assistance," in its limited, administrative sense, is heavily emphasized by the federal agency. So is the rendering of "services," which *may be* antithetical. This is one problem implicit in the 1962 amendments.

The tension between rights and services was brilliantly analyzed in 1957 by Alan Keith-Lucas in his administrative study, *Decisions about People in Need*.[4] Keith-Lucas found that federal and state statutes contained only primitive, ineffective standards for welfare administrators, who therefore responded to "public

[1] See, for example, Frank B. Watson, *The Charity Organization Movement in the United States* (New York, 1922) and Amos Warner, Stuart A. Queen, and Ernest B. Harper, *American Charities and Social Work* (3rd ed., New York, 1930).

[2] Daniel R. Mandelker, "A Legal Perspective on Public Assistance," *Social Service Review*, XXXI (1957), 418, and "Judicial Review in General Assistance," *Journal of Public Law*, VI (1957), 100; A. D. Smith, "Public Assistance as a Social Obligation," *Harvard Law Review*, LXIIII (1949), 266.

[3] See especially Edith Abbott, *Public Assistance* (Chicago, 1940).

[4] Alan Keith-Lucas, *Decisions About People in Need* (Chapel Hill, 1957).

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opinion" informally, locally, and largely through the "law of anticipated reactions." This made for wide interagency variation and unequal treatment of individuals. Social work as a discipline provided ambivalent guidance between two casework values of "self-determination" and "adjustment." Caseworkers, Keith-Lucas inferred, were finally reliant on a vague, if commendable, professional ethic and the frequently competing needs of their own personalities in the "treatment" of assistance applicants and recipients. Supervisory decisions were largely anticipatory reactions to local publics. Analysis of a sample of casework records from two counties in two Southern states with different administrative arrangements and political traditions confirmed Keith-Lucas' expectations based on statutes, regulations, and professional literature: county policies differed significantly without much control by the state frameworks; and caseworker practices differed within each county revealing, on the record, personalities in action.

To overcome the program's role conflicts Keith-Lucas proposed that Congress create a legislative "right" to public assistance; that administrative regulations separate financial aid from "services" and reserve the latter unless specifically requested by recipients; and that welfare workers adopt a professional ethic affirming the priority of "self-determination" over "adjustment." Although the social work profession had long stressed simple eligibility standards and adequate grants, Keith-Lucas suggested that this "rights" policy was compromised in practice by collateral emphasis on "services." His strong preference for "self-determination" over "adjustment" aligned him on the minority side of the social work profession's main doctrinal division between "functionalism" and "social diagnosis." Keith-Lucas himself noted that most authors favoring a "rights" approach were lawyers.

I

Federal policy took a different turn from that advocated by Keith-Lucas. As he wrote, Congress adopted the 1956 social security amendments.[5] Jacobus tenBroek described them as the most sig-

[5] U.S., *Statutes at Large*, LXX, 807.

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nificant since 1935, as conferring an independent stature on public assistance by adding to it new legislative definitions of purpose (self-care, self-support, and strengthening family life) designed to support "social services," and as enacting the views of the HEW Department and the social work profession.[6] At the same time tenBroek uttered a formalistic warning against excessive zeal in pressing services on recipients. Actually, the 1956 amendments had little effect on the rendering of services; but emphasis on services steadily increased in federal policy, culminating in the 1962 amendments, which all but mandate them. The latter amendments have been described professionally as "social work's response to Newburgh . . . . they shared a basic premise with the proponents of the Newburgh plan; namely, the assumption that the preferred address to the problem of economic dependency was to intervene in the life of the individual family."[7] The amendments did not enunciate "rights," nor did they increase financial aid or alter the grant formula in the most controversial Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) (now Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]) category, nor did they encourage a merger of this category (as they did the others) or elevate general assistance to federal status. They did, however, somewhat broaden AFDC in the direction of general assistance (a step first taken, temporarily, in 1961), and they sought to integrate it with child welfare programs. On balance, the amendments seemed to emphasize *services;* those sought to be encouraged by a special grant-in-aid ratio were to be prescribed by the federal administration.[8]

"Services" did not specifically appear in the Social Security law until 1956, nor were they implicit in the original act.[9] The services

[6] Jacobus tenBroek, "The 1956 Amendments . . . ," *Journal of Public Law,* VI (1957), 123.

[7] Bertram M. Beck, "Casework as a Method: A Reassessment," *Social Work Forum* (New York, 1964). The author was associate executive director of the National Association of Social Workers.

[8] For a general discussion of substance and history, see Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962," *Public Welfare,* XX (1962), 191.

[9] It *might* be argued that *only* financial aid was intended, on the prevailing model of state "pensions," and because assistance was closely coupled with

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philosophy entered the program early, however, through the professional social workers who moved from private to public employment in the Depression, first in FERA and later, mostly at supervisory levels, in the program that became known as "public welfare."[10] Early professional publications emphasized "individualization" in eligibility determination and extension of services in ways as consistent as possible with existing casework techniques.[11] Eligibility determination was the logical point of entry for casework because, short of an all-out "rights" program, it does entail casework of some sort.

Eligibility has two aspects. One is categorical: is an applicant aged, disabled, or otherwise dependent within the meaning of the statutes, including state qualifications like "suitable home," "relatives' responsibility," and residence? The other aspect is financial: how much money is required? The latter in turn has two elements: needs and resources. Decisions about subsistence needs, while somewhat arbitrary, can be broadly standardized; but calculation of the applicant's available resources is less simple. Where standards of eligibility are complex and funds are strictly limited, detailed "individualization" is a way of assuring substantial (rather than purely formal) equality of treatment—yet such individualization obviously opens the door to "maternalism" and personal discrimination. The most straightforward alternative—gross standardization on the "needs" side and payments high enough so that "resources" may be more or less ignored—is at the least expensive and may violate widely held norms about personal responsibility and resource allocation; it may be inconsistent with present federal legislation, which does not create "pensions"—that is, "rights" to a certain *level* of aid. Many states (toward the other extreme) have legislatively established maximum grants at

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the straight social insurance program. There is nothing about services in the House and Senate hearings of 1935, or in E. Witte, *Development of the Social Security Act* (Madison, 1962).

[10] Josephine C. Brown, *Public Relief, 1929-1939* (New York, 1940), 228 ff.

[11] See R. H. Kurtz (ed.), *The Public Assistance Worker* (New York, 1938), especially papers therein by D. W. Howard and M. E. Rich, and American Association of Schools of Social Work, *Education for the Public Social Service* (Chapel Hill, 1942).

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some stated fraction of their own administratively determined minimum standards of living, thus harshly compromising the dilemma of adequacy *versus* equity. As a lawyer once expressed it, the problem of administrative discretion is

> closely related to the legislative treatment of the classification problem. The broad discretion wielded by the agency results from the traditional practice in welfare legislation of enacting general measures which create a large class of eligibles and then appropriating funds which are insufficient to aid all those who come within the terms of the legislation.[12]

The first concrete federal incentive for provision of "services" appeared in State Letter 25 of 1943, which authorized inclusion of costs of services in state administrative expenses for federal matching.[13] In 1945, Charlotte Towle's *Common Human Needs* (written for the federal administration and circulated to the states) emphasized relational casework's role in the program, partly as a means of redressing "rigid regulations which belie man's right to assistance on the basis of need," thus neatly combining services and rights.[14] A year later the Bureau of Public Assistance published Grace Marcus' *The Nature of Service in Public Assistance Administration* with an introductory note by the director disavowing it as formal policy because in discussions "it became apparent that no single point of view exists in the general social work field or among staff of the Bureau with regard to the character of service in . . . public assistance."[15] Both Towle and Marcus sought to encourage sensitivity in eligibility determination and readiness in referral. Neither offered any specific techniques of casework or catalogue of services; they relied on professional tradition.

[12] Smith, 266.

[13] The "state letter" system dates from March 1942. On the early evolution of federal relations in the program, see Mark P. Hale, "The Process of Developing Policy for a Federal-State Grant-in-Aid Program . . . ," *Social Service Review*, XXXI (1957), 290.

[14] Charlotte Towle, *Common Human Needs* (Washington, D.C., 1945).

[15] (Washington, D.C.), Public Assistance Report No. 10, preface by Jane Hoey. Such publications continued; see Helen B. Foster, *Services in Public Assistance: The Role of the Caseworker* (Washington, D.C., 1957), Public Assistance Report No. 30.

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Although services might be mildly encouraged by fifty per cent matching of state administrative expenses, they could not be *required* without express legislation—or so agency counsel advised. In 1949, following campaign statements by President Truman promising welfare improvements, the Bureau of Public Assistance prepared amendments that would have abandoned the "categorical," approach and authorized a federal *requirement* that the states provide certain "services."[16] The resulting 1950 social security amendments did not go nearly so far, though they broadened assistance importantly, and reversed the growing imbalance with social insurance.[17] The Bureau did obtain a few lines in a House Ways and Means Committee report that denied a need for express service authorization because ample authority existed; but the report did *not* say that existing law authorized a federal *requirement*.[18]

The next step was the 1956 amendments, mentioned above. The language in their purpose clauses came from existing California law through Charles Schottland, then Social Security Commissioner and formerly head of California's public welfare. At the same time Congress specifically left provision of services optional with the states.[19] The new language did support more federal exhortation toward services, and authorized research, demonstration, and staff training grants to back it up—though Congress provided no appropriations for any of these until 1960. State Letters 296 and 299 of 1957 set out new state plan requirements for states performing

[16] Similar legislation had been introduced several times in the late nineteen-forties by Representative Forand (Democrat, Rhode Island) with encouragement from the Bureau of Public Assistance but without administration sponsorship.

[17] The program of Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled was added in 1950, together with medical vendor payments; and the formula for federal participation was made more steeply variable. Perhaps more important, OASI was strengthened, relieving the growing strain on OAA. For one of the best summary histories, see Jules Berman, "Public Assistance under the Social Security Act," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XIV (1960), 83.

[18] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Report No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 55.

[19] The amendments provided that, pursuant to the new purpose clauses, state plans should "provide a description of the services (*if any*) which the state agency makes available." (Italics added.) This language appeared in the state plan requirements of Titles I, IV, X, and XIV of the Act.

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services: definition and description of the client "problems" to receive attention and of the "services" rendered, including outside referrals and consultations, organized programs (like homemaker, day care), and "community planning."

Two issues arose in the writing of these state letters. One was the administrative difficulty of defining problems and services so clearly as to satisfy federal uniformity and accounting requirements while facilitating "individualization" and professional work. The other was the moral danger of imposing services on clients. On the first point federal policy began by calling attention to the difficulty, though State Letter 299 provided a list of problems (personal, social, financial, physical, and so forth) common in the various assistance categories. "Services" were not federally defined except in terms of the organization or profession providing them: the basic method of "individualized" service was casework, or "the purposeful use of the worker's relationship with the individual . . . to help him deal constructively with his needs and problems."[20] At the same time the *Federal Handbook of Public Assistance Administration* sought to make clear that "the interest and desire of the applicant or recipient for help with his problems are basic to helping him effectively, and therefore the individual's freedom of choice in accepting or rejecting agency proffers of service is essential."[21]

The 1956 amendments did not lead to general extension of services in the states, although they encouraged some experiments and demonstrations and increased professional interest in services.[22] The experiments (some under way before 1956) took the form of caseload review and classification, with more intensive casework, referral, and services aimed either at "self-support" or at "strengthening family life."[23] (The problems of compatibility of these objectives and methodology of the experiments are noted below.)

[20] State Letter 296, April 4, 1957, Sec. 4340.

[21] As incorporated in *ibid.*, Sec. 4340.

[22] See Eunice Minton, "The Relationships of State Commitments to the Progressive Framework of the Social Services Policies," Washington, D.C., HEW, Bureau of Family Services, mimeographed, July 1964.

[23] See those cited in a memorandum by Winifred Bell in U. S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, *Hearings on Public Welfare Amendments of 1962* (Washington, D.C., 1962), 371 ff. and various reports published in *Public Welfare* in recent years.

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The attempt in the 1962 amendments, as proposed to Congress, to *require* state services with federal definitions and financial incentives can be viewed as an outgrowth of the post-1956 experiments. But social and political change were more important factors.

Among the broadly "social" factors (one cannot include them all) was secular change in caseload characteristics. In 1935 Old Age Assistance received far more legislative attention than Aid to Dependent Children: OAA recipients far outnumbered those in ADC; and an estimated five-sixths of ADC mothers were widows.[24] After 1950 the national OAA caseload began to decline and eventually fell below ADC (in total cases; not families), which rapidly increased from the mid-nineteen-fifties while the character of its caseload continued to change. Some measure of the change appears in comparison of two Chapel Hill studies of ADC for the American Public Welfare Association: Gordon W. Blackwell and Raymond F. Gould's *Future Citizens All* (1952), on which Keith-Lucas relied heavily for generalizations; and M. Elaine Burgess and Daniel O. Price's *An American Dependency Challenge* (1963).[25] In light of the "problem family" concept and the danger of a permanent, dependent subculture, casework and community prerogative seemed to many to outweigh the merits of laissez-faire assistance.[26] The same factors, and perhaps some backlash from post-1954 desegregation attempts, brought growing opprobrium on the program, culminating in the "suitable home" confrontations between Louisiana, Michigan, and the federal government in 1959-60 and in the Newburgh imbroglio of 1961.[27] These forces put public welfare and especially federal enforcement on the defensive and made

[24] Paul H. Douglas, *Social Security in the United States* (New York, 1936), 186.

[25] Published by American Public Welfare Association, Chicago, 1952 and 1963 respectively.

[26] See, for example, Greenleigh Associates, Inc., *Facts, Fallacies, and the Future: A Study of the Aid to Dependent Children Program of Cook County, Illinois* (New York, 1960); M. Orshansky, "Children of the Poor," *Social Security Bulletin* XXVI (1963), 3; R. H. Mugge, "Aid to Dependent Children . . . ," *ibid.*, XXVI (1963), 3. On the "problem family" concept, see Bradley Buell, *et al.*, *Community Planning for Human Services* (New York, 1962); L. L. Geismar, "The Multiproblem Family . . . ," *Social Welfare Forum* (New York, 1960), 166; Kermit Wiltse, "Aid to Dependent Children . . . ," *ibid.*, 218.

[27] The "suitable home" issue involved Louisiana's adoption of an eligibility standard of a "suitable home" and the dropping of some twenty-five per cent

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tactically attractive the counter-argument that the *constructive* approach to dependency lay in trained staff and rehabilitative services —an argument potentially (though not necessarily) threatening to recipients' "rights" from the other side. Meantime, the federal administration rapidly stepped up communications to the states: collection and circulation of studies and reports on caseload characteristics, demonstration projects, and "public"—that is, journalistic—reactions to welfare programs.

Thus, in social, political, and administrative context the 1962 "service" amendments seemed a logical response and consistent development. Still, there was another policy concern, more nearly in the "rights" tradition, about broadening the federal categories and increasing grants. Such, in sum, were the main recommendations of the Advisory Council on Public Assistance created by Congress in 1958 and reporting in 1960: it favored federal aid to general assistance, equalizing treatment among categories or abolishing categories altogether, increasing federal payments on a more steeply equalizing interstate formula, and extending some federal control over state grant standards.[28] Such policies were favored by some in the federal bureaucracy and social welfare profession who would have accorded them higher priority than services. Not all thought the two approaches incompatible; but some did, arguing that talk of services distracted attention from inadequacy of grants, and that talk of "relational" casework opened the door to paternalism, whereas "commonsense" services like day care, legal aid, literacy and vocational training, and home economics would be more useful.

Those emphasizing a "rights" approach have generally argued that to resolve the dilemmas around stringency-adequacy, discrimination-equality, paternalism-independence, informality-formality

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of ADC cases from the rolls on this account. Ultimately, the federal government held a hearing; and a federal ruling against such a standard was later issued. The incident is described in E. Wickenden and W. Bell, *Public Welfare: Time for a Change* (New York, 1961) and especially in W. Bell, *Rejected Families: A Study of "Suitable Home" Policies in Aid to Dependent Children* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University School of Social Work, August 1964).

[28] Advisory Council on Public Assistance, *Public Assistance* (Washington, D.C., 1961).

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it would be necessary—for both fiscal and administrative reasons —to enlarge the federal role in the program toward more redistribution and firmer standards. Many of this persuasion also criticized a lack of federal rigor in review of state practices like "suitable home" and "relatives' responsibility," which seemed to be administered discriminatively, in violation of federal "uniformity" regulations. Wickenden and Bell wrote of the Louisiana issue and its resolution: "The conclusion was inescapable that however much Louisiana's policy had departed from sound social welfare policy and the basic protection due all children, the federal agency had either lacked or failed to utilize its authority to prevent it or ameliorate its impact on individual children."[29]

Winifred Bell's recent study of the suitable home problem adds that the "Fleming Ruling" (disallowing "suitable home" requirements) accomplished almost nothing because states simply turned to such other vague and discriminatory tests as "employability."[30] Bell's study bears comparison with Keith-Lucas', for its concern is much the same but its diagnosis is different. In essence, Bell maintains that, while the suitable home condition came from professional doctrine, the modern problem is administrative:

> In defining eligibility for specific programs there is a premium on simple, objective criteria. . . . When public accountability requires a federal agency to evaluate the accuracy of a decision from which it is far removed in space and time, the need for something precise to measure against becomes compelling. . . . However, with wearisome repetition studies revealed that the (state) "suitable home" policies continued to be vague and imprecise.[31]

Thus Bell emphasizes administrative ambiguity rather than professional ambivalence, and points to the absence of trained staff in

[29] Wickenden and Bell, 2. Federal officials in the Division of Administrative Review, Bureau of Family Services, do not accept this interpretation. Whereas Winifred Bell had argued in her study of "suitable home" requirements that federal officials had already accepted a statute identical to Louisiana's in Mississippi, the officials concerned say they already were carefully watching actual Mississippi practices under the statute. They distinguish Louisiana's practice, in which all ADC recipients were made to reapply for assistance, in which process more than a quarter of the caseload was struck off the rolls.

[30] *Ibid.*, Chap. 6.

[31] *Ibid.*, 60-61.

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most public welfare agencies. The very *lack* of professionalism in public welfare is an important point; from study of the program at the local level it appears that trained professionals may be able to strike sophisticated balances between the tensions in the program and in professional doctrine, but that untrained caseworkers are likely to lean toward one extreme or another. If, as appears, the practical antinomies of professional doctrine are becoming more evident, then *professional* services may be less of a threat to "rights" than are required services defined professionally but rendered by untrained staff less alert to the tensions of theory and practice. Then the question is whether administrative regulations and formal accountability serve the purpose better than professional training, techniques, and ethics.

In any event, some professionals felt that federalism had failed of both fiscal redistribution and administrative uniformity, of adequacy and equity.

II

The growing journalistic and professional concern about public welfare and the battles of Louisiana and Newburgh roughly coincided with a change of national administration. The chairman of President-elect Kennedy's Task Force on Health and Social Security was Wilbur Cohen, whose federal career in the welfare field began in 1935 and terminated temporarily in 1956. Cohen soon became Assistant Secretary (for legislation) of HEW, and his role in the 1962 amendments (as in those of 1950 and 1956) can hardly be overemphasized. His Task Force report leaned toward the services approach. While in principle favoring federal aid for all needy persons, its single legislative proposal in this field was extension of ADC benefits to children of unemployed parents (which became law in 1961). Its proposals for social service were administrative (rather than legislative):

> . . . a Family and Child Welfare Services plan which would bring together in one program the resources of Federal aid to the States under the Social Security Act for assistance and services to needy families and children and community social services in such areas as juvenile delin-

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quency prevention, services to the aging, and other related programs designed to strengthen community life.[32]

With the change of administration HEW adopted two new emphases in policy-making. One was increased involvement of public and private welfare's professional leaders in studies of federal policy and administration. The inquiry by Wickenden and Bell referred to above was partly a survey of professional reactions to changes in policy and organization proposed by the authors. Soon afterward a so-called "Ad Hoc Committee" of two dozen professional leaders was formed to suggest policy changes. Although formally independent of HEW and financed by a private foundation, both studies were closely interconnected in their personnel; and Wilbur Cohen was intimately connected with both through personal acquaintance and his role in their creation.[33] When the two reports appeared in the fall of 1961 they bespoke a tenuous professional consensus arrived at not so much spontaneously as in reaction to the current Newburgh controversy and in response to the tactical sense of a few leaders.

The Wickenden-Bell study revealed divergent professional leanings between more emphasis on liberal grants and eligibility on one hand and provision of services on the other. The Ad Hoc Committee implicitly accepted the "services" approach as its frame of reference, but disagreed about such specific proposals affecting re-

[32] The Task Force Report is printed in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, *Hearings on Nominations of John M. Leddy . . . and Wilbur J. Cohen, March 22-23, 1961* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1961), 86 ff. Its content was heavily conditioned by President-elect Kennedy's instruction to concentrate on immediate legislative proposals.

[33] See Wickenden and Bell. The Ad Hoc Committee report and the Wyman report on federal administration appear in U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, *Hearings on Public Welfare Amendments of 1962* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1962), 65ff. Cohen was instrumental in setting up the Wickenden-Bell study at the New York School of Social Work. The Ad Hoc Committee was almost an accident: Secretary Ribicoff began it offhandedly when a group from the National Association of Social Workers waited on him to offer assistance, as they normally do with new secretaries. One of the party was an acquaintance of Ribicoff's from Connecticut; and it appears that the Secretary spontaneously suggested that the group be enlarged and advise him about policy changes. After that the details of constitution and financing were worked out and Cohen kept in close touch with the group.

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cipient "rights" and private agency interests as community work and training, protective payments, and foster care payments. Newburgh's effect on the committee's deliberations was explicit: services, research, and training were means of countering the assertion that fraud and laxity in public welfare stemmed from professional social work with the more realistic argument that they reflected insufficient professionalism.[34] Under pressure to produce tangible, passable legislation the Ad Hoc Committee reluctantly did so, while still attempting the overall review of program for which it had much more enthusiasm.

After detailed review of all the foundation-sponsored studies by a departmental task force, which elaborately evaluated pros and cons and wrote position papers, most of the Ad Hoc Committee's proposals were translated by the department into draft legislation. They were probably more of a professional compromise than a consensus. There were divergent views within the department and among the outside professionals, perhaps especially between public and private institutions. Those leaders, including Wilbur Cohen, most sensitive to public reactions and political tactics carried the day and this, rather than steady historical development, seems to have been decisive. Nonetheless, the procedure lent professional sponsorship to the 1962 amendments.

The second emphasis in policy-making was an attempt to proceed administratively, without legislation if necessary. In the fall of 1961 a memorandum from Secretary Ribicoff directed a series of administrative steps which led immediately to new state requirements about location of deserting partners, control of recipient fraud, programs of staff training, and certain protective services for dependent children.[35] And on January 3, 1962, State Letter 549 transmitted *draft* requirements for social services, caseload standards, coordination of public assistance and child welfare for specified types of "problem" ADC families. These requirements were not finalized until after passage of the 1962 amendments, when they served as interim standards, later extended in definitive

[34] Some of these comments are based on examination of transcripts of the final meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

[35] *Hearings on Public Welfare Amendments of 1962*, 158 ff.

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regulations. At the time, their function was both experimental and tactical: to test the practicability of writing and interpreting detailed regulations on this subject and sample state reactions to them; and to pose the threat of federal action even in the absence of legislation, since some officials (not including departmental counsel) believed it to be legally feasible. For both reasons the new regulations went through repeated drafts in the fall of 1961, which fact was carefully advertised to the states together with that of the legislative drafting. In general, the reaction of state administrators was affirmative—though a few resisted, citing the "if any" language in existing law.[36]

III

The 1962 amendments are too technical for detailed review. Their major provisions are the separation of "services" from "administrative expenses" with the former matched at seventy-five per cent in approved state plans as against fifty per cent for the latter; authority for the secretary to prescribe the services for special matching; support for services to persons not presently dependent but in danger of becoming so; mandatory coordination of child welfare and AFDC and extension of the former to all counties by 1975; a broader definition of child welfare and specific emphasis on day care facilities; requirement of a "social study and plan for services" for every child under AFDC; the broadening of AFDC to take in *both* parents (if on the premises) as well as families (with children) affected by unemployment; permission for states to combine the three "adult" categories into one; special staff training and demonstration project grants to the states; and several technical amendments of ADC practice, including "protective payments" in cases of parental neglect, foster care payments to institutions (a means of sectarian support), and "community work and training" programs for unemployed parents. Thus, the amendments were a mixed bag, both as proposed to Congress and as adopted. Some of their professional supporters stressed their progression toward a more comprehensive public welfare structure; others remarked

[36] There is a summary of state administrators' reactions in *ibid.*, 297 ff.; but my own statement rests on interviews with federal officials as well.

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their concessions to local opinion in the amendments of ADC practice. But the heaviest emphasis during congressional consideration and later, in explanations to the states, was placed on the value of services, especially to the ends of "prevention and rehabilitation," and particularly for AFDC families—those at the center of public controversy.[37]

For the most part the administration, after careful soundings and calculations, got what it asked of Congress. The influential Ways and Means and Finance Committees handle social security legislation. Floor debate in the House was virtually foreclosed by a restrictive rule, and Senate discussion was almost totally devoted to attempts to add a "medicare" amendment. In two perennially sensitive areas Congress—chiefly the committees—made changes. One was federal relations: here the administration had sought authority to *require* services of states as a condition of any federal matching; this provision passed the House, but not Senator Harry Byrd's Senate Finance Committee. It was Byrd who in 1935 had drawn the financial teeth of public assistance by resisting provision for a federally established minimum grant standard; in 1962 he resisted an absolute services requirement, and Senator Kerr proposed instead that services be matched at seventy-five per cent (as proposed) but that administrative matching be reduced from fifty to twenty-five per cent for failure to provide services.[38] In this form the bill was reported—which is of interest because it provided a sliding scale of sanctions and incentives which some felt would enhance federal control more than the cumbersome all-or-nothing provision that is characteristic of federal grants. On the floor further compromise seemed necessary and the fifty to seventy-five per cent scale was adopted.[39] This scale offered an incentive for services, but no negative sanction for not providing them. Though the administration failed to close completely the "if any" language of

[37] *Ibid.*, 63 ff; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, *Hearings on Public Assistance Act of 1962* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1962), 69 ff.

[38] In 1935 Senator Byrd is said to have been concerned about protection of low Southern wage levels; Douglas, 100 ff.

[39] The legislative history is dealt with in somewhat more detail in Cohen and Ball.

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1956, some federal officials in retrospect preferred the new incentive principle as something potentially more enforceable.[40]

Oddly, when the strict service requirement was cut out of the legislation there were left the "plan and services" requirement for each dependent child and the coordination of AFDC with child welfare, under which caseload standards and certain services *have* been federally required. Thus, through a quirk of legislative history, services may apparently be required absolutely in AFDC but not in other categories—a result perhaps consistent with the focus of public concern but not with the probable understanding of Congress or intent of the department (despite State Letter 549).

The other predictably sensitive issue concerned the role of voluntary operations. Here the administration asked authorization for purchase of services from private agencies, only to have the agencies themselves express misgivings in testimony, particularly to the effect that public purchase should be limited in volume to protect the autonomy of voluntary charities.[41] Sectarian differences also threatened, especially over public foster care and services to those persons verging on dependence.[42] Faced with interest group differences of opinion Congress—that is, the Ways and Means Committee—simply removed the proposal from the bill.

The 1962 amendments were generally hailed as landmark legislation, but their meaning was not entirely clear. Their very ambiguity marked a large increase in administrative discretion, as well as masking some enhancement of federal controls. The secretary's authority to prescribe the services for special matching was probably necessary: Congress could not easily define them; the hearings and debates show little interest in their definition; and existing legislative standards (self-care, self-support, strengthening family life) were broad. The problem was left to professionals. From a sit-

[40] Kerr's earlier proposal for a seventy-five to twenty-five per cent scale would have involved more of a penalty on states and might, therefore, have resulted in more services. As it stands, states lose nothing by providing *no* services since their separate administrative reimbursements are unaffected. The administration itself had, however, prepared the compromise positions it fell back on.

[41] See, especially, *Hearings on Public Welfare Amendments of 1962*, 468-73, 572-91.

[42] *Ibid.*, 572-91.

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uation in which conventional and professional welfare standards had seemed more seriously threatened than at any time since 1935 there was extracted authority both to encourage and require more conformity to those standards. The legislation—conceived by a few influential professionals—passed substantially as drafted by the department. Among its several objectives were some that appealed strongly to professionals and state administrators, others that recognized urgent public concerns.

The mix of objectives led to ambiguities and possible contradictions. One common criticism has been that the amendments were sold by the promise of mass rehabilitation and rapidly declining relief rolls; that "self-support" overcame "self-care" and "strengthening family life." Secretary Ribicoff did make statements in this vein; and Congress has since looked for quick results and questioned the program's continued expense.[43] Professionals, however, have placed their main emphasis on *prevention*—or breaking the AFDC cycle—arguing that federal categorical cases are overwhelmingly unemployable, and that the desirability of employment of many AFDC mothers is doubtful.[44] The President's original welfare message of 1962 seemed to stress both prevention and rehabilitation equally.[45] Still, potential conflict between them in the direction of "services" was a problem.

Closely allied to this problem was that of the appropriate conception of "services." Virtually nothing in the congressional hearings or reports defines them. Professional expectations appear to have ranged between poles that can be described as "sophisticated"

[43] For Secretary Ribicoff's statements, see *ibid.* Congress' impatience and expectation of reduced rolls is clearest in the House Appropriation Subcommittee on Labor and HEW in its annual appropriations hearings. For an especially well balanced discussion of rehabilitation possibilities by the director of the Bureau of Family Services in 1962, see U. S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, *Labor-HEW Appropriations* for FY 1963 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1962), I, 856.

[44] In this connection it should be noted that the heavy emphasis on day care in the 1962 legislation resulted from two opposite interests: those who saw it in terms of child welfare services, and those who wanted to facilitate employment of mothers to reduce AFDC rolls.

[45] The message of February 1, 1962, is in U.S., *Congressional Record*, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, CVIII, Part 8, 1404.

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and "commonsense" conceptions of relational casework and treatment on one hand, and concrete activities like literacy, vocational, and homemaking training plus complementary services like day care and legal aid on the other. Most conceptions clustered somewhere between the two poles. Administrative regulations might in time evolve a position on this issue—but analysis of them (below) leads to doubt on that score.

The issue of services is closely related to two other emphases of the legislation: research and demonstrations, and training. On each point critics could argue that, for political reasons, logical priorities were reversed. Thus one could maintain that existing evidence of the effect of "services" was largely impressionistic despite the demonstration projects of the nineteen-fifties—and some competent professionals acknowledge this. Some services might even increase dependence.[46] Given imprecise objectives the outcomes of "experiments" or "demonstrations" are difficult to interpret. There is some evidence of economic rehabilitation (though in most caseloads the directly employable are a small minority); but there have been few systematic checks on recidivism or controlled evaluations of technique. In casework as in psychoanalysis standards of evaluation are indirect or conditional; and existing devices for measuring "movement" are of doubtful validity.[47] The effects of services are probably easiest to measure in pragmatic, aggregate situations and more difficult with sophisticated, "individualized" services. The point is not to question the effect of services in general, but to note the absence of evidence about *types* of services and perhaps especially about the comparative outcome of services and adequate grants. New research and deomonstration sections

[46] Two recent papers by a leading social work writer offer persuasive arguments against the dependency thesis; see Helen Harris Perlman, "Are We Creating Dependency?," *Social Service Review*, XXXIV (1960), 323 and "Social Casework Today," *Public Welfare*, XVII (1959), 51. Also, for a psychoanalytic argument against the thesis, J. P. Kahn, "Attitudes towards Recipients of Public Assistance," *Social Casework*, XXXVI (1955), 359.

[47] Some of the difficulties in evaluating "services" may be seen in J. McV. Hunt and N. Kogan, *Measuring Movement in Casework* (New York, 1950); L. Geismar and B. Ayres, *Measuring Family Functioning* (St. Paul, 1960); Gordon Allport, "The Limits of Social Services," in James E. Russell (ed.), *National Policies for Education, Health, and Social Services* (New York, 1954).

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would now encourage inquiry; but the 1962 legislation was based on the premise that services "work."

A similar point applies to professional staffing. Some have argued that a "services" policy requires high professionalization, and that actually the proportion of trained workers in public welfare has been declining and has never been substantial.[48] Others point out that the program is unlikely to attract professionals until it provides "services," and that the new orientation suggested by services, training, and research together must, practically speaking, begin on all fronts if it is to make an impact. Some long-time public servants, moreover, have hoped to reorient the social work profession and produce more innovation and "realism" in treatment of economic dependency; for them the amendments made possible a fresh start.

The foregoing issues are reciprocal. The ambiguity, or even ambivalence, in objectives (prevention or rehabilitation) affects conceptions of services (sophisticated or commonsense). These condition the feasibility of evaluative research because "movement" may not be measurable in sophisticated casework, but economic rehabilitation may have pragmatic tests. Finally, the direction of staff development depends on objectives and conceptions of services.

There is another policy issue tied to these that, from the "rights" standpoint, is most important of all: the argument that "services never filled an empty belly," that they not only work best when accompanied by adequate grants, but that personal integrity and independence are threatened by services in direct proportion to the stringency of financial grants.[49] If those arguments are well grounded—and even this point is not empirically clear—then it can only be said for the amendments that at the time just one step, with one foot, could be taken. Wealthier states may now raise grant levels themselves and it does appear that it would require a drastic change in federal relations and far more redistribu-

[48] Bureau of Public Assistance, HEW, *Public Social Welfare Personnel, 1960* (Washington, D.C., 1962); A. L. Schorr, "Need for Trained Social Work Staff . . . ," *Social Security Bulletin*, XXIV (1961), 11.

[49] E. Burns, "What's Wrong with Public Welfare?," *Social Service Review*, XXXVI (1962), 111, for skepticism about services' effectiveness in the absence of adequate grants.

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tion among states to improve conditions in the poor states without conferring a heavy windfall on the relatively wealthy.

IV

The meaning of the 1962 amendments would ultimately depend on their administration. Federal regulations—called "policy" in public assistance—would narrow and clarify legislative standards, though to what extent remained to be seen. The task was immense: to identify the services most essential to the statutory purposes, and to define them clearly enough for administrative accountability. As background there were available statistical data on incidence of broadly defined "problems" in state caseloads, professional doctrine, and outcomes of demonstration projects. Based on these, there were the services regulations for ADC drafted concurrently with the legislation. The task was further complicated by the Senate Appropriations Committee's demand, in the spring of 1962, for a survey of rates of ineligibles on state rolls to be accomplished in FY 1963; the demands of this on the Bureau of Family Service staff were heavy enough that consultation with state officials on service regulations was stopped.[50] Design of the eligibility survey and drafting of the service regulations went on simultaneously—a reminder of the program's basic ambivalence.

Three administrative and intellectual issues were faced explicitly in drafting the regulations.[51] The first was that of a realistic deadline for state compliance: states electing services for seventy-five per cent matching were asked to prepare state plans for phased development, to begin services within six months, and to achieve full compliance in four years (observing the uniformity condition at all times). The second issue was how to define required services: whether in terms of (a) recipients' most common "problems" with no specification of "solutions" or treatments; (b) generic categories of service, like casework, group work, community planning, day care, homemaking, and so forth; (c) simple description of those

[50] Senate Appropriations Committee, *Report on Labor-HEW Appropriation* for FY 1963 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1962). For the results of the survey, see HEW, "Eligibility of Families Receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children," Washington, D.C., mimeographed, July 1963.

[51] Minton; and State Letter 606, Nov. 30, 1962.

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services provided by a professionally trained social work staff; or (d) "performance" definitions of activities and work units. The last two were briefly considered and discarded—the performance approach because there was no experience with it and it threatened neglect of "casework principles of timing, client readiness, and progression in dealing with . . . problems," the professional approach because of critical staff shortages although, as the principal draftsman wrote, "this approach brought forth a deep yearning."[52]

The approach that was adopted emphasized specification of "problems"—for example, "children in need of protection," "families disrupted by desertion," "families with adults with potentials for self-support" in AFDC—together with somewhat more specific objectives of services in each problem: for example, for "disrupted families, services with respect to "maintaining ties or effecting reconciliation . . .; support from the absent parent; problems in recent desertions; dual responsibilities of remaining parent; serious problems of children resulting from loss of parent; . . ." and so on through a checklist of more specific problems within the general type.[53] The position of the Division of Welfare Services in the Bureau of Family Services has been that definition of "problems" rather than prescription of "services" makes possible an ordering of priorities and a limiting of the federal role to "policy" rather than regulation. At the same time, Division officials maintain that the services appropriate to any particular problem are common professional knowledge—by which they mean conventional social work activities like casework, group work, and community planning plus "complementary" services; and the language quoted above in fact requires some of these traditional activities for federal matching. What these mean in practice remains to be seen; "social study" in AFDC, case classification, caseload maxima, and minimum visitation frequencies are the main standards. Within these limits "services" *could* amount simply to casework as an extension of eligibility determination.

Finally, there was the difficulty of distinguishing *prescribed*

[52] Minton, 9. Note, however, that "social services" were defined in the federal policy statement as "those activities of social work staff and other specialists . . ." in State Letter 606, Sec. 4241.

[53] *Ibid.*, Sec. 4500.

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from optional services (or "problems") and the desirability of limiting top priority to something like state capacity. Interviews confirm the statement in the *Handbook* that the criteria for inclusion were

> 1) the social problems or needs of serious current and future consequences for the families and adults involved and to the community at large; 2) the expressed interests and concerns of the Congress, State agencies, related national organizations, and the general public; 3) the capacities of State agencies to provide services. . . .[54]

Conceivably the 1962 provisions for child welfare, training, and demonstrations will do more to raise state standards in the long run than the service provisions; but the latter raise more interesting administrative problems. State Letter 606 on service policy went through thirty-eight drafts of the whole and more of some portions before its release. The logical problems of definition and practical issues of priority are important because they *may* involve a choice between effective and therefore highly detailed regulation of state practice or ineffective, generic policy. States that press forward with professionalization and their own methods will probably obviate this issue; those that simply parrot federal language in state plans (as some have) may stimulate more detailed federal regulation as a response to *pro forma* compliance.

One problem is to provide standards that effectively change state practice while allowing flexibility and initiative. Another is that of enforcement in the absence of strict performance standards: this problem seems likely to arise soon; and it is not at all clear that a federal administrative review can establish state dereliction if formal, quantitative standards are met and local offices go through the conventional casework motions. The 1963 eligibility survey led to a new federal requirement for state "quality control" systems; but initially these only covered eligibility determination, and it was uncertain whether review and evaluation of services could be handled in this way.[55] Finally, the fiscal accounting system as the most formal, procrustean federal check interferes with state administrative initiatives and professional flexibility at

[54] *Ibid.*, Sec. 4620.
[55] State Letter 704, Dec. 18, 1963.

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almost every turn; yet somehow all operations must be classified as "services" or "administration" to validate federal matching at different ratios.[56]

Thus a critical issue in public assistance is how to fit a professionalized activity with the formal requirements of public administration. The problem becomes more difficult as notions of services become more sophisticated. One possibility is separation of services from eligibility determination while simplifying the latter so that the income maintenance-medical care aspects of the program could progress toward a "rights" approach and services would be harder to insinuate.[57] At the other end of this spectrum is what is called "aggressive casework" with "hard to reach" families, tied integrally to eligibility determination.[58]

There are also two *administrative* approaches to service, which may be termed the "professional" and "performance" approaches. The first would emphasize professional doctrine and competence, leaving ample discretion to trained staff for relational, contextual casework. The second would attempt to refine existing regulations (at least at the state level) by defining problems and services with increasing specificity. Federal policy so far leaves room for either approach; but the realities of state staff and the quest for more accountability may encourage the second method.

These alternatives are based on services defined primarily as casework. They suggest continuing tensions in policy between administrative regulation and professional discretion, *and* between self-determination and adjustment. The casework method, as the core of the social work profession, was elaborated in private service, not public assistance, in practice rather than academic analysis. It is more pragmatic than formal, emphasizing "individualiza-

[56] As this article is written the Bureau of Family Services is working on a new, simplified *Handbook* in which, it is hoped, detail and complexity will be reduced. The Bureau is also beginning work on a series of "monographs" about services which are intended to convey "understanding" rather than requirements about federal expectations.

[57] This seems to be favored in E. Burns, "What's Wrong with Public Welfare?"

[58] See, for example, Kermit Wiltse, "Social Services in the Aid to Dependent Children Program, *Social Service Review*, XXVIII (1954), 173 and "Social Casework and Public Assistance," *ibid.*, XXXII (1958), 41.

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tion" and the reciprocity of investigation-diagnosis-treatment.[59] On the other hand, there is an administrative concern with formal accountability and efficiency (the evaluation of outcomes) and some recent experimentation with standardized handling of cases in stages: analysis, classification, casework, evaluation; which may well improve accountability even if efficiency in its strict sense is unattainable.[60] The latter approach probably emphasizes "adjustment" more than autonomy in its treatment of clients, while the professional casework tradition is ambivalent on this point. Discovery of the "problem family" has provoked strong assertions of community prerogative;[61] but it has also prompted concern about inflicting class and cultural biases in assistance and reaffirmation of the doctrine of "starting with the client where he is."[62]

[59] See Mary Richmond, *Social Diagnosis* (New York, 1917). Helen Harris Perlman, *Social Casework* (Chicago, 1957)—a modern statement—discusses casework as "problem solving" in avowedly Deweyite terms. In general, I think it can be argued that early social casework method was part of the "revolt against formalism," and that the later "reception" of psychoanalysis intensified this emphasis.

[60] The principal experiments have been those engineered by Community Research Associates, Inc., in several states. Both literature and observation reveal that, so far, standardization has been more a method of providing data for policy decisions, of establishing accountability and coordination, and providing continuity of service than of enabling the evaluation of services and thus of achieving "efficiency." In this it demonstrates the difficulties in this field of affecting substance (at least measurably) by altering structure. Expositions of CRA's approach appear in Bradley Buell, *et al.*, *Community Planning for Human Services* (New York, 1954); D. B. Glabe, L. J. Feider, and H. O. Page, "Reorientation for Treatment and Control," Supplement to *Public Welfare*, XVI (1958); and Alice Voiland, *Family Casework Diagnosis* (New York, 1962). Critical literature includes I. F. Lukoff and S. Mencher, "A Critique of the Conceptual Foundation of Community Research Associates," *Social Service Review* XXXVI (1962), 433; H. S. Maas, "Family Casework Diagnosis: An Essay Review," *ibid.*, 444; Alfred J. Kahn, "A Coordinated Pattern of Services. . . ," in Charles Cella and Rodney Lane, *Basic Issues in Coordinating Family and Child Welfare Programs* (Philadelphia, 1964), 6-24.

[61] See the views of Kermit T. Wiltse, "The 'Hopeless' Family," and Helen B. Foster, "Family-centered Services through Aid to Dependent Children," in *Social Work Forum* (New York, 1958), 135-65. Referring to the "Friendly Visitor" tradition, Wiltse argues that "the profession of social work and social workers . . . are and always have been instruments of social control as well as of social change" (p. 147). See also his "Social Casework and Public Assistance," *Social Service Review*, XXXII (1958), 41.

[62] See Walter B. Miller, "Implication of Urban Lower Class Culture for Social Work," *Social Service Review*, XXXIII (1959), 219.

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The difficulty is that counseling toward autonomy often involves infinite gradations of intervention to the end of "adjustment."[63] By definition this is most likely in dealing with the "dependent," for whom any suggestion must seem heavily sanctioned. For Keith-Lucas and other critics, then, the best approach is to stress rights heavily and resist services (casework, at least) *in limine*. In light of the pragmatic casework tradition of "relationship" this may be the best strategy for formalists. On the other hand, one may ask whether social responsibility and individual motivations do not vary from one case to another; whether a "rights" program alone will be self-fulfillingly effective; and what of the community's interest (a formal, police-power heritage) in reducing economic dependency and protecting social dependents? Then one might be willing to try to formalize methods of "intervention"—either in professional doctrine or administrative regulation.

These issues of administrative regulation-professional discretion, autonomy-adjustment are closely related. They are also linked to at least three issues mentioned earlier, of which one is a more "adequate," less restricted income policy. The "rights" orientation to policy is based on, or aims at, "adequate" grants; yet, apart from the political difficulty of securing them, there are questions of their effect on incentives and (short of a universal subsidy) on the principle of "less eligibility." An "adequate" standard of living as officially defined exceeds the incomes of some workers not on public assistance. These problems, and the beginnings of "service" implicit in eligibility determination, have led many to accept the combination of services and assistance.

Secondly, research about relief of dependency is likely to be more troubled by fact-value confusions and individual variation than most policy research. The difficulty of measuring effects of services was mentioned above; by and large it appears that the more "sophisticated" the service the less formal are objectives and the more difficult is measurement of its effects. The "research and demonstration" model of policy-making differs in degree from

[63] An interesting discussion is Saul Bernstein, "Self-Determination: King or Citizen in the Realm of Values," *Social Work*, V (1960), 3.

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"research and development" in that it is aimed at improving methods where objectives are often imprecise; often the improvement has to do with administrative methods or with public acceptance in the course of which ends are altered as fully as means. This kind of "R&D" can never settle the ethical issues for those who feel most strongly about them; though it may illuminate or even reduce those issues. If so, the shortage of appropriations and research capacity in welfare have been unfortunate.

Finally, it is clear that practice is exceedingly hard to formalize. The seemingly endless literalization of state and federal policy results from attempting to convey the ambivalence of policy to untrained caseworkers and to shift the balance of values in response to changing public attitudes and professional practice. Keith-Lucas sought a single broad standard and the separation of services from assistance; others hope through professionalization to substitute understanding for written standards. The problem Keith-Lucas explored may be most acute between these extremes, where several narrow standards are applied by non-professional staff.[64]

V

The 1962 welfare amendments can be interpreted as bureaucratic survival tactics in face of public criticism, as the inertial progress of professionalism, or as recognition of the changing nature of dependency and a fresh attack on chronic poverty. Their history indicates that they were all of these. It should contribute to understanding of the difficult issues in public assistance; but it also shows how the program has been shaped by traditional, political, federal, and professional contexts, all of which are closely related.

(1) The poor law, police power, and charity organization traditions all constrain financial aid and stress strict eligibility determination. Notions of social responsibility and individual dignity

[64] Directors and supervisors in county public assistance offices have told the writer (and observation tends to confirm it) that professionally trained caseworkers are best able to handle what seem (to untrained workers) to be contradictory policies of strictness in eligibility determination and liberality in tendering services. Untrained workers lean toward either strictness or liberality in both respects. These are the policies of many states; and appear to be federal policy also.

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emphasize a "right" to assistance. These ideologies are as mixed as human motivations. They lead to ambivalence in policy and complexity in administration. The 1962 amendments were in part an attempt to escape from the dilemmas of tradition.

(2) The political context of public assistance reflects these dilemmas. There is probably some response to voting blocs in policy, chiefly the aged, the blind, and their relations; and there is some group representation of sectarian interests. But the politics of income maintenance consist primarily in administrative movement conditioned by amorphous public attitudes on the moral issues, rather than by direct self-interest. Since the Social Security Act, and excepting Medicare, it has not involved active presidential leadership, nor has Congress been deeply concerned except to protect decentralization and restrict eligibility. The open-ended federal obligation directs congressional attention to eligibility and administrative expense; "services" were accepted by many in Congress as a way to reduce the rolls with some increase in administrative costs.

(3) The federal context is properly the subject of a separate study. The decentralization in the basic statute leaves policy (grant level, eligibility standards) primarily to the states while amply authorizing federal supervision of administrative detail. Fiscal relations have reached an impasse in which further redistribution to poor states would confer windfalls on rich states; politically, this reflects a balance of Southern committee positions and large delegations from wealthy states in Congress. The existing aid formula roughly compensates for state income differences but still discriminates among individuals. The extent of federal control *versus* decentralization is uncertain. Provisionally, it appears that the aid formula has reflected state policies at least as much as it has changed them,[65] and that administrative regulations have steadily tightened without, however, affecting basic policy directly.[66] In

[65] See James Robinson and Richard Dawson, "The Politics of Public Welfare," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, *Politics in the American States* (Boston, 1965).

[66] See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Statutory and Administrative Controls Associated with Federal Grants for Public Assistance* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1964).

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this situation development of a sense of profession has been a means of federal leadership and of reaching policy indirectly. Many of the program's administrators on all levels have been with it since its Depression beginnings. Their organization—the American Public Welfare Association—has played an important role in developing consensus about policy, as well as in mediating between "federals" and the states. The 1962 amendments can be seen as an extension of this professional method.

(4) In encouraging services the amendments reflected professionalism. By leaving them largely undefined they contributed substantially to administrative discretion. They also left open some professional issues, such as the casework model *versus* group work and community organization; the relation of services to income and eligibility; the extent of professional discretion *versus* administrative regulation; the degree to which research and demonstration projects can settle any of the issues; and the relative emphasis to be placed on individual autonomy or adjustment. Professional doctrine and practice are likely to be of increasing importance in public welfare programs; but they will also be changed by legislation and necessity.

In the generation after the Social Security Act public assistance dominated public welfare. The 1962 amendments may have been a kind of culmination for, at the same time, a reaction set in against "conventional" welfare, including federalism and professionalism. On one hand, there has been increasing interest in a more "adequate" national income policy, separate from services, which may not yet (or ever) be politically acceptable. On the other hand, the "opportunity" approach has emphasized direct participation by the poor and redirection of such non-"relational" programs as health, education, housing, and redevelopment. Both approaches to welfare tend to reduce the dilemma between "rights" and "services" instead of generalizing it as the 1962 amendments threatened to do. Yet there will almost certainly remain an important role for services, together with income and opportunity policies, though the balance and relations among them have now become more critical issues.

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The Compromise of 1787

STAUGHTON LYND
Yale University

On July 12, 1787, the Constitutional Convention, meeting in Philadelphia, adopted the three-fifths compromise regarding apportionment of the House of Representatives. On July 13 the Continental Congress, meeting in New York City, adopted the Northwest Ordinance. The three-fifths compromise sanctioned slavery more decidedly than any previous action at a national level.[1] The Ordinance, on the other hand, was in Ulrich Phillips' words "the first and last antislavery achievement by the central government in the period."[2] The Ordinance has become a symbol of the Revolution's liberalism, while the compromise, if not a covenant with death and an agreement with hell, is at least a dramatic instance of its pragmatic conservatism. Why did Congress and Convention act so differently? The answer to this question, could it be found, would surely throw much light upon the troubled relation between the Founding Fathers and the peculiar institution.

Apart from the coincidence of dates, two circumstances make this problem still more intriguing. One is that the Continental

[1] This essay takes issue with Professor Max Farrand's belief that the three-fifths compromise was of secondary importance at the Convention, and that the question of the West was separate from the sectional conflict between North and South (Max Farrand, *The Framing of the Constitution of the United States* [New Haven, 1913], 107-11). My reasons for questioning Farrand's approach are presented more fully in Staughton Lynd, "The Abolitionist Critique of the United States Constitution," in Martin Duberman (ed.), *The Antislavery Vanguard* (Princeton, 1965), 209-39.

[2] Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (New York and London, 1933), 128.

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Congress, at the time it adopted the Ordinance, was controlled by the South. Its temporary president was a Southerner (William Grayson of Virginia); three of the committee of five which drafted the Ordinance were Southerners (Richard Henry Lee and Edward Carrington of Virginia, John Kean of South Carolina); and a Congress with a Southern majority adopted the Ordinance with a single dissenting vote (by a Northerner, Abraham Yates of New York). Why these Southern delegates voted to ban slavery in the Northwest puzzled Nathan Dane of Massachusetts at the time,[3] and has remained a puzzle to historians. Thus B. A. Hinsdale commented that an antislavery clause "had been rejected by Southern men when Mr. Jefferson first brought it forward, and now five of the eight States present are Southern States and eleven of the eighteen men Southern men, and it prevails."[4] Southern sup-

[3] Dane to Rufus King, July 16, 1787, Edmund C. Burnett (ed.), *Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress* (Washington, D. C., 1921-36) (hereafter cited as *LCC*), VIII, 622.

[4] B. A. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest: The Beginnings Of Our Colonial System* (New York, 1899), 266. John M. Merriam said, similarly, in "The Legislative History of The Ordinance of 1787," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, New Series, V (Worcester, 1889), 336: "The most surprising facts in connection with this article are that it hung fire so long when it would seem that its best friends were interested in it; that Dane and King especially were ready on May 10th to vote for an ordinance which omitted it, and that when proposed in Congress as an amendment to a matured plan, it was so readily adopted." Perhaps the fullest set of questions was posed by William F. Poole, *The Ordinance of 1787, And Dr. Manasseh Cutler As An Agent In Its Formation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1876), 19: "Why were three Southern members, all new men, and constituting a majority of the committee, put in charge of an antislavery ordinance for a Northern territory, which had been defeated by the entire vote of the South three years before? If antislavery principles were so popular with Southern members, why did not Mr. Dane insert an antislavery clause in the ordinance which was to have taken its third reading on the 10th of May? As Mr. Johnson of Connecticut was the chairman of that committee, and three out of five of its members were Northern men, why did not the committee make it an antislavery ordinance? Whence did so much light dawn so suddenly upon the mind of Mr. Dane, when associated with a majority of Southern members on another committee? What is the explanation of the entire unanimity of feeling and action on the slavery question, then exhibited for the first and last time, in the whole history of our national legislation?" Poole answered his own questions by saying that Southerners doubtless were thinking of the public revenue the Northwest lands would bring (*ibid.*, 27). Francis S. Philbrick in the monumental introduction to *The Laws Of Illinois Territory 1809-1818* (Springfield, Ill., 1950), clxxxvi, note, stresses that by creating a buffer against British and Indian aggression, the Northwest Territory would promote settlements in the Southwest. No wholly satisfactory explanation has yet been suggested.

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port for the Ordinance must puzzle us still more when we set it side-by-side with the determined defense of slavery at the Convention by Deep South delegates such as William Davie of North Carolina and the entire South Carolina group: Pierce Butler, the Pinckneys, and John Rutledge.[5]

A second, less familiar circumstance which thickens the mystery surrounding these events of mid-July is that a number of men were members of both Congress and Convention, and communication between the two bodies was apparently frequent and full. Members of Congress in 1787 who were also named delegates to the Convention were Gorham and King of Massachusetts, Johnson of Connecticut, Blount of North Carolina, Few and Pierce of Georgia, and James Madison of Virginia, who went directly from New York to Philadelphia in early May. A number of men traveled back and forth between the two cities while the Convention was in session. William Pierce returned to New York, where he remained from June 14 to June 18, just after discussion of the rule of representation had begun in Philadelphia, and according to Nathan Dane spoke freely of sectional conflicts at the Convention.[6] Blount and his fellow North Carolinian, Benjamin Hawkins visited Philadelphia from June 19 to July 2, returning to Congress when work on the Northwest Ordinance began. At the same time Pierce again came back from Philadelphia to New York along with his fellow Georgian, Few, like himself a member of both bodies.[7] Others, who, although not members of both groups, very likely carried news from one to the other, included Gouverneur Morris, a Convention delegate who returned to Philadelphia July 2 after a lengthy New York sojourn, and Richard Henry Lee, a member of Congress who took his seat on July 9 after a week in Philadelphia en route.[8] The full text of the Ordinance was, of course, available in Philadelphia

[5] See Davie and C. C. Pinckney on July 12, Butler on July 13, C. C. Pinckney on July 23, C. Pinckney, C. C. Pinckney, and Rutledge on Aug. 22. Max Farrand (ed.), *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven, 1911) (hereafter cited as *RFC*), I, 593-94, 605; II, 371-73.

[6] Dane to Rufus King, June 19, 1787, *LCC*, VIII, 611.

[7] Wm. Blount to John Gray Blount, June 15, 21, 1787, *ibid.*, VIII, 610, 613; Blount to the Governor of Virginia (Richard Caswell), July 10, 1787, *ibid.*, VIII, 618; Richard Dobbs Spaight to John Gray Blount, July 3, 1787, Alice Barnwell Keith (ed.), *The John Gray Blount Papers* (Raleigh, 1952), I, 315; *RFC*, III, 587, 589.

[8] Lee to Thomas Lee Shippen, *LCC*, VIII, 627, 613, note.

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soon after it was passed; however, its essential provisions may have been known to some members of the Convention as early as July 11 or 12.[9]

According to his secretary, Edward Coles, Madison years later suggested that there had been a bargain or compromise between the sections involving both the Ordinance and the Constitution. He said, so Coles stated in the eighteen-fifties:

> Many individuals were members of both bodies, and thus were enabled to know what was passing in each—both sitting with closed doors and in secret sessions. The distracting question of slavery was agitating and retarding the labors of both, and led to conferences and inter-communications of the members, which resulted in a compromise by which the northern or anti-slavery portion of the country agreed to incorporate, into the Ordinance and Constitution, the provision to restore fugitive slaves; and this mutual and concurrent action was the cause of the similarity of the provision contained in both, and had its influence, in creating the great unanimity by which the Ordinance passed, and also in making the Constitution the more acceptable to the slave holders.[10]

Coles, speaking shortly after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, may well have exaggerated the importance of that aspect of the compromise of 1787. But it is difficult to imagine that he misremembered the broad idea that communication and compromise had occurred between Congress and Convention, or that Madison, a member of both bodies, was misinformed.

If other direct testimony exists supporting Madison's account it has not come to my attention. Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to make a tentative reconstruction of Southern motives for accepting the Northwest Ordinance, and of the impact of the Ordinance on the work of the Constitutional Convention.

[9] Dane sent a copy of the Northwest Ordinance to King on July 16 (*LCC*, VIII, 621). Madison sent a copy to James Madison on July 28 (*Letters and Other Writings of James Madison* [Philadelphia, 1865], I, 335). According to Poole, 28, note, the Ordinance was first publicly printed in the *Pennsylvania Herald*, July 25, 1787.

[10] Coles' statement begins: "This brings to my recollection what I was told by Mr. Madison, and what I do not remember ever to have seen in print" (Edward Coles, *History of The Ordinance Of 1787* [Philadelphia, 1856], 28-29). A similar theory is presented by Peter Force (*Life Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler L.L.D.* [Cincinnati, 1888], II, Appendix D, 419).

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I

"The clause respecting slavery was agreed to by the Southern members for the purpose of preventing tobacco and indigo from being made on the N. W. side of the Ohio as well as for sev'l other political reasons." So William Grayson wrote to James Monroe on August 8, 1787.[11] What were the "sev'l other political reasons"? Why did the Southern majority of the Continental Congress unanimously vote for the Northwest Ordinance, despite its antislavery clause?

One answer is as simple as it is surprising: the South expected that the states formed from the Northwest Territory would vote with the South in the sectional conflict then raging in Congress. Late in 1783, when congressional acceptance of Virginia's cession was finally in sight, Thomas Jefferson had written the governor of Virginia: "If a state be first laid off on the [Great] lakes it will add a vote to the Northern scale, if on the Ohio it will add one to the Southern."[12] Jefferson had proposed, and Congress had essentially accepted, a plan to divide the Territory into ten states, some near the lakes and others near the Ohio River. The Ordinance of 1787 provided instead that there be three states running from the river to the lakes, the present Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The result was that *both* North and South could hope for their allegiance. Dane of Massachusetts wrote to Rufus King on July 16 that the easternmost state of the three would "no doubt" be settled chiefly from the East, "and there is, I think, full an equal chance of its adopting Eastern politics."[13] A month later he was more confident. Writing again to King on August 12, Dane said:

> Much will depend on the directions given to the first settlements in my opinion, and as the Eastern states for the sake of doing away the temporary governments, etc. established in 1784, and for establishing some order in that Country, gave up as much as could be reasonably expected, I think it will be just and proper in them to establish as far as they can

[11] *LCC*, VIII, 631-32.
[12] Jefferson to the Governor of Virginia (Benjamin Harrison), Nov. 11, 1783, *LCC*, VII, 347.
[13] *Ibid.*, VIII, 622.

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> consistently, Eastern politics in it, especially in the state adjoining Pennsylvania.[14]

But the Southern states, too, hoped and expected to dominate the Northwest. On November 3, 1787, the Virginia delegates in Congress wrote to Governor Edmund Randolph:

> Indeed, if it is thought Material to the interest of the Southern States, that their Scale be Strengthened by an accession this quarter, that object will be better secured by the New, than the old plan, because upon the former there may be an early admission of a State [since the states under the new plan would be larger], but upon the latter such an event must be long, or perhaps forever, postponed.[15]

If it was not because they would be slaveholding, it was also not because they were "agrarian" that the South looked forward to the admission of states from the Northwest Territory. Vermont was agrarian, but throughout the seventeen-eighties the South opposed the admission of Vermont because of what Madison called "an habitual jealousy of a predominance of Eastern interest."[16] Clearly the South believed that, unlike Vermont, the Northwest would be settled mainly by Southerners, by an outcropping of the great tide of migrants then flowing over the mountains into Kentucky and Tennessee. Conversely, Rufus King was relying on a predominance of Easterners in the area to produce the "Eastern politics" for which he hoped. Only the event could prove which section's expectations were correct, and so in July 1787 they could join almost unanimously in promoting the Territory's speedy settlement and organization.

What were the other "political reasons" to which Grayson referred? Richard Hildreth, writing in 1849, supposed that the Southern states were "reconciled" to the Ordinance "by the idea, afterward acted upon, of securing the continuation of slavery in the

[14] *Ibid.*, VIII, 636. One might say that the Northwest was an eighteenth-century Kansas, in that each section knew its political destiny would be determined by the geographical origins of its settlers.

[15] *Ibid.*, VIII, 672-73.

[16] "Observations Relating To The Influence of Vermont, And The Territorial Claims, On The Politics Of Congress. May 1st, 1782," Henry D. Gilpin (ed.), *The Papers Of James Madison* (Washington, D. C., 1840), I, 123.

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territory south of the Ohio, under future terms of cession."[17] As we have seen, the South did not need to be reconciled to the Ordinance: it welcomed it in the belief that, even without slaveholding, the Northwest would support the South in national politics. But it is perfectly possible that Hildreth correctly identifies a second motive. For he stresses what many subsequent historians have forgotten, that as late as May 1787 Congress was on the verge of passing an ordinance for the West "the provisions of which extended to the whole western district, both that ceded [the Northwest] and that of which the cession was anticipated [the Southwest]."[18] The ordinance reported on April 26, 1787, was an ordinance "for the government of the western territory."[19] It was read twice but its third and final reading scheduled for May 10 was postponed, and on July 11, "the Committee . . . to whom was referred the report of a committee touching *the temporary government of the western territory* reported an Ordinance for *the government of the territory of the United States North West of the river Ohio,* which was read a first time."[20] [Italics mine.] Thus just at the moment the Convention adopted the three-fifths compromise, Congress for the first time drew an explicit East-West line through the Western territories by legislating for the Northwest alone. What if anything was implied as to the status of slavery south of that line in the region that became the Southwest Territory?

So far as I am aware, at no Southern ratifying convention was any fear expressed that the antislavery portion of the Northwest Ordinance would be applied south of the Ohio River. Southerners presumably knew that North Carolina's cession of the area later called Tennessee read in part: "Provided always, That no regulations made or to be made by Congress shall tend to emancipate slaves, otherwise than shall be directed by the Assembly or legislature of

[17] Richard Hildreth, *The History Of The United States Of America* (New York, 1849), III, 528-29.

[18] *Ibid.*, 527.

[19] *Journals Of The Continental Congress 1774-1789* (Washington, D. C., 1904-37) (hereafter cited as *JCC*), XXXI, 669; XXXII, 242, 281. Actually, the title of the plan as reported on September 19, 1786, and April 26, 1787, was "a plan of a temporary government for such districts, or new states, as shall be laid out by the United States." The print ordered on May 9, when the ordinance was read for a second time, shortened this to the phrase given in the text.

[20] *Ibid.*, XXXII, 313.

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such State or States."[21] Other evidence supports the supposition that in legislating against slavery in the Northwest Congress tacitly legislated for it in the Southwest. South Carolinians at the Constitutional Convention were notoriously apprehensive about their slave property, but on August 9, 1787, the South Carolina legislature, undeterred by the Northwest Ordinance, completed the cession of its Western lands.[22] Richard Henry Lee, who in 1784 voted against Jefferson's proposal to ban slavery throughout the West, was mentioned by both Dane and Cutler as a particularly warm supporter of the 1787 Ordinance which banned it only North of the Ohio.

The Northwest Ordinance legislated against slavery in that part of the West where it did not exist and left it alone in the Southwest where it already was. This was generally recognized. "The Western people are already calling out for slaves for their new lands," George Mason told the Constitutional Convention in August.[23] And forty-seven years later Nathan Dane made a revealing statement in a letter to Daniel Webster:

> . . . in the years 1784, '85, '86, and '87, the Eastern members in the Old Congress really thought they were preparing the North-Western Territory principally for New England settlers, and to them the third and sixth articles of compact more especially had reference; therefore, when North Carolina ceded her western territory, and requested this Ordinance to be extended to it, except the *slave* article, that exception had my full assent, because slavery had taken root in it, and it was then probable it would be settled principally by slaveowners.[24]

Thus, while from the standpoint of the North the Ordinance appeared an antislavery triumph, to the South it may have seemed

[21] Walter Clark (ed.), *The State Records Of North Carolina* (Goldsboro, No. Carolina, 1905), XXIV, 563. Essentially the same clause was included in the North Carolina cession of December 22, 1789; the act of Congress accepting this first Southwestern cession of April 2, 1790; and the Ordinance for the Southwestern Territory of May 26, 1790 (Clarence E. Carter [ed.], *The Territorial Papers of The United States*, [Washington, D. C., 1936], IV, 7, 16, 18).

[22] Neither the South Carolina cession nor the Georgia cession of February 1, 1788, mentioned slavery (*JCC*, XXXIII, 475-77; XXXIV, 320-26).

[23] *RFC*, II, 370.

[24] Nathan Dane to Daniel Webster, March 26, 1830, in *The Part Taken By Essex County in The Organization And Settlement Of The Northwest Territory* (Salem, Mass., 1889), 40.

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the end of the national government's attempt to prohibit slavery South of the Ohio.

A third political reason which may have induced Southern congressmen to support the Northwest Ordinance is suggested by a letter of Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina. Writing to the governor of North Carolina on July 10, Hawkins said that he and William Blount had returned to Congress from the Convention in the

> hope of being able to procure some aid from the Union towards the protection of our Western Citizens, and of securing and preserving our right to the free and common use of the navigation of the Miss . . . . the latter which is very interesting to the Western citizens of the Southern States . . . has at length, from a variety of circumstances unnecessary as well perhaps as improper to relate been put in a bitter situation than heretofore.[25]

The question of the navigation of the Mississippi was the most serious sectional issue to come before the Continental Congress. It had troubled Congress during the war, when Robert Morris told the French envoy that (in Thomas P. Abernethy's paraphrase) "the strength of the Confederacy lay in the North and that the North should be kept in the ascendancy by curtailing the territory on the Southwest."[26] It took on new intensity in 1786 when John Jay, secretary for foreign affairs, secured congressional approval to sacrifice the right to the navigation in negotiations with Spain. For the South the issue was political as well as economic. Jay obtained his authorization from Congress by seven states to five in a strictly sectional vote; and the South feared, as William Grayson told the Virginia ratifying convention, that "if the Mississippi was yielded to Spain, the migration to the western country would be stopped, and the northern states would, not only retain their inhabitants, but preserve their superiority and influence over that of the southern."[27] The effort of Northern Congressmen to close the Mississippi had the same sectional character

[25] *LCC*, VIII, 619.

[26] Thomas P. Abernethy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* (New York, 1937), 203-04, reporting a dispatch by Gérard dated Oct. 20, 1778.

[27] Speech of June 12, 1788, Jonathan Elliot (ed.), *The Debates In The Several State Conventions* (Washington, D. C., 1836), 281.

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as the attempt by Northern members of Congress and Convention to limit the political representation of new states.

The bitter Mississippi controversy of 1786 became "much entangled" with the problem of evolving a government for the West.[28] On May 10, 1786, a five-man congressional committee with a Southern majority recommended that the number of states to be formed from the Virginia cession be reduced to not less than two nor more than five, but that, as in the plan of 1784, each state should enter the Union when its population was equal to that of the smallest of the original thirteen.[29] This, as the Virginia delegates observed in 1787, was a change which would accelerate the admission of new states. On July 7 Congress unanimously recommended to the states that they revise their acts of cession so that three to five states be formed from the Northwest. But now Northern congressmen began to press to raise the population requirement for admission to one thirteenth of the total population of the original thirteen states at the last census prior to the request for admission.[30] *This* change would have slowed down the admission of the new states. Indeed, had it been applied it would have delayed the admission of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin an average of thirty-eight years, with Wisconsin excluded from statehood until after 1900.[31] On July 19 a personnel change gave the committee a Northern majority, and on September 19 the committee reported a revised ordinance including both the "Northern" population formula for admission to statehood and a new condition, equally offensive to the South, which provided for admission if "the consent of so many States in Congress is first obtained as may at that time be competent to such admission."[32]

Meantime the North was using its congressional majority to

[28] Edmund C. Burnett, *The Continental Congress* (New York, 1941), 653; *ibid.*, 651-53, describes the sequence of events discussed in the following paragraph.

[29] *JCC*, XXX, 251-55; James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 1786, *LCC*, VIII, 359-60.

[30] *JCC*, XXX, 390-94; James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, July 16, 1786, *LCC*, VIII, 403-04.

[31] George Bancroft, *History Of the Formation Of The Constitution Of The United States Of America* (3rd ed., New York, 1883), II, 104.

[32] *JCC*, XXX, 418 n., 669-73. Philbrick comments, cclxxvi-vii, that this proviso violated the terms of the Virginia cession just as did the clause of the Constitution giving Congress discretionary power over the admission of new states.

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change Jay's instructions regarding his negotiations with Spain about Mississippi navigation, which led at least three congressmen seriously to contemplate disunion. And on September 1, 1786, a procedural rule was approved which blocked reconsideration of Jay's instructions unless the same number of states were present (twelve) that had voted them in August.[33]

During the winter Congressman Madison noted that the idea of separate confederacies had for the first time reached the newspapers;[34] and in April, learning that Jay had drawn up a draft treaty with Gardoqui in which the Mississippi navigation was given up, Madison launched a frontal attack. On April 18 he moved that negotiations be transferred to Jefferson in Madrid, a step, he confided to his journal, "which if it should answer no other purpose would at least gain time." In inconclusive debate on the motion on April 23, Gorham (soon to leave for the Convention) stated that he thought the Mississippi *should* be closed to American commerce. On April 25, grasping the nettle, Madison moved to repeal the rule of September 1786. Rufus King (another member of both Congress and Convention) led the opposition which forced a postponement. Nevertheless Madison thought it a victory, writing in his journal:

> It was considered on the whole that the project of shutting the Mississippi was at an end; a point deemed of great importance in reference to the approaching Convention for introducing a change in the federal Government, and to the objection to an increase of its powers foreseen form the jealously [*sic*] which had been excited by that project.[35]

On May 2 he left for Philadelphia.

The issue of Western government and Mississippi navigation arose once more before Congress lost its quorum in mid-May. On May 9, Congress gave the ordinance for the "western territory"

[33] *JCC*, XXX, 323, and XXI, 46-84; *LCC*, VIII, 427-30, 438-42, 449-450. As to disunion, see Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Strong, Aug. 6, 1786, *ibid.*, VIII, 415-16; James Monroe to the Governor of Virginia (Patrick Henry), Aug. 12, 1786, *ibid.*, VIII, 424-25; Timothy Bloodworth to the Governor of North Carolina (Richard Caswell), Sept. 4, 1786, *ibid.*, VIII, 462. For the rule of Sept. 1, 1786, *JCC*, XXI, 620-21.

[34] "Notes Of Debates In The Continental Congress," entry for Feb. 21, 1787, *JCC*, XXXIII, 724.

[35] *Ibid.*, XXXII, 210, 216-20; XXXIII, 734-39.

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its second reading, but also recorded the receipt of a memorial from Samuel Parsons and his associates which led to the postponement of the third reading ordered for May 10. On May 9 Congress received another letter from Jay requesting "express Instructions on the Points in Difference between the United States and the Crown in Spain." On the tenth Pierce and Few of Georgia (both Convention delegates) carried the motion of April 25 repealing the order of September 1786, and on May 11 a committee on new instructions was appointed with a Southern majority.[36]

Therefore, when Congress regained its quorum July 4 the trend of congressional action was favorable to the South with respect to the Mississippi issue, unfavorable in regard to the admission of Western states. Since both strands of policy directly affected Southern prospects for becoming a majority in Congress, the overall position of the South in the Union was very much in doubt.

The first business of the reactivated Congress was to hear a report from the committee on instructions to Jay which affirmed, predictably, that it was an "indispensable obligation to preserve the right of the United States to their territorial bounds and the free Navigation of the Mississippi from its source to the Ocean . . . ."[37] One Northerner at least was not ready to concede defeat. The next day Nathan Dane wrote to Rufus King, now at the Convention in Philadelphia: "What is best for us to do about procuring an attendance of the Eastern States and to renew the subject of the S[panish] Treaty?"[38] But the stand-off achieved by Madison in April was in fact left undisturbed. "The Mississippi is where you left it; i.e. nothing has been done," Grayson wrote to Monroe on August 8. "I . . . think we are safe for the present."[39] The Mississippi question "has been dormant a considerable time," Madison wrote to Washington in October, "and seems likely to remain so."[40] In September 1788 Congress referred the matter to the new government with a declaration of opinion that free navigation

[36] *JCC*, XXXII, 274-83, 292, note. The members of the committee were Kearny (Delaware), Hawkins (North Carolina), Grayson (Virginia), Few (Georgia), and Pettit (Pennsylvania).

[37] *Ibid.*, XXXII, 299-300.

[38] Dane to King, July 5, 1787, *LCC*, VIII, 617.

[39] *Ibid.*, VIII, 632-33.

[40] James Madison to George Washington, Oct. 28, 1787, Gaillard Hunt (ed.), *The Writings of James Madison* (New York, 1900-10), V, 43.

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was a clear and essential right and should be supported, thus belatedly confirming the committee report of July 4, 1787.

Dane himself joined in a more substantial concession to Southern views on Western government. The first full draft of the Northwest Ordinance, in Dane's handwriting, included a provision to admit new states when their population reached sixty thousand and completely dropped the stipulation as to the consent of a competent number of states in Congress.[41] Francis Philbrick comments: "There is no evidence on the subject, but the matter was so bitterly contested as to justify suspicion that some understanding preceded Dane's proposal of the new formula."[42]

To sum up this portion of the discussion: The foregoing pages sketch three lines of reasoning which may have led Southerners to support the Northwest Ordinance, despite its antislavery proviso. The Northwest, even without slavery, was expected to support Southern policies in Congress; the Ordinance may have been construed as a tacit endorsement of slavery in the Southwest; and the negotiations that led to the Ordinance appear to have involved an agreement to speed the admission of new states from the Northwest by lowering the population required for admission. Taken together with the continued stalemate on the issue of Mississippi navigation, the Ordinance could well have seemed a Southern victory to the Southern congressional majority.

Two qualifications need emphasis. First, in speaking of "Southerners" or "Southern attitudes" I mean to suggest only that sectional conflict was already so intense that Southern politicians as a group were conscious of defending commonly-recognized sectional interests.[43] There is no intention of obscuring the difference between Grayson and Lee on the issue of slavery, or between Lee and Blount in regard to Southwestern expansion.[44] Second, thus far

[41] The text reads (*JCC*, XXXII, 342): "and whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free Inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its Delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever."

[42] Philbrick, cclxxix.

[43] See John R. Alden, *The First South* (Baton Rouge, 1961), *passim*.

[44] A history of these events might be written from the standpoint of land speculation. Lee and his family, as well as Washington, were longtime investors in Ohio Valley lands; uncharacteristically for Southerners, both Lee and Washington opposed immediate opening of Mississippi navigation. Blount was a

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I have deliberately ignored Madison's suggestion of cooperation between Congress and Convention, and approached the Northwest Ordinance as the product of sectional compromise within Congress. Whether or not the Ordinance was consciously intended to resolve problems in the Convention, it may have had that effect. We now turn to examine just what those problems were.

II

The coalition which secured the three-fifths compromise at the Convention was not a combination of "large states." It comprised the states of the South aided now by one Northern state, now by another. The key votes were on July 11, when the three-fifths rule was defeated six-four; on July 12, when it was adopted; on July 13, when it was extended to prospective Western states; and on July 14, when by a five-four vote a motion to limit representatives from the West to a number no greater than that from the original thirteen states, was beaten. The sectional pattern is obscured because South Carolina voted agains the three-fifths rule in an effort to have Negroes counted equally with whites. If South Carolina is placed in the "aye" column, one finds Virginia and the states South of it forming a solid South throughout these crucial votes.[45]

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leading speculator in Southwestern lands and during the summer of 1787 wrote letters to the New York press from an imaginary Westerner demanding the opening of the Mississippi. Grayson held stock in the Indiana Company, as did James Wilson, who defended Westward expansion at the Convention.

[45] On July 11, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, South Carolina, voted against the three-fifths ratio, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Connecticut voted for it. On July 12, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia voted for it, with New Jersey and Delaware opposed, and Massachusetts and South Carolina divided. On July 13, Congress was voted "authority to regulate the number of Representatives" in new states on the basis of the three-fifths ratio by a 9-0 vote with Delaware divided. On July 14, Gerry, seconded by King, moved that "in order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the number of Representatives in the 1st. branch of the States which shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in number, the Representatives from such of the States as shall accede to this confederation." Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland voted for this motion, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and New Jersey opposed, with Pennsylvania divided. (*RFC*, I, 588, 597, 606; II, 3.) It should be noted that New Jersey's delegates to Congress had been instructed to oppose closure of the Mississippi, and voted accordingly in the spring of 1787.

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The struggle, as Gouverneur Morris observed, was one "between the two ends of the Union."[46] Madison was still more explicit. On June 29 he stated:

> If there was real danger, I would give the smaller states the defensive weapons.—But there is none from that quarter. The great danger to our general government *is the great southern and northern interests of the continent, being opposed to each other. Look to the votes in congress, and most of them stand divided by the geography of the country, not according to the size of the states.*[47]

The next day Madison reiterated "that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves."[48] By July 14 Madison could say that it was "pretty well understood" that the "institution of slavery & its consequences formed the line of discrimination" between the contending groups of states at the Convention.[49]

Early in July delegates' attention turned from the size of their individual states to the size, actual and anticipated, of the sections to which their states belonged. At first Madison's mention of the sectional issue was rather to soften the conflict between large and small states than to bring forward the problems between North and South. But these problems became inescapable when the committee reports of July 5 and 9 brought the Convention to grips with allotment of representation to the West and to the slave. King said in the ensuing discussion that he "was fully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great & small States; but between the Southern & Eastern."[50]

The three-fifths rule had been accepted by a nine-two vote on June 11, but it now became once more problematical, because it was connected with Western expansion. For the South, inclusion of slaves in the basis of apportionment for the House and the

[46] Speech of July 13, *RFC*, I, 604. Morris went on to say that in the sectional struggle the Middle States ought to "join their Eastern brethren."
[47] *Ibid.*, I, 476.
[48] *Ibid.*, I, 486.
[49] *Ibid.*, II, 10.
[50] Speech of July 10, *ibid.*, I, 566.

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admission of Western states represented equally with the old were alternative means of strengthening its power in Congress. This was because, as Bancroft and Alden have noted, it was generally assumed that the South when strengthened by the West would become the most populous part of the country.[51] Delegate after delegate at the Convention asserted that "the Southern & Western population" would "predominate . . . in a few years," that "N.C. [,] S.C. and Georgia only will in a little time have a majority of people in America," or at least that "the people & strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly & S. westwdly."[52] Later, at the Virginia ratifying convention, no one questioned that (as Grayson put it) "God and nature have intended . . . that the weight of population should be on this side of the continent."[53] Antifederalists reasoned from this assumption that Virginia should wait until a Southern majority in Congress made it safe to transfer power from the states to the national government. Federalist Wilson Nicholas reasoned from the identical premise to a contrary conclusion. "The influence of New England, and the other northern states is dreaded," Nicholas said,

> there are apprehensions of their combining against us. Not to advert to the improbability and illiberality of this idea it must be supposed, that our population, will in a short period, exceed theirs, as their country is well settled, and we have very extensive, uncultivated tracts. We shall soon out-number them in as great a degree as they do us at this time: therefore this government, which I trust will last to the remotest ages, will be very shortly in our favor.[54]

Nicholas' argument did not convince George Mason. Nicholas showed, stated Mason, "that though the northern states had a most decided majority against us, yet the increase of population among us would in the course of years change it in our favor. A very sound argument indeed, that we should cheerfully burn ourselves to death in hopes of a joyful and happy resurrection!"[55]

[51] Bancroft, II, 87; Alden, 13, 75, 105-06, 131.

[52] The persons quoted are Mason on July 11, Morris and Butler on July 13 (*RFC*, I, 586, 604-05). See also Madison on July 11, 14, 21 (*ibid.*, I, 584-86; II, 9-10, 81).

[53] Speech of June 14, Elliot, III, 343.

[54] Speech of June 6, *ibid.*, III, 121-22.

[55] Speech of June 11, *ibid.*, III, 260-61

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The generally accepted premise that the weight of numbers was shifting from North to South gave both sections an interest in discarding the existing arrangement which gave each state one vote in Congress. Writing to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington before the Convention met, Madison correctly predicted that proportional representation would be "recommended to the Eastern States by the actual superiority of their populousness, and to the Southern by their expected superiority."[56] This was the basis of compromise at the Convention.

It was a compromise excruciatingly difficult to formulate in detail. What was needed, as Mason said on July 11, was a system which accorded the North its present right to predominate but was so framed that when the Southern states grew larger, power would pass to them.[57] But Deep South delegates feared that the North might use even a temporary majority to force emancipation. Thus Butler of South Carolina stated: "The security the Southn. States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to do."[58] Northerners, in their turn, feared that the South and West would employ their eventual majority to oppress commerce and thrust America into needless wars. "He must be short sighted indeed," King said,

> who does not foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be more numerous than the Northern, they can & will hold a language that will awe them [the Northern states] into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force shall back their demands?[59]

Ironically, the South expected to dominate the House of Representatives while the North looked for its security to the Senate. Gouverneur Morris asserted on July 13 that he saw "the Southn. Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way

[56] Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 19 [18], 1787, Hunt, II, 327; also same to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, and to George Washington, April 16, 1787, *ibid.*, II, 340, 345.

[57] *RFC*, I, 578, 586. Mason and other Southerners were insisting that a periodic census be mandatory.

[58] Speech of July 13, *ibid.*, I, 594.

[59] Speech of July 12, *ibid.*, I, 595-96.

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open to their gaining a majority in the public Councils." This would oblige him "to vote for ye. vicious principle of equality in the 2d. branch in order to provide some defense for the N. States agst. it."[60] Madison, speaking for the South, was equally alarmed at the idea of equal representation in the Senate because of "the perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northn. agst. the Southn." states. "Should a proprtl. representation take place it was true, the N. side would still out-number the other: but not in the same degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards an equilibrium."[61]

This tangle of anxieties was complicated further by the ordinance for government of the West passed by the Continental Congress in 1784. King reminded the Convention on July 6 that Congress had "impoliticly laid it [the west] out into ten States," and covenanted with the settlers to permit any Western state to enter the Union as soon as the number of its inhabitants equalled the population of the smallest of the original thirteen. Since little Delaware had only thirty-five thousand inhabitants, King concluded, a large number of Western states representing very few people might soon be admitted.[62] The Senate could hardly provide a fortress for Northern interests if in the near future it were overwhelmed with twenty new senators from the West.

Thus by early July the conflict of large and small states had been partially transformed into a conflict of North and South. Georgia, the third smallest state in the Union, and South Carolina, smaller than New York or Connecticut, voted as "large" states because they expected to grow and because they expected the section of which they were a part to grow.[63] Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the

[60] *Ibid.*, I, 604.

[61] Speech of July 14, *ibid.*, II, 9-10.

[62] *Ibid.*, I, 541.

[63] In a speech of June 30, Bedford observed that Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina behaved as large states, along with Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, because the Southern states (with the exception of Maryland) expected to grow (*RFC*, I, 491). On July 2, C. Pinckney referred to Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as "the large States" (*ibid.*, I, 510), they (with the exception of Georgia, which divided) having just voted against an equality of suffrage in the Senate. Luther Martin, in his *Genuine Information*, stated that Georgia voted as a large state because it had an area larger than Great Britain and thirty times the size of Connecticut, and expected in time a population proportionate to its size (*ibid.*, III, 187).

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large Northern states, voted as large states when discussion centered on the balance of power in the existing confederacy; but when Western representation came on the floor, what Bancroft called New England's "ineradicable dread of the coming power of the South-west" tended to draw them toward the "small" state position.[64] Section as well as size was involved in the great Convention crisis which led Franklin to suggest prayer and Washington (as Freeman says) to express despair in a tone he had hardly used since the worst days of the war.[65]

III

What resolved the crisis? Farrand, attempting to account for the change in the tone of the Convention after July 10, was driven to invoke the fact that the weather became cooler.[66] Bancroft, characterizing the passage of the Northwest Ordinance by a Congress racked with sectional strife, concluded that "every man that had a share in it seemed to be led by an invisible hand to do just what was wanted of him."[67] Madison's comment to Coles invites us to search for more adequate explanations by viewing as parts of one whole the events of mid-July in both New York and Philadelphia. Coles' recollection of Madison's memory of events a generation before their conversation[68] can hardly be relied on in detail. What it provides is a fresh point of departure.

The most obvious relationship between the Ordinance and the Constitution is that their fugitive slave clauses are almost identical and their clauses on the sanctity of contracts very

[64] Bancroft's dictum (II, 80) was illustrated when on July 5 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania urged the small states to accept proportional representation but also favored "irrevocably" giving the Atlantic states more votes than new states of the West. Madison on the eleventh rightly accused him of adjusting his principles to the "points of the compass." It was Morris' plan of July 5 which two Massachusetts men moved on the fourteenth and for which both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania voted (*RFC*, I, 533-34, 584; II, 3; see also n. 45, above).

[65] Douglas S. Freeman, *George Washington, a Biography* (New York, 1948-57), VI, 100.

[66] ". . . on the night of the twelfth it turned cool" (Farrand, *Framing of the Constitution*, 104).

[67] Bancroft, II, 98.

[68] One assumes that the conversation took place when Coles was Madison's secretary, 1809-15 (E. B. Washburne, *Sketch of Edward Coles, Second Governor of Illinois* [Chicago, 1882], 18-19).

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similar.[69] There can be little question that the Convention, which worded these clauses of the Constitution in August, had the Ordinance of July in mind.

There were other ways in which the documents, without duplicating each other, were clearly supplementary. Thus the Ordinance said nothing about retaining the right to the Mississippi navigation, although a clause providing that waterways leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence "shall be common highways, and forever free," may have been seen as a precedent.[70] But a requirement that treaties be approved by two-thirds of the Senate was inserted in the Constitution "for the express purpose of preventing a majority of the Senate . . . from giving up the Mississippi."[71] Again, the Constitution was vague about the admission of new states. The Randolph Plan said that admission should be "with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the whole"; the Committee of Detail reported that the admission of new states should require the consent of two-thirds of the members present in each branch of the legislature; and at the insistence of Gouverneur Morris, Article IV, Section 3 merely stated that "New States may be admitted by Congress into this Union."[72] On the other hand, Article I, Section 2 made it clear that the three-fifths rule for the House would apply to "the several States which may be included within this Union," the agreement voted by the Convention on July 13.[73] Southerners reading this clause in conjunction with the provision of the Ordinance that "whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free Inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted . . . on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever," might well feel that

[69] Northwest Ordinance, Articles 2 and 6; United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 and Article IV, Section 3.

[70] A resolution to this effect had been moved by Grayson, seconded by King, and passed by Congress on May 12, 1786 (*JCC*, XXX, 263).

[71] Hugh Williamson to James Madison, June 2, 1788, *LCC*, VIII, 746.

[72] *RFC*, I, 22; II, 188.

[73] Rufus King told the Senate at the time of the Missouri Compromise that the three-fifths rule was merely "a settlement between the original thirteen states," inapplicable to new ones (*ibid.*, III, 430). The Convention resolution of July 13 clearly implies that the "may be included" of Article I, Section 2 was meant to refer to new as well as old states. The Committee of Detail put it: "The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen . . . by the people of the several States comprehended within this Union" (*ibid.*, II, 178).

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they had gained their points about *both* slave representation and the equal representation of new Western states.

All this is consistent with Madison's idea of a connection in the drafting of Ordinance and Constitution. One is, therefore, led to inquire whether consultation between Congress and Convention preceded the drafting of the Northwest Ordinance on July 9-11; whether the nature of the Ordinance was such as to ease the sectional tension then troubling the Convention; and whether the essential features of the Ordinance were reported to members of the Convention in time to influence its voting on July 12-14. Since the answer to all three questions is probably, Yes, I think one can justifiably present the hypothesis that there occurred in July 1787 a sectional compromise involving Congress and Convention, Ordinance and Constitution, essentially similar to those of 1820 and 1850. The business of a hypothesis, I take it, is to present a structure of logic which accounts for the available facts, and is susceptible to proof or disproof. Evidence proving or disproving the hypothesis of a Compromise of 1787 may come to light, or have (unknown to me) already come to light, in any of some dozens of manuscript collections. The hypothesis is brought forward in the hope that such evidence will be forthcoming.

Were there "conferences and inter-communications" (to use the words Coles attributed to Madison) between Congress and Convention in early July? When the Convention adjourned for three days on July 2 to allow a committee of all the states to seek a compromise, four congressmen, three of them members of the Convention, left for New York City. It was this journey of Blount and Hawkins of North Carolina, Pierce and Few of Georgia, that enabled Congress to achieve a quorum for the first time in almost two months.[74] (The accession of the two Southern states also gave the South a majority in Congress.) Richard Henry Lee, who arrived on July 7 and took his seat on July 9, was therefore the fifth prominent Southerner to travel from Philadelphia to New York in less than a week. Hamilton, who left the Convention June 29, was in New York City by July 3.[75] On July 5 Manasseh Cutler arrived

[74] See nn. 6-8 above.

[75] On July 3 Hamilton wrote to George Washington from New York City: "I own to you Sir that I am seriously and deeply distressed at the aspects of the Councils which prevailed when I left Philadelphia" (Harold C. Syrett [ed.], *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton* [New York, 1961-], IV, 224).

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from Massachusetts. When one recalls that Pierce, on his earlier return from the convention (June 14-18), had spoken freely of "the plans of the Southern, Eastern, or Middle States,"[76] it seems a reasonable conclusion that "conference and inter-communication" occurred.

Was the nature of the Ordinance relevant to the crisis at Philadelphia? If we can assume (as contended earlier) that the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest was not threatening to the South, then the antislavery-fugitive slave clause of the Ordinance may have reassured men like Davie and Butler, just then expressing the first apprehensions about slave property on the floor of the Convention.[77] This was the element in the putative compromise stressed in Coles' recollection. But we have Dane's testimony that the antislavery proviso was added to the Ordinance at the last moment.[78] And Deep South statements of alarm at the Convention continued unabated until the compromise on the slave trade at the end of August.[79]

More significant, surely, were the provisions of the Ordinance concerning the admission of new states. After the Ordinance passed, Dane wrote to King (as already quoted) that "the Eastern states for the sake of doing away the temporary governments, etc. established in 1784, and for establishing some order in that Country, gave up as much as could be reasonably expected." What did the North give up? It gave up its plan to require a large population for admission to statehood, and to make admission depend on the consent of a competent number of states in Congress. The Northwest

[76] See n. 6, above.

[77] See n. 5, above.

[78] Dane to King, July 16, 1787, *LCC*, VIII, 622. Dane says he omitted an antislavery clause from the draft reported to Congress on July 11 since only Massachusetts of the New England states was present, but that "finding the House favorably disposed" he moved its inclusion, and it was "agreed to without opposition." The draft reported on July 11 did not contain the antislavery clause (*JCC*, XXXII, 314-20).

[79] Another essay might be written about the compromise of late August. On August 29 Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina supported Gouverneur Morris' motion to strike from the Constitution the idea that new states should be admitted on terms of equality with the old (*RFC*, II, 454). The three Deep South states had just been gratified on the issues of slave importation (which, of course, would add to their political as well as economic strength) and fugitive slaves.

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Ordinance even added that "so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the Confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there may be a less number of free Inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand." Philbrick, the most detailed commentator on the Ordinance, judged this to be so drastic a change in the ordinance almost passed in May that it raised a "suspicion that some understanding" was involved. If the North rather than the South made the major concession in the drafting of the Ordinance, one could make better sense of Grayson's statement to the Virginia ratifying convention that the Ordinance "passed in a lucky moment," leaving Massachusetts "extremely uneasy about it."[80]

But the admission provisions of the Ordinance spoke to the needs of North as well as South. On the one hand, given the Southern assumption that the states of the Northwest (even if non-slaveholding) would strengthen the South in Congress, the provisions for easy and early admission to statehood held out hope to the South of swiftly increasing its forces in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, however, the Ordinance wrote into law what had only been approved in principle the year before: that the Northwest would consist of three to five states rather than of ten. Thus it forestalled the prospect, threatening to the North, of losing control of the Senate. This would explain Dane's statement to King that he thought the population requirement for admission too small, "but, having divided the whole Territory into three States, this number appears to me to be less important."[81]

If (as George Mason put it) what the Convention needed was a plan that recognized the present dominance of the North while providing for eventual transition to a Southern majority, a plan, too, which safeguarded the present minority needs of the South and the future minority needs of the North, the Ordinance supplied a *deus ex machina* uncannily appropriate. The beauty of its admission requirements was that they appeared at the time to promote the South's interests in the House while protecting the North's interests in the Senate. Some necessary ambiguity remained. North as well as South hoped for the political allegiance of at least

[80] Speech of June 13, Elliot, III, 331.
[81] Dane to King, July 16, 1787, *LCC*, VIII, 622.

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some of the Northwest states. The clause on slavery could be presented to Southern ratifying conventions as a guarantee of property and to Northern ratifying conventions as a bar to the creation of new slave states.[82] In place of a West vaguely attractive or dangerous, the Ordinance made available a West just sufficiently specific that each section could read in it the fulfillment of its political dreams.

Still, could the essential features of the Ordinance have become known in Philadelphia in time to affect the voting of July 12-14? The answer is, Yes. Whatever the catalyst was at the Convention, it was not yet apparent on July 10, when Washington wrote to Hamilton that matters were if anything worse than at the end of June.[83] That same afternoon, after returning to the appropriate congressional committee a draft of the Ordinance with several amendments, Manasseh Cutler left New York for Philadelphia. Arriving on the twelfth, he spent the evening at the Indian Queen tavern with delegates from the South and Massachusetts—Strong, Gerry, Gorham, Madison, Mason, Martin, Williamson, Rutledge, one of the Pinckneys—together with "Mr. Hamilton of New York," and other, unnamed persons. The morning of the fourteenth he spent with Strong, Martin, Mason, Williamson, Madison, Rutledge, and "Mr. Hamilton, all members of the Convention," before returning to New York City.[84] What better messenger could have been wished than the promoter of the Northwest Ordinance?

Cutler's references make clear that Hamilton was also in Philadelphia. He was not yet there on July 10, Cutler saw him on the twelfth and fourteenth, he did not represent New York at the Convention, and he was back in New York City by the twentieth.[85]

[82] Thus James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, December 3, 1787, that "the *new* states which are to be formed, will be under *the control* of congress in this particular; and slaves will never be introduced amongst them" (Elliot, II, 423).

[83] Washington to Hamilton, July 10, 1787, Syrett, IV, 225: "I *almost* despair. . . . I am sorry you went away. I wish you were back." At the end of July 11 the Convention "found itself without having advanced a single step" since July 5 (Farrand, *Framing of the Constitution*, 103).

[84] *Life of Cutler*, II, 242-72.

[85] Washington's letter cited in n. 83 shows that at the time on July 10 when Washington wrote, Hamilton was not in Philadelphia, at least to Washington's knowledge. On July 14 King apologized for referring to New York at the Con-

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The purpose of this brief and unofficial visit is unknown. Conceivably, Hamilton left New York late enough to learn the outlines of the Ordinance and arrived in Philadelphia early enough to influence the voting of the twelfth.[86] Hamilton's good friend Gouverneur Morris closed the Convention session of July 11 on a note of intransigence and opened the next morning's session with a proposal to "bridge" the sectional conflict.[87] But at this point one moves from the realm of legitimate speculation to that of uncontrolled fantasy.

If the Northwest Ordinance did in fact influence the compromises of the Constitution, how bitter a pill for its Antifederalist sponsors, Grayson, Lee, and Melancton Smith! And that would not be the only irony. It would mean that the South, backing the Ordinance on the doubly-mistaken assumption that its security lay in the House of Representatives and that the states of the Northwest would give it strength there, had produced a charter of freedom for the Negro; but also, that this charter made possible the Constitution, which gave slavery new sanctions.

Finally, why did Congress and Convention act so differently? The evidence suggests that the motives which moved men in making Ordinance and Constitution were essentially the same. The drafters at Philadelphia were troubled about slavery as were the legislators

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vention "in the absence of its representatives"; on July 16 Randolph speculated as to how "New York if present" would vote (*RFC*, II, 7, 18; Yates and Lansing, the other New York delegates, left July 10). On July 20 Hamilton wrote a letter to Nathaniel Mitchell from New York City (Syrett, IV, 226).

[86] He might then not only have influenced Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina in altering their votes on the three-fifths rule (see n. 45, above), but also have arranged a meeting with Cutler for the twelfth. It does seem odd that at one of the tensest points in the Convention, a quarter of its membership accidentally (as Cutler's journal suggests) happened to be together and willingly idled away an evening with the visitor. See Irving Brant, *James Madison, Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800* (New York, 1950), 98-99, who asks, What brought Madison and Pinckney to the Indian Queen?, and suggests that they may have been preparing large state strategy for a last attempt to block equal suffrage in the Senate. But would they have talked to Cutler about this? My suggestion requires only that *he* talked to *them*.

[87] Morris said on the eleventh that "he could never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as would be given by allowing them a representation for their negroes" (*RFC*, I, 588). The next day, while still asserting that "he verily believed the people of Pena. will never agree to a representation of Negros," he proposed that taxation and representation be proportional, with the object, Madison said, "to lessen the eagerness on one side, & the opposition on the other" to the three-fifths rule (*ibid.*, I, 591-93; II, 106 and note).

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in New York. But in Congress, Southerners who sought to guarantee slave property and to make possible a stronger Southern voice in Congress saw Northwest settlement, even without slavery, as a means to these ends. At the Convention, sanctions for slavery (the three-fifths clause and the slave trade clause) seemed necessary to bring about the same results: protection against emancipation and a Southern majority in the House. In each case the North made the compromises the South demanded, but in Congress, because of the South's mistaken assumptions about the future of the Northwest, an antislavery clause could be included. The fugitive slave clause adopted unanimously by both bodies shows, if not that there was a sectional compromise between Congress and Convention, at least that the makers of both Ordinance and Constitution were ready to compromise the concept that all men are equal. This was the fundamental compromise of 1787.

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Education at the Top of Government

RAYMOND L. THURSTON
U. S. Embassy, Mogadiscio, Somali Republic

In a survey made by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago in 1961-62 it was learned that 28,770,000 persons were engaged in some kind of adult educational course or activity in the United States, including "the courses offered by government agencies and the armed forces to government employees."[1] Many factors contribute to this picture of a nation engaged in such a massive adult educational effort, but the primary impetus undoubtedly stems from the dynamic character of social, economic, and technological change in our contemporary society. The tempo of change imposes a requirement on working adults for periodic refresher courses related directly or indirectly to their jobs, and at the same time we have the technologically created phenomenon of more leisure time for millions of our fellow citizens who increasingly seek a compensatory, non-vocational outlet in broad cultural studies.

Other than purely vocational or cultural motivations are at work in this vast, new complex of adult education. Among leaders in business, industry, labor, government, and the professions an acute awareness has developed that even as technical specialization proliferates in the educational and "working" worlds, a need greater

[1] Jerome M. Ziegler, "Continuing Education in the University," *Daedalus*, XCIII (1964), 1162-63.

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than ever has emerged for men and women of varying backgrounds who possess a broad understanding of the political, economic, social, and military factors in our society and who perceive their interrelationships—in short, those who see the forests and not just the trees on the national and international scenes. Interwoven with the concept of "continuing education" is the expanding requirement for civic leadership at all levels of our society, a leadership transcending the narrow technical skills, a leadership characterized by political and philosophical wisdom of the highest order.

If the generality of American adults is faced with the problem of continuing education to keep them on their civic, vocational, and cultural toes in this rapidly changing world, what is the situation with respect to that group of Americans who in recent decades have had thrust upon them a pointed and heavy responsibility for resolution of mid-twentieth-century problems facing the nation, namely, the senior, permanent career officials, military and civilian, of our federal government?

Though from the very beginnings of the republic our federal government has tended to be more Hamiltonian than Jeffersonian —in practice if not in theory—the modern era of strong, centralized government began in 1933 with Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. With the consent and support of a majority of the electorate the national authorities have assumed new functions and ever increasing responsibilities in the social and economic realm. The federal bureaucracy has expanded many-fold, as has the complexity of its tasks. On top of this pervasive movement toward unprecedented government activity on the domestic scene came the events of World War II and its aftermath, leading to radical changes in our traditional foreign policy and military posture. The impact of these latter changes on our government structure was symbolized in the National Security Act of 1947, the net effect of which was to create an integrated area of national government activity at the presidential level under the rubric of "national security" and to establish various formal links between the newly unified national military establishment, the Department of State, the new Central Intelligence Agency, and other key agencies concerned with foreign and military policy.

It should be acknowledged that similar problems face state and local officials and, for that matter, elected representatives at all

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levels of government. As to the former category, attention to improving the quality of state and local government leadership is obviously timely and desirable. It is intended here, however, to focus on the national level and to leave it to others more qualified to deal with the comparable aspects of the problem in the state and local sphere. With respect to elected officials—from president to dog-catcher—all we can expect is that they will be chosen by an educated and therefore discriminating electorate. To suggest the imposition on this category in our democracy of formal in-service education is unrealistic, however much one may be inspired by ideas drawn from Plato's *Republic*.

The present discussion of in-service education for our senior officials will be limited to one segment, albeit a major one, of the problem. What follows is an appraisal only of those programs for this purpose conducted by the federal government itself, namely, the top schools for military and foreign affairs' personnel and comparable courses for civil service executives in the other agencies, together with suggestions for improvement of this government-administered system. Only passing references will be made to the important part played by the great private and state universities and the privately endowed foundations and other scholarly institutions in the enlightenment of our public officials, for that is really another story.

A unique and important advantage of governmental educational institutions is their ability to draw upon sensitive, highly classified official sources relating particularly to military and diplomatic questions. Even apart from such privileged information the government schools have the undeniable benefit of being closer to the flow of current official policies and operations, thus enabling the mature and experienced participants to pursue their studies in a more realistic and responsible fashion than would otherwise be possible. Furthermore, government-administered schools and inherently more responsive than academic institutions under private auspices to the special requirements for career development of senior personnel in the agencies concerned, including personnel programs for greater job mobility. Lastly, an important by-product of the government college system that is not so readily created in more diversified academic environments is the fostering of an *esprit de corps* among the various categories of public servants.

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While such considerations provide a solid justificaton for distinctive governmental activity in the field of higher education, they do not, of course, automatically ensure that the present system is free of deficiencies or that it is fully adequate to the needs of the times. Greater public awareness of the nature of the problem, especially among specialists in education and public administration in and out of government, may well be the indispensable first step to needed reforms and innovations on this not too well known but vital front of our national effort. The evaluation that follows is offered as an opening gambit in a game that will attract other more qualified players.

The War Colleges

In the same early post-World War II years that saw the passage of the National Security Act came the beginnings of the present system of senior schools for military officers and diplomats, the war colleges and the Foreign Service Institute.[2] Superimposed on the existing service war colleges (the Naval War College dates from 1882, the Army War College from 1901, while the Air War College was not established until 1947 when the Air Force was created as a separate service) were the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, organized in 1946-47 and placed under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the spirit of the National Security Act close links were forged early in the history of these national military institutions with civilian departments and agencies in the national security area, notably, the Department of State. A senior career diplomat serves as deputy commandant for foreign affairs at the National War College,[3] and a

[2] The institution of in-service education for military officers antedates the modern era. Education in one form or another for war is an obviously desirable pursuit for the soldier in peacetime. We are indebted to the older war colleges in Europe and America for such classic works on military strategy as Clausewitz' *On War* and Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. The antecedent of the Foreign Service Institute is of more recent vintage, namely, the Foreign Service Officers' Training School established by the Rogers Act of 1924. Even as late as 1939, when the author spent four pleasant months in this school, it had a permanent staff of two to look after seventeen student officers and was comfortably if not elegantly housed in one room in the basement of the old State, War and Navy Building in Washington.

[3] George F. Kennan was the first to serve in that capacity.

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number of State Department officers have lesser faculty positions. In a typical National War College class of 134 students about thirty are civilians, the great majority being State Department or Foreign Service officers. Though on a more limited scale, the same situation now prevails with respect to the Industrial College and the service war colleges, all of which have State Department advisers, almost invariably senior career Foreign Service officers, on their staffs and include a number of State Department and other civilians in their student ranks. It has been estimated that in the years since 1946 about 514 State Department and Foreign Service officers have completed the regular courses in residence at the various war colleges. This is a small number compared with the thousands of military officers who have been graduated from these insituations since the war, but it exceeds significantly the number of career diplomats (104) who have been graduated from the comparable senior course at the Foreign Service Institute which, however, dates only from 1958.

The overall mission of the war colleges is to prepare senior military officers for the important responsibilities many will assume shortly in the various service, joint, and international commands and in other policy-making roles in the defense establishment. In a ten-month course the Air Force and Army colonels or lieutenant colonels and the Navy captains and commanders achieve through lectures by national leaders and prominent specialists, reading assignments, group discussion, and problem-solving a better understanding of the contemporary international scene with emphasis, of course, on United States objectives and programs and on military and politico-military factors. At the Industrial College, however, primary attention is given to the economic component of the defense spectrum. The curriculum of the National War College has a heavy non-military content. The current course is structured around such subjects as "The World Situation," "Factors of National Power," "The Formulation of National Security Policy," "Strategy and Warfare," "The Communist States," "Free Europe and the Western Hemisphere," "Africa and Free Asia," and "Counterinsurgency."

Though the instruction at the service war colleges might be expected to dwell heavily on military subjects of particular interest to the respective services, this is not the case. The courses of study

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pursued at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army), Newport, Rhode Island (Navy), and Montgomery, Alabama (Air Force) are similar to those at Fort McNair, Washington, D. C., the site of the National War College and the Industrial College. The principal aim in all these institutions is to broaden the outlook of senior military officers with respect to the nature and direction of the dynamic forces in our contemporary world and, more concretely, to the importance of, and imperative need for, cooperative working relations among all branches of the armed forces and all other agencies and instruments of our national security. These senior schools in the field of national security constitute an invaluable means for the fostering and maintenance of an *esprit de corps* among government officials of varying professional backgrounds. The joint quest for knowledge of mature, responsible men, temporarily freed of hierarchical and bureaucratic inhibitions, is an important, binding element in later years. This is true both in respect of personal and institutional relationships.[4]

In the years that follow their common educational experience the graduates of a given war college class find themselves doing business with one another in their new roles as flag and general officers, ambassadors, assistant secretaries of state, political advisers to unified and international commands, and so forth. The writer has vivid recollections of joint efforts in the field with former war college classmates: in Athens in the mid-fifties, both on shore in the senior ranks of the U. S. Military Mission to Greece and in the Sixth Fleet afloat in the Eastern Mediterranean, naval flag officers of the same Fort McNair vintage helped a new deputy chief of embassy cope with politico-strategic problems arising from the Cyprus dispute; in Haiti in the early nineteen-sixties the senior U. S. military commander in Latin America gave unstinted support to an ambassador then on collision course with the local dictator.

In the months spent in the government war colleges and comparable civilian institutions, the student is exposed to a rare and stimulating blend of authoritative facts and unconventional in-

[4] John W. Masland, "The National War College and the Administration of Public Affairs," *Public Administration Review*, XII (1952), 267-75; see also John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars, Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, 1957).

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sights into the current world scene; his judgment is sharpened keenly. What is even more difficult to find in other adult educational realms is the kind of foresight a student can acquire in the war colleges and comparable institutions on the civilian side of government. There is probably no more important attribute for a senior government official to possess in this rapidly changing world than a rough grasp of the future. For example, it was in 1951-52 that some students in and out of uniform at the National War College first learned about the Rand Corporation studies on the possibilities of launching earth satellites and discussed the uses to which such instruments could be put for peaceful and warlike purposes six years before the news about the Soviet sputnik created such a public sensation. It was also there that meaningful discussion took place about the prospect for the resurgence of nationalism in Western Europe and the emergence of animosities between Moscow and Peking several years before de Gaulle came to power in France and the dimensions of the Sino-Soviet rift became generally known. The war colleges or other government schools do not possess a magical power for making prophets and seers out of simple soldiers and staid bureaucrats, but they do contribute to a significant reduction in the murkiness of those crystal balls we must all consult from time to time.

The Foreign Service Institute

On the civilian side of in-service education in the national security area the principal instrumentality is the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State established under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. As defined in the act the task of the Institute is the very broad one of acting as the main training center of the U. S. government for its civilian officers and employes working in international affairs.

Divided into two branches, the School of Foreign Affairs and the School of Language and Area Studies, the Institute is now conducting programs at home and abroad for over eighteen thousand full-time and part-time students each year, about half of them from other government agencies. The School of Language and Area Studies accounts for ten thousand of the eighteen thousand total annual enrollment. This school gives brief three-week introductory

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area studies (Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa South of the Sahara, South Asia and East Asia), and selected officers (ten in 1963) are given advanced area studies of nine months' duration at leading American universities.

In the School of Foreign Affairs three general career development courses are given: a basic eight-week course for new Foreign Service officers; a mid-career course of twelve weeks for middle-level State Department and Foreign Service officers as well as officers of equivalent rank from other agencies; and a ten-month Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy for officers in the top grades of the department, the Foreign Service, and other branches of the government concerned with the conduct of our foreign relations.[5] The School of Foreign Affairs also offers a wide variety of short courses on communist strategy, the current American scene, economics, administration and management, and consular operations. In collaboration with other departments and agencies the Institute conducts a number of additional educational programs including the National Interdepartmental Seminar on Development and Internal Defense (a one-month course) and specialized courses on commercial and labor problems. There is also an Extension Training Division to handle the many courses offered to non-resident officers and employes. Lastly, the Institute monitors the assignment of State Department officers to nine-month courses at the universities and war colleges. In the latter category fall not only U. S. military institutions but also the Imperial Defense College at London, the NATO Defense College at Paris, and the Canadian Defense College.

From its establishment in 1947 until 1958 the Institute was constrained by the modesty of its budget and other considerations from embarking on other than fragmentary and cursory educational programs for senior career diplomats and comparable high-ranking representatives of the other civilian and military agencies concerned with international affairs. It was in the latter year that the Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy was organized to meet a long-

[5] The mid-career course has been dropped recently. To replace it a new Foreign Affairs Program Management Seminar has been instituted on a somewhat higher level. In another recent change the Senior Seminar has been accorded an autonomous status and consideration is also being given to a change in its name to show more clearly that it stands with the war colleges in the hierarchy of government education.

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standing need for a civilian facility comparable to the National War College and the other war colleges of the military establishment.

In the short six years of its existence the Senior Seminar has achieved standards of excellence and a government-wide prestige at least comparable to that of the National War College. A number of its graduates have received ambassadorial or other high appointments, including one of the few American women to become chief of a diplomatic mission, Margaret Joy Tibbets, our present ambassador to Norway.

The ten-month course offered by the Senior Seminar is divided into separate studies of approximately equal length under six headings: The Evolution of the United States as a World Power, including a review of U. S. diplomatic history in this century; the Domestic Base (U. S. political, social, and economic institutions); International Relations and Power (politico-military concepts); the United States in the World Arena (including economic and financial questions); Internal Defense and the Diplomacy of Development; and the Administration of National Security Policy.

The similarity in broad outline of this curriculum to that of the National War College will be noted. However, the emphasis on diplomatic history, the American domestic scene, international trade and finance, and development diplomacy is a distinguishing characteristic of the Senior Seminar course.

Unfortunately, in the writer's opinion, the Institute's well conceived Senior Seminar effort is too restricted. The number of senior officers who benefit from this course each year has averaged only about twenty, of which four or five come from the military services and other non-State Department agencies. Granted that the small size of the group has certain advantages, the national need for more senior officials to benefit from this kind of training should have priority. One obstacle to expansion is the inability of the operating agencies, principally the State Department and the Foreign Service, to forego the services of key senior personnel for a ten-month period. Another and related factor is lack of funds and physical facilities. The contrast in this respect with the military side of the house is striking. It has been estimated that at any given time twelve per cent of our military officers are engaging in formal, in-service educational training as against five per cent for the State Department

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and its Foreign Service and only two per cent for the Agency for International Development.[6] With respect to physical facilities one has only to visit the various war colleges to appreciate the limitations imposed by the inadequate quarters in which the Foreign Service Institute operates in Arlington, Virginia.

Until some change is made in this situation, the State Department and Foreign Service will continue to be dependent on the war colleges for taking under their hospitable wing a number of senior diplomats who might otherwise be assigned to the more appropriate and professionally profitable course offered by the Senior Seminar.[7]

Proposals for New Government Training Programs in Foreign Affairs

Early in the Kennedy administration former Secretary of State Christian Herter was named to chair a committee of distinguished private citizens to look into the question of "Foreign Affairs Personnel." In its critical examination of this subject the committee gave attention to some of the deficiencies of the Foreign Service Institute and recommended that the Institute be replaced by an interdepartmental National Foreign Affairs College. Subsequently, President Kennedy asked James A. Perkins, vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation, to head another committee to inquire further into the concept of "a new institution at the national level for advanced training, education and research with respect to U. S. foreign affairs." The committee proposed on December 17, 1962, the establishment of a "National Academy of Foreign Affairs" with an autonomous charter, operating at the highest level of government and striving for a level of quality equal to that of our best universities. This proposal was embodied in administration-sponsored bills in both houses of the Eighty-eighth Congress (H. R.

[6] It is not intended to suggest that these data are strictly comparable, since a large part of the military establishment in peacetime, even in this era of the cold war, is essentially a training enterprise, whereas the State Department might be said to be fully engaged in the current twilight zone between peace and war.

[7] A small number of Foreign Service officers would, of course, continue to attend the war colleges in any event as a prerequisite for later assignments to positions requiring a specialized knowledge of politico-military affairs.

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3668 and S. 865). Extensive hearings were conducted in April-May 1963 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[8]

Under this legislation the Academy would have a Board of Regents chaired by the secretary of state with four official colleagues from other government agencies and five members appointed from private life by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The chancellor of the Academy, who is also to be a member of the Board of Regents, would likewise be a presidential appointee approved by the Senate. To the chancellor would be entrusted the responsibility of directing the affairs of the Academy under the general supervision of the other regents. Though exceptions might be made in certain cases "when deemed to be in the national interest," the permanent purpose of the Academy would be the education of senior U. S. government personnel in foreign affairs and related fields. The functions and facilities of the Foreign Service Institute would accordingly be transferred to the Academy. In addition to instructional activity the staff of the Academy would be authorized to perform research.

While the proposed Academy represents a commendable effort to escape what some may feel to be the fetters of traditional diplomacy, those critics who describe it as merely a "beefed up" or "glamorized" substitute for the Foreign Service Institute are not completely wrong. The proposed Academy does, of course, seek to reflect more faithfully in its interdepartmental structure the reality of the current "country team" approach to our international operations, but the Institute cannot be said to have been unresponsive to

[8] S. 15 and S. 865 would establish a U. S. Foreign Service Academy and a National Academy of Foreign Affairs; S. 414 would establish a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy. For an account of the hearings see *Training of Foreign Affairs Personnel* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1963). The Freedom Commission and Academy bill has some important features in common with the administration-sponsored National Academy scheme, but there are major philosophic and operational differences between them. The Freedom Academy would function under a commission entirely independent of the major government departments (like the Atomic Energy Commission). It is envisaged as the indoctrination and training spearhead of the free world cold war effort and would not only train U. S. government personnel for this struggle but also would have the task of teaching thousands of private U. S. and foreign citizens how to fight communism. The commission would be empowered to establish information centers in the United States and to publish high school and college textbooks. This proposal obviously raises contentious issues of national policy outside the scope of this article.

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this in recent years. The Academy prospectus places a warranted emphasis on the need for operational research in the new fields opening up as our missions abroad engage in unprecedented, nation-building programs. Here, too, one wonders why the present Foreign Service Institute could not do the job with the help of more funds, physical facilities, and, on the psychological side, a change in nomenclature, for example, the renaming of the Institute as a National Academy of Foreign Affairs. If the premise is accepted that a quantum jump in the professional training of senior officials concerned with foreign affairs is an urgent necessity, together with the corollary that the State Department is the proper agency to take the lead in this endeavor, then much lost motion can be avoided by concentrating on ways and means to make the Foreign Service Institute the best possible instrument for this purpose. It has been learned recently that in the aftermath of congressional inaction on the Academy bill[9] the officials directly concerned are operating on these sound assumptions.

Interagency Training Under Leadership of the Civil Service Commission

Judging by the published record of Senate hearings on the various academy bills, no interest was shown in the relationship between the new institutions proposed for the training of officials in the national security area and the government-wide system of in-service education coordinated by the Office of Career Development of the Civil Service Commission. Only one witness touched briefly on the underlying aspect of this problem in explaining his recommendation that the title of S. 865 be changed to the "National Academy of Public Affairs Act of 1963 or the like. . . . The security and welfare of the Nation, in its commitment to peace and freedom, does require a body of public servants with a common understanding, who can operate in all areas of the struggle both in matters foreign and domestic."[10]

Agencies outside the national security field have, of course, been

[9] The bill was not reported out of committee, and there are other reasons to believe that the Academy project has been quietly shelved.

[10] Training of Foreign Affairs Personnel, 428-29. The witness was Captain J. C. Webb, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), a graduate of the Naval Academy.

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engaged for many years in employe training programs of one kind or another. However, it is only since the enactment of the Government Employees Training Act in 1958 that real progress has been made toward coordinated development of educational programs for career executives to help equip them for their new and complex tasks.[11] The extent of these efforts best can be appreciated by reference to the latest annual bulletin on Inter-Agency Training Programs of the Civil Service Commission.[12] Here we learn that about 250 regular courses of from one or two days' to several months' duration are offered by twenty-one departments and agencies represented on the Committee on Inter-Agency Training. The roster of the latter includes men and women drawn from virtually every field of government activity in Washington, from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National Capital Housing Authority to the State and Defense Departments. The courses offered range from elementary management and personnel studies to advanced seminars in automatic data processing and an executive leadership institute for GS-16's and above. The Civil Service Commission itself gives more than fifty courses, many of them for senior officials such as the two just mentioned.

The gains made in the promotion and coordination of interagency training under the leadership of the Civil Service Commission have gone far to meet the main objective of the Government Employee Training Act, namely, the utilization of existing government educational facilities as an across-the-board, integrated resource for all government employes needing, and otherwise eligible for, whatever instruction may be available in their own or other agencies. However, officials of the Office of Career Develop-

[11] Beginning in 1954 The Brookings Institution was a pioneer in exploratory work to determine the need for training for federal executives in the civilian agencies. The Brookings Federal Executive Conferences in 1957 contributed to the passage of the Training Act in 1958. This great foundation has been actively engaged in the years that followed not only in direct training efforts for senior federal officials but also in a promotional and advisory role in the various government programs outlined in this section. This is an outstanding example of fruitful collaboration between private institutions and government agencies in the educational sphere.

[12] The writer is indebted to the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, John W. Macy Jr., for the 1964-65 edition of this bulletin and other helpful material on government educational activities of the Commission which have been liberally drawn on in what follows.

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ment of the CSC recently have set their sights higher. They envisage the eventual establishment of a Senior Staff College with a four-month residential program for federal career executives in grades GS-16 and above. In a recent partial step in the direction of this CSC "war college," the Commission inaugurated in 1963-64 an Executive Seminar Center at King's Point, New York, with an integrated curriculum for careerists of grade GS-13 and above which can be taken through a series of conceptually related two-week courses over a period of years. If the King's Point effort is a success, two additional centers will be developed, one in the Midwest, the other on the West Coast.

In addition to its small resident faculty, the King's Point Center draws on knowledgeable persons from government, private industry, and the academic world as guest lecturers and discussion leaders. Instruction is given on Administration of Public Policy, Environment of Federal Operations, Public Policy and the National Economy, Social Needs and Federal Programs, Implications of International Conditions (emphasis on how foreign affairs interrelate with domestic activities), Effects of Technological Development, The National Defense Establishment, Inter-Governmental Programs and Problems, Administrative Interrelationships, and Skills and Goals of Management.

In its prospectus for an eventual Senior Staff College the CSC sets out six objectives:

1. To provide career executives with the opportunity to enlarge their understanding of the total problems of government—national and international—so that they may better appreciate the scope of their work and the impact and consequences of their decisions as they relate to national needs and purpose.
2. To make available to career executives the time and opportunity to renew and enlarge their understanding of the great issues of society in this century.
3. To provide an opportunity to explore the fundamental tenets of the democratic process.
4. To evaluate administrative concepts to ensure the most effective administration of the public business and the best use of resources.
5. To examine the inter-relationship of government, business, education, and other institutions in achieving total national purposes.
6. To foster a sense of common purpose, to increase mutual under-

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> standing, and to stimulate sound approaches to common problems among career executives of diverse interests and experience.[13]

Classes of about one hundred students for each four-month session would be drawn primarily from senior career officials of the executive branch in GS-16 and above, but the following additional, and rather interesting, categories would also be invited to attend "as circumstances permit": politically appointed members of the executive branch, military personnel, employes of the legislative or judicial branches, employes of state and local governments, and representatives of business, labor, and education. To achieve the objectives of the college a broad program of selected addresses, group discussions, project committee assignments, planned reading, and selected case discussions is sketched out. Curriculum content would be directed to the major social, economic, technological, and governmental problems facing the American authorities at all levels of our federal system. Interrelationships of government to other institutions and the foundations of the American democratic process would be examined as necessary background for the role of the federal career executive as an innovator of program alternatives for political decision. From the informal and tentative Civil Service Commission study at hand there appears to be no intention to deal in depth with military matters and foreign affairs in the Senior Staff College course. Aside from brief reference to global aspects of communist strategy and formulating meaningful governmental patterns for new nations, the prospectus concentrates on the civilian and domestic aspect of our national purposes.

Strengths and Deficiencies of the System

Despite the necessarily brief treatment accorded the subject the writer has endeavored to sketch out a fairly complete picture of the present federal system for the education of senior officials. The fact emerges clearly that in response to the contemporary challenge to our national security, remarkable educational progress has been

[13] University-Federal Agency Conference on Career Development, *Conference Report* (Washington, D. C., 1962); see also David T. Stanley, *The Higher Civil Service* (Washington, D. C., 1964), 92-93, for a thoughtful evaluation of the contribution a Federal Staff College would make to the maintenance of a superior higher civil service.

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and continues to be made by the three principal governmental arms. The military establishment with its war college system, the State Department with its increasingly effective Foreign Service Institute, and the Civil Service Commission through its interagency training program in the domestic civilian sphere are all making a substantial contribution to the vital requirement for keen and up-to-date senior professionals in the national service.

Of the three systems, that of the military services is the best equipped with physical facilities, qualified instructional personnel, and funds, and is probably the most effective in fostering an *esprit de corps* among its elite graduates. The prestige enjoyed by the war colleges is not merely a by-product of the financial largess placed at their disposal by the American taxpayer. It stems in part from the direct relationship between selection for war college assignments and subsequent promotion to the highest ranks of the services, but it is more profoundly a reflection of the fact that the very nature of the contemporary military threat to our national security places an unambiguous premium on knowledge at the frontiers of modern science and statecraft. This is not to say that the present war college system is completely satisfactory or that those responsible for its operation are complacent. The role of the military professional in our society is subject to constant review in the light of changing technology, the emergence of such civilian skills as operations and systems analysis, and the highly centralized political control over military operations imposed by the realities of our nuclear age. There is a constant struggle to keep the substance of war college instruction synchronized in "real time" with the dynamic factors at work in the world outside the lecture halls and seminar rooms of these military cloisters. The point is that the up-dating effort is being made with favorable prospects within the existing institutional framework and that no radical changes in the system itself appear to be necessary at this time.

The situation with respect to senior professional training in diplomacy, foreign affairs, and international operations generally is somewhat different. Criticism has focused on the inability of the Foreign Service Institute to escape from the allegedly narrow outlook of traditional diplomacy and its failure to recognize the importance of the many new skills and outlooks bearing on the advancement of our interests abroad. These strictures are largely

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exaggerated. The Institute has by no means been content to lie dormant in the comfortable rut of the old diplomacy. From the very beginning it has done pioneer work in the fields of area and language studies and inter-cultural conflict. In more recent years its Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy and its National Interdepartmental Seminar on Development and Internal Defense have been at the forefront of the government's educational effort. Another forward-looking step was taken in January 1965 with the inauguration by the Institute of a pilot seminar of four weeks' duration on "Science, Technology and Foreign Affairs" under the direction of Professor Ludwig Andrieth, a distinguished scientist who recently served as science attaché in our embassy at Bonn.

It is to be hoped that the apparently stalemated movement for the establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs will continue to impel the State Department, in cooperation with the other agencies concerned, to initiate a more amply financed and determined campaign to strengthen the Institute. There is no reason why such a strengthened Institute could not fulfill the role of a center for government-wide training in all aspects of foreign affairs. The outlook of the present State Department and Institute leadership is certainly no "ideological" block to progress in this direction; nor, given the State Department's paramount role in foreign affairs, should there be any serious organizational obstacles.

The emphasis in the Civil Service Commission-directed program of senior professional education has properly been on civilian executive administration in the context of the American domestic scene. The experimental program at King's Point and the proposed Senior Staff College represent commendable efforts to inculcate an overall outlook on national problems among selected senior civil servants and to foster an *esprit de corps* in this group along the lines of the diplomatic and military services. These educational projects should also help to create a more favorable climate for mobility and interchange of senior personnel in the executive branch. Another constructive aspect of these programs is the provision of studies, as stated in the first objective for the Senior Staff College, "to enlarge understanding of the total problems of government—national and international."

In rendering what is, on the whole, a favorable verdict on present and prospective U. S. government in-house educational under-

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takings on the senior level, I do not wish to give the impression that serious gaps, weaknesses, and deficiencies do not exist in the overall pattern. Considering the profound crisis through which mankind is passing— one which is likely to persist for many decades— and the role of world leadership which history has imposed on the United States in this era, there is no room for complacency in any of our national institutions, including those under consideration. Good as they may be, how can we make them better? From this viewpoint action is considered desirable in three areas:

(1) Permanent senior officials in the legislative and judicial branches of the government are not brought together with their colleagues on the executive side in existing high-level, official colleges and schools.

(2) Career officials at the very top of the ladder (ambassadors, flag and general officers in the military, GS-16 and above categories) are largely excluded from existing arrangements.

(3) The vital relationship which exists between our domestic and foreign policies is inadequately recognized in our government educational activities and is nowhere the object of sustained examination by senior officials.

The third deficiency is the most basic. As an old-line Foreign Service officer the writer is acutely aware of how separate his professional world has been from that of career officials dealing with domestic problems, and this despite many years spent in Washington assignments and several special tours of an economic and military character off the classic Foreign Service track. Certainly officials on the foreign affairs side could gain from an educational experience shared with those struggling with homeside headaches. Looking at the other side of the coin, it is not difficult to agree with Roger Smith's observations concerning the powerful restraint imposed on United States foreign policy by "the power and the parochial orientation of the major domestic government agencies."[14] In his testimony before the Jackson subcommittee on December 11, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk pointed out that

> sound foreign policy runs directly into important domestic policies of interest between the foreign policy interests and a point of domestic

[14] Roger Smith, "Restraints on American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, XCI (1962), 712.

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> interest as it comes up, say, from Commerce or Agriculture or Interior, when the foreign policy interest would point in one direction, but our domestic interest would point in another . . . . there is no real distinction between domestic and foreign policy anymore. Almost everything we do affects foreign policy.[15]

There is always the danger, of course, in any scheme of cross-fertilization between foreign affairs agencies and those dealing with domestic matters that the latter will yield to the temptation to dabble in foreign policy and thus threaten the entire governmental process with paralysis. It perhaps was thoughts of this kind that led former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to throw up his hands in horror when the general drift of this article was conveyed to him in a conversation in 1963. One can only ask how it is possible to fight the specialization and parochialism of the domestic agencies other than by involving them "more directly in the foreign policy process and improving the caliber of people within these agencies dealing with foreign affairs."[16] Is our present system of education at the top of government coping effectively with this problem?

While both State Department and Defense Department programs for senior professional training reflect a highly developed sense of the interrelationships between the two spheres and benefit from an intimate interchange of personnel and program content, the same cannot be said for the third side of the house—the educational facilities for officials concerned with the domestic problems of our national society. This is unfortunate because however strong our military and diplomatic leadership, our national security is inseparable from strength on the home front. In the nineteen-forties and fifties we tended to envisage the maintenance of our security in primarily military and diplomatic terms and to take the health of the domestic base for granted. Today, while avoiding the isolationist excesses of the nineteen-thirties, we find ourselves engaged in a significant shift of attention to problems of a domestic character. This renewed interest in the state of the American society at

[15] Hearing, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Part 6, published under title *Administration of National Security* (Washington, D. C., U. S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1964), 398.

[16] Smith, 712.

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home is dramatized by the far-reaching reform programs of the present administration. Our leadership is proceeding on the sound premise that our security as a great power is assured only if we work also to be a great society.

Consider the contribution made to the national security by those officials who advise our top political leaders on policies and programs calculated to build an even more productive economy, to eliminate unemployment and illiteracy, to improve our educational system, to streamline government processes at all levels, to cope with problems of urbanization, housing, and highways, to develop our agricultural resources more rationally and to conserve our forestries and other resources, to remove racial and social barriers to opportunity, to name only some of the major items on the national agenda. Is it in the national interest that officials in this category remain separated as they are now in their professional life from their colleagues dealing with military and foreign affairs?

A fully satisfactory answer to the question thus posed cannot be found within the framework of the existing State Department and Pentagon schools. However broad and enlightened the concept of their respective missions may be, inherently parochial factors impose limitations on the scope of studies, the composition of classes, and the level of those attending these institutions. The same drawbacks obtain with respect to the CSC-coordinated educational program as presently organized. Even the imaginative scheme of the CSC for a Senior Staff College falls short of the objective in mind. While it is designed for very senior career officials including those in other than the executive branch, thus filling important gaps in the current system, its orientation would appear to be almost exclusively directed toward the civilian and domestic aspects of our national affairs.

Need for a National College at the Top

A more effective response to the educational challenge in the higher reaches of government would lie in the creation at the pinnacle of the government educational hierarchy of a National College of the United States in which the three streams, the military services and the foreign and domestic civilian services, would flow together

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to constitute one academic body.[17] Through a continuing, concerted effort a college of this kind could contribute significantly to the forging of a more perfect synthesis of our national purpose. Groups of officials drawn from the top echelons of the services and the departments and agencies divided more or less equally into contingents representing the three basic areas of government activity would come to such an institution for periods of one to twelve weeks. The central core of instruction would be a twelve-week course for classes up to one hundred; shorter special courses and seminars also would be available for smaller groups. Ambassadors and other senior officials serving abroad might be expected to attend courses of varying lengths in connection with their home leave and between tours. General and flag officers would be assigned to this educational duty in much the same manner. But the essential need is to find ways and means to detach high-level officials from their Washington desks, for without the participation of the career people at the sub-cabinet level, the assistant secretary and deputy assistant secretary level, the bureau chiefs, the senior special assistants and advisers to cabinet secretaries, and agency directors, this proposal would have little meaning. In short, the underlying purpose of a National College of the United States would be to bring together in an educational environment those career executives who have the most direct impact on policy formulation and decision-making at the very top of the government hierarchy whether in domestic, foreign, or military policy roles.

It would also be hoped that means could be found to provide for the assignment to the student body of senior staff members attached to the major committees of Congress and perhaps a few officials from the judicial branch of the national government. Lack of familiarity with the latter category of public servants dictates a more tentative suggestion about their inclusion than in the case

[17] Though the concept of an institution of this kind did emerge independently in my thinking some years ago, I learned subsequently that such an institution had been proposed by different sources much earlier, including papers written at the Army War College in the nineteen-thirties. In 1946 the report of a special board headed by Lieutenant General Gerow, which led to the establishment of the National War College, included a recommendation for a National Security University composed of an administrative college, an intelligence college, one National War College, the Industrial College, and a State Department College.

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of congressional staff personnel whose important role in policy-making is more obvious. A greater understanding by the public servants in one branch of the problems and perspectives of the other branches would not do damage to our basic constitutional principle of separation of powers and would, in fact, have a decidedly beneficial effect on national welfare and security. It was this aspect of the idea of a National College of the United States that particularly appealed to the late Edward R. Murrow, director of the United States Information Agency, when the subject was broached to him in 1963.

It is not intended here to put too much flesh on the skeleton of the proposed National College of the United States. Hopefully, others better qualified will be stimulated by this preliminary outline of possibilities to perform that task. Such a National College could come into being only in response to presidential interest and initiative and with the support of major members of his cabinet and ranking congressional leaders. Whatever the organizational details, the direction of the College would have to be in the hands of an outstanding citizen appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate and subject to an interagency advisory board representing the various government interests concerned. As to the courses of formal instruction, they would have to be conceived in the breadth and depth suitable to the interests of the leading nation of the free world; and a faculty would have to be assembled accordingly.

Such an institution would be strictly a school for senior officials with a curriculum designed to enhance their later professional contributions to the various federal services and agencies. No academic degree would be granted, nor would classes and other facilities be generally open to private persons and scholars save, of course, those serving on the staff and faculty. Given its highly specialized purposes, the National College could not be considered as competitive with the regular American graduate schools. Despite similarity of nomenclature the proposed school is therefore *not* a lineal descendant of George Washington's recommendation in his final address to the Congress in 1796 that a national university of the United States be established in the District of Columbia under federal auspices. Our first president clearly had in mind a university for "the education of our youth," for he hardly could have foreseen the

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need which has arisen in our own times for the education and re-education of our adult citizenry generally, not to mention senior government officials.

The proposed National College would, however, have a spiritual affinity with Washington's vision. It would reflect his abiding interest in imparting knowledge about the science of government. In his last address to Congress, he asked: "In a republic, what species of knowledge can be equally important and what duty more pressing on its legislature than to patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be the future guardians of the liberties of the country?" Today, almost two centuries later, the guarding of our liberties is still the central national task, albeit in conditions that have grown far more complex and demanding than in the early days of the republic. Every American citizen has his own civic responsibilities, but an especially heavy burden is carried by those entrusted to lead the nation, and their principal associates and advisers. The qualifications for service of these official guardians of our liberties cannot be too high. To the extent that the disciplines and processes of higher education can be helpful to this end, they must be maintained and fostered as precious national assets.

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Intranationalism vs. Internationalism: The Interregnum Struggle for the Sanctity of the New Deal

ELLIOT A. ROSEN
Rutgers University

The New Deal proposed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1932 campaign was based on the program prepared by the so-called brain trust, especially by Raymond Moley, Rexford Guy Tugwell, and Adolf A. Berle Jr., who were his most intimate advisers. These men believed that domestic reforms, reflation, and recovery should precede international economic action. In their estimate, recovery would be possible only in a nation shut off temporarily from the foreign influences that might exploit every advance made on the domestic scene. Specific measures designed to accomplish recovery included aid to agriculture in the form of the domestic allotment principle, correction of price disparities in the economy, federal regulation of securities and exchange practices, banks, and public utility holding companies, a public works program, a limited degree of industrial planning, a system of employment exchanges, unemployment insurance, relief measures, aid to the railroads, a balanced budget, and utilization of the "yardstick principle" for regulation of utility rates.

It was a program whose central theme was "intranationalism" which by its very nature precluded at least for a time international

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economic cooperation in certain areas. Elimination of abuses in the American economic system might well be accomplished without reference to external affairs. But establishment of a structured economy with an artificially induced rise in price levels, especially of farm products, and therefore a drop in the purchasing power of the dollar, required for a time insulation of the American economy from the vicissitudes of the world market. "We wanted recovery, we wanted a balanced economy, we wanted to institutionalize the balance and prevent future depressions. We had to shut off interference."[1]

Intranationalism, with its domestic emphasis, had a political appeal as well. It was a program certain to please the Western progressives, Republicans as well as Democrats, who had supported Roosevelt in the campaign and whose continued support would be essential in Congress. And it seemed to have been sanctioned by an electorate in the November election which was by and large ill disposed toward the European powers.

Yet the winter of 1932-33 saw a fierce contest behind the scenes between those who tried to reshape the President-elect's thinking and those who struggled to keep him on the road marked out during the campaign. It was not so much a struggle between Hoover and Roosevelt as between two sets of advisers, Moley and Tugwell on the one side and Norman Davis and Henry L. Stimson on the other. Nor was it mere competition for the favors of a man who had been chosen for the presidency. Rather it was a contest between the advocates of alternative paths to recovery, the one stressing domestic remedies for economic ills as the first need and the other giving priority to international agreement on such questions as monetary stabilization, restoration of the gold standard, reparations, debts, tariffs, and disarmament. At stake was the course of the New Deal.

Scholars have paid too little attention to the fact that Roosevelt, in the period between his election in November 1932 and his inauguration in March 1933, seriously considered reversing the choice made during the campaign. A close look at the record reveals significant behind-the-scenes developments in this respect.

[1] Rexford G. Tugwell to author, May 5, 1964.

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I

The record of the internationalists' effort to alter the course of the New Deal opens with Herbert Hoover's telegram to Roosevelt on November 13, 1932. Seemingly innocuous on the surface, the telegram bore deep implications. It informed the President-elect that Great Britain and the other debtor governments had requested suspension of the mid-December debt payments, pending a review of the entire debt situation. Despite reiteration of prior public statements opposing outright cancellation, Hoover revealed a willingness to bargain. "We should be receptive," he admonished Roosevelt, "to proposals from our debtors of tangible compensation in forms other than direct payment in expansion of markets for the products of our labor and farms [presumably, reduction of tariff barriers and import quotas]." With Roosevelt's assistance, Congress might be persuaded to revive the Debt Commission, obviously with but one purpose: reduction of debts. Hoover hoped that Roosevelt, who was scheduled soon to leave for Warm Springs, would "find it convenient to stop off [at Washington] long enough for me to advise with you."[2]

Roosevelt and his brain trusters were suspicious. Moley feared that the New Deal might be jeopardized by the reaction in and out of Congress if Roosevelt became involved in foreign affairs, particularly in the emotion-ridden debts question.[3] Tugwell and Moley also suspected

> that the private debts which never got discussed were what lay behind the pressure for forgiveness of the governmental debts. These were of a size which, if paid regularly according to schedule, would

[2] Raymond Moley Papers, in Mr. Moley's possession, item #39/25; Henry L. Stimson Diary, Yale University Library, Nov. 10, 13, 1932. The Hoover message to Roosevelt was Stimson's suggestion and was drafted originally by Stimson and Ogden Mills. Hoover, however, altered it to include many statements which his Secretary of State rightfully believed would only serve to antagonize Roosevelt. (Stimson Diary, Nov. 13, 1932.) The idea of granting debt reduction in exchange for Britain's raising of our agricultural quota to a pre-depression average was suggested by Hoover to Stimson on October 20, 1932. Stimson seconded the idea, though his advisers, Harvey Bundy and James Rogers, felt "there was not enough in it to interest Great Britain." (Stimson Diary, Oct. 20, 21, 1932.) See also "Original [?] Draft by Mills and HLS of Proposed Hoover Letter to Roosevelt," Nov. 1932, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[3] Interview with Raymond Moley. That Moley's fears were justified is evident from a *Time* article of December 5, 1932, which described a meeting held by

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> exhaust foreigners' ability to get dollars. The banks, therefore, wanted the government debts out of the way. . . . It was not true, as it had been pointed out by the propagandists, that payment was impossible. It was just inconvenient for the bankers. . . .[4]

Despite an initial reluctance, Roosevelt decided to meet with Hoover and asked Moley to accompany him to Washington. In preparation for the encounter, Moley sought out Adolf Berle's opinion on the debts. Berle observed that France could easily collect the funds requisite for meeting her debt payment and that Great Britain, Italy, and Greece could do so with reasonable effort. Further, "diminution of armaments would of course permit collection of the values by all governments." The transfer problem and disposition abroad of an export surplus of farm products greatly complicated the payments problem. But Berle concluded that

> the debt payments are relatively unimportant in comparison with interest on private debts (foreign bonds, etc.) and payments on short

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Hoover and congressional leaders of both parties on November 22. In attendance at the White House were Garner, Rainey, Harrison, Snell, Hawley, Reed, and Watson, among others. Hoover was informed that they would oppose any proposal for revision of debt agreements. The item continued: "The President agreed that the December 15 payments should be made. He also indicated that he was against any downward revision. Pertly broke in Garner: 'Then why converse about it?' The President replied that he wanted Congress to give him another commission. Senators and Representatives chorused 'No!' and advised him to use the regular channels of diplomacy to study the revision pleas." *Time*, Dec. 5, 1932. See also Rexford G. Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Dec. 20, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.; and Stimson Diary, Nov. 23, 1932. According to Stimson, Hoover told the congressional leaders that it was "unthinkable for us to decline to meet friendly nations who are our debtors when they asked for such a conference. He explained his ideas about the possibility of getting a compensation for sacrifices which we might make and the practical machinery of having the same members on the Disarmament Conference, the Debt Conference, and the Economic Conference, a sort of interlocking directorate. . . . Garner and Rainey led the opposition. They were not in favor of doing anything. They said the House would not vote for a Conference. They, themselves, would not vote for any suspension of the December 15th payment. . . . That was the general sentiment around the table."

[4] Rexford G. Tugwell, *The Democratic Roosevelt* (Garden City, N.Y., 1957), 256. Tugwell commented in his diary on December 20: "It was an easy inference that the forgiving of the public debt would make the private debts much more easy to collect. Both Moley and myself travelled about the same road in this respect. . . . ."

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term paper of which eight hundred millions (about) are in New York. The significance of the debt payments is therefore appreciable but not determinitive; the psychological factor outweighs the financial or economic.[5]

Herbert Hoover never stood a chance at the November 22 conference with Roosevelt. F.D.R., armed with three-by-five note cards supplied by Moley,[6] asked questions which clearly indicated a disinclination to become involved in the debt question at that early date. Moley recorded the conversation only hours after the confrontation. Versions of the meeting vary;[7] but on one point all of those who lay claim either to expertise on the subject or presence at the affair agree: when the smoke had cleared Hoover's and Roosevelt's basic positions remained unaltered. Roosevelt rejected the proposed reincarnation of a Debt Commission in a statement issued as his train made its way to his Warm Springs retreat.[8]

Hoover was not to be stymied. In a statement to the press, on November 23, he refused to postpone debt payments, yet urged that Congress create an agency to negotiate with the debtor nations. "Such agency," Hoover proposed, "should be so constituted through complete or partial identity of membership with the delegations to the World Economic Conference and to the General Dis-

[5] Memorandum, Adolf Berle Jr., to Raymond Moley, Nov. 15, 1932, Moley Papers, item #40/6.

[6] The original copies are in the Moley safe deposit box; see also item #39/17 in the Moley Papers.

[7] Four persons were present: Hoover, Roosevelt, Moley, and Ogden Mills. If Mills has left a record of the meeting it is not yet unearthed. Roosevelt commented (Samuel I. Rosenman [ed.], *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 13 Vols. [New York, 1938-50], I, 867) that "on the subject of foreign debts no tangible suggestion was forthcoming." Indeed Hoover had made very concrete suggestions which Roosevelt and Moley promptly rejected. Hoover makes the assertion (*The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover*, 3 Vols. [New York, 1951-52], III, 179-81) that Roosevelt and Moley had agreed to all his proposals, which was not the case. He also erroneously includes Stimson at the gathering, probably because he kept Stimson in reserve in the event that Garner would appear. Stimson wondered, when writing *On Active Service in Peace and War* (with McGeorge Bundy [New York, 1947-48]), if there had been a "welch by FDR?" Marginal note, Stimson Diary, Nov. 22, 1932. According to the entry of Nov. 23, 1932, Roosevelt "had promised the night before that he would come out in support of it [a Debt Commission]. Now they [Mills and Hoover] think he is going to welch." According to the Moley notes, in Moley safe deposit box, there never was any such agreement.

[8] Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York and London, 1939), 78.

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armament Conference, that under the direction of the President, and with the final decision in the Congress, we may take the strongest possible coordinated steps towards the solution of the many underlying causes of the present calamity."[9] The Hoover announcement confirmed Moley's and Tugwell's convictions that the defeated Republican incumbent wanted to link debts with the major international questions of disarmament, tariff barriers, reparations (the Lausanne Agreement), monetary stabilization, and reestablishment of the gold standard by Great Britain. Moreover, Roosevelt's acceptance of this package would have constituted concurrence with Hoover's interpretations of the causes and remedies "of the present calamity," a proposition rejected by the brain trusters during the recent campaign.

Tugwell and Moley were in no mood to bargain debts for what they believed to be illusory economic or political concessions by the European nations.

> I began to see that it was unnecessary to cancel the debts entirely and began to have a feeling that many of those Americans in the Middle West who were so bitter about cancellation had perhaps a shrewd conception of the right in the matter [Tugwell recorded in his diary]. If we should make the grand gesture of renunciation, as we were asked to do by the European countries, it would certainly not forward any of the other purposes we had in mind. They would smile at us as Clemenceau once smiled at Wilson. Any generous gesture of this sort which we might make would be taken advantage of.

In the instance of disarmament: "We might make concessions on the debts and get in return concessions in disarmament but there would be nothing to prevent new crises in Europe from causing another race for armaments there after we had received these concessions. And we should have nothing with which to buy more relief."

Tugwell came to the conclusion—a point Hoover and Stimson never seemed to grasp—

> that there were three separate matters for international negotiation and that they ought not to be confused: first, the debts; second, disarmament; and third, the problems involved in the Economic Con-

[9] Memorandum on "the President's views upon the Debt situation," Nov. 23, 1932, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

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> ference which would be, we thought, the general regularization of commodity production throughout the world to reduce surpluses, the problem of stability of exchanges which was especially acute because of the recent fall in the pound after Great Britain went off the Gold Standard, the matter of negotiated tariffs, and other matters. . . .

Another exchange of telegrams between Hoover and Roosevelt in December seemed to wrap things up as far as Moley and Tugwell were concerned. They would now concentrate their energies on the preparation of a legislative agenda for the next Congress.[10]

Both brain trusters, however, were aware of the capacity of their pupil to reverse himself in mid course.

> The difficulty will be that he [Roosevelt] will not always be careful to have continuing advice. He is apt to take it from me [Tugwell] at one time, from Moley at another time, and perhaps, if we are not handy, from some senator or congressman who happens to turn up at an opportune moment. An incident of this sort happened yesterday when Felix Frankfurter happened to be in Albany. . . .[11]

II

These were prophetic words. For Frankfurter, Norman Davis, and later Henry L. Stimson almost caused Roosevelt to reverse the policy and philosophy of economic recovery upon which his whole campaign had been based.

At the center of the next phase in the internationalists' effort to alter the course of the New Deal was Norman Davis, a secondary figure who has received too little attention from historians of the New Deal era. He returned from the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on December 22, 1932, determined to succeed where Hoover had failed in moving Roosevelt from his campaign position. Though he had been serving Hoover and other Republican presidents for many years, Davis' entree to Roosevelt was facilitated by an acquaintance and correspondence which began during their service in the Wilson administration. Davis had high faith in diplomatic negotiations such as those proceeding so endlessly

[10] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Dec. 20, 23, 1932; Moley, *After Seven Years*, 78-79.

[11] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Dec. 23, 1932; interview with Raymond Moley, tape recorded series, Sept. 1963.

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and so fruitlessly at Geneva. This was one of the reasons why the brain trusters were suspicious of him. But they were wary of him also because of his Wall Street connections and because of his business activities in Cuba some time earlier.[12] According to Stimson, Davis was ambitious to become Secretary of State.[13] In short, his outlook in national and world affairs was that of one who had spent much of his time in Geneva, Paris, London, and other centers of international diplomatic negotiations.

There exists considerable correspondence between Roosevelt and Davis. As early as 1928 Roosevelt had asked Davis for a "few thoughts" on foreign policy to be used in drafting the Democratic platform and in writing an article for *Foreign Affairs*. The reply cautioned Roosevelt against advocating "outright membership in the League," but urged a general support "in order that we may thus contribute our share in the important and inspiring work of promoting world peace."[14]

The tenor of Davis' advice followed that of the internationalist school of thought. "What is needed to improve domestic economic conditions in practically all of the countries," he counseled the New York Governor in 1930, "is to give more freedom to world trade"; and two years later he urged the Democratic nominee to make "the tariff . . . an issue" and to visit Europe for a round of talks with heads of state after the election.[15]

Two letters sent in mid-November 1932 are particularly significant since they reveal an awareness on the part of Davis that Roosevelt's "inner circle" did not accept the thesis of domestic recovery via international cooperation. In one dated November 15, Davis delegated to Edmund E. Day, American representative to the Pre-

[12] Moley, *After Seven Years*, 90; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 467. That the brain trusters knew of what Schlesinger refers to as Davis' "dubious business career in Cuba" and of the unfavorable court decision which followed as a consequence is evidenced by the presence of a copy of Davis v. Las Ovas Co., Inc. 227 U.S. at 80 in the Moley Papers. Tugwell's distrust of Davis was expressed in his diary, Jan. 7, 1933: "He [Davis] is too close to the N.Y. financial crowd and I have no faith that any of them are ever disinterested about public policy."

[13] Stimson Diary, Dec. 29, 1932.

[14] Roosevelt to Davis, March 30, 1928, Davis to Roosevelt, April 12, 1928, container 51, Norman H. Davis Papers, Library of Congress.

[15] *Ibid.*, Davis to Roosevelt, Nov. 7, 1930, July 4, 1932, October 15, 1932; see also, Davis "Memorandum" of Aug. 22, 1932.

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paratory Commission of the forthcoming Economic Conference, the task of educating Roosevelt's advisers toward

> getting over ultimately something constructive. I have had a thorough talk with him [Day] as to what our strategy and policy should be and I have given him a letter to you [Roosevelt] as I think it would be a good idea for you to have a talk with him and then let him thrash out these matters in detail with some of your economic advisers.[16]

Davis' substantive proposals are outlined in a letter dispatched only three days later. He reminded Roosevelt of the merits of a visit to Europe; his [Davis'] efforts to "get France and Italy . . . to agree to enter the London Naval Treaty"; of possibilities regarding attainment of a preliminary disarmament agreement; of the need to reach "some important decisions" on the Manchurian question; of the relationship between the debts, disarmament, and the tariff question; and, "of utmost importance," the need to "maintain a continuity of policy along general fundamental lines." Though Roosevelt rejected Davis' suggested trip to Europe ("while there is much to be said for it, the difficulties are such that I have concluded to stay here"), he nevertheless invited Davis into the "inner circle" by soliciting a "confidential letter in the diplomatic mail bag" on the "whole situation" and by inviting Davis to call upon him when he returned from Europe.[17]

When Davis debarked in New York on December 22, 1932, he furthered the growing impression that he had become Roosevelt's spokesman on foreign affairs by his definite announcement that the World Monetary and Economic Conference would meet in London in April, following a final organization meeting of the committee of experts in January, and by his remarks about monetary stabilization, a return to the gold standard, and the need for tariff reduction.[18] An appointment was made by Davis to see the President-elect on the twenty-sixth. Roosevelt, meanwhile, had agreed with Tugwell, Day, and Williams[19] that the final meeting to decide the agenda of the Conference would be delayed until March 15 and that the Conference itself would not convene until "about

[16] *Ibid.*, Davis to Roosevelt, Nov. 15, 1932.
[17] *Ibid.*, Davis to Roosevelt, Nov. 18, 1932; Roosevelt to Davis, Nov. 26, 1932.
[18] New York *Times*, Dec. 23, 1932.
[19] John H. Williams, who with Edmund E. Day represented the U.S. at the Preparatory Commission of Experts.

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July 1st." Tugwell sought also—and Roosevelt agreed—to delay the sailing of Day and Williams (hence the work of the organizing committee) until mid-February. In this way work begun by Hoover appointees would be completed after inauguration.[20]

Thus began the "unseemly scuffling behind closed doors that service in Roosevelt's interest seemed to require for the next few days."[21] At stake was not merely a timetable for the projected Conference. Rather both Moley and Tugwell believed that if the internationalists had their way, through a speed-up in the meeting of the Conference and through the premature raising of irritating international questions, the only result would be in angering the Congress and thereby endangering the passage of Roosevelt's legislative program. True enough it had been hoped originally that a special meeting of Congress might be avoided. But all hopes of remedial legislation bogged down in the anarchic winter lame-duck session, and by late December it was evident that the new Congress would be summoned after inauguration to carry out the pledge of a "New Deal." The brain trusters believed that international negotiations could succeed only after domestic conditions had been improved here and abroad.[22]

Tugwell became so concerned about Davis' dockside statement to the press and the possibility that Day and Williams might return to Europe uninstructed in the policies of the incoming administration that he called Hyde Park on Christmas eve. Roosevelt preferred "not to interrupt his family party." When Roosevelt returned the call the next morning Tugwell learned to his dismay that "our plans for postponing the conference until the storm is over seem all to have gone wrong." Davis had succeeded in preventing Day and Williams from seeing Roosevelt and, amazingly, for a time blocked Tugwell as well from Roosevelt.

> I determined to go to Albany in the afternoon [December 26] hoping to arrive before Davis to tell the Governor what I have been able to learn. But when I arrived at the executive mansion Davis was already closeted with him and I was told to come back at 9:30 in the morning.
>
> At 9:30 I went to the Governor's bedroom and found Davis there.

[20] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Dec. 20, 1932.
[21] Moley, *After Seven Years*, 91.
[22] Interview with Raymond Moley.

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> The Governor apologised handsomely for not having me in on the conference of the night before, saying he wanted to make up his mind about Davis by letting him talk alone. I was naturally anxious about whether Day and Williams were to be seen. They were not. Davis and I were to go to New York together and see Day at Davis' house; Davis had his way about this too. . . .[23]

The first stage of the Davis interlude resulted in a compromise. "Davis had his way about the preliminary meeting of the experts," meaning that Day and Williams were to depart for Europe immediately; and neither was to see Roosevelt for orientation in the philosophy of the new administration. On the other hand, Davis was unable to bring Roosevelt around to support his statement that the conference would convene in April. "He told reporters last night it would not come until summer."[24]

To Tugwell's chagrin Davis told reporters even more. "I was rather pleased when I picked up the morning paper," Tugwell recorded sarcastically in his diary, "to note that Mr. Davis has been the medium through which Mr. Hoover and Governor Roosevelt had been brought closer together in their foreign policy. The cleverness with which these diplomats learn to forward their interests in the press is perhaps their chief accomplishment. . . ."[25]

III

In the meantime, Raymond Moley had returned from a trip to Ohio to be disturbed not only by the activities of Davis but even more by those of Felix Frankfurter who was working to bring together Roosevelt and Henry L. Stimson.[26] Roosevelt had deep respect for the Republican internationalist statesman and eagerly welcomed Frankfurter's suggestion on December 22, 1932 (following the first abortive Hoover-Roosevelt meeting), that the Presi-

[23] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Dec. 24, 25, 26, 27, 1932.
[24] *Ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1932.
[25] *Ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1932; see also the New York *Times*, Dec. 29, 1932.
[26] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Dec. 30, 1932. Tugwell remarked in his diary: "[Moley] had just come back from Albany rather discouraged at the kind of advice the Governor seems to be accepting. He cursed Felix Frankfurter heartily."

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dent-elect should have the benefit of Stimson's counsel. "Why doesn't H.L.S. come up and see me," was Roosevelt's reaction.[27]

In dealing with the Stimson-Roosevelt talks, diplomatic historians have tended to stress the decision taken then to reaffirm Stimson's position on Manchuria. They have regarded this decision as Roosevelt's first tentative step toward open opposition to the Japanese and Fascist aggressors.[28] The historian of the New Deal, however, is more interested in the importance of the talks for domestic policy. How close did Roosevelt come to accepting a set of internationalist ideas that would have been a repudiation of the New Deal philosophy even before the New Deal had been launched?

Stimson, anxious for a compromise with the British on the debts question, desired to break the impasse between Hoover and Roosevelt. "The quicker we get these damn debts out of the way in some settlement, in which we will be able to get some quid pro quo for our concessions, the better off we will be." Debt reduction, he believed, would stimulate a price recovery, secure Anglo-American cooperation vis-à-vis Japan in Manchuria, and effect "a proportionate gain in disarmament."[29] Moley and Tugwell would describe this as a Wall Street point of view. And, indeed, it had come at least in part from Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company, George Harrison, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Owen D. Young. Thus on July 11, 1932, when Hoover was disturbed by rumors of a gentleman's agreement at Lausanne which

[27] Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 438; Norman Davis to Henry L. Stimson, Dec. 28, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, Dec. 24, 1932, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library. Stimson's "Mem. of notes of talk of Frankfurter" is in the Stimson Collection, Dec. 22, 1932.

[28] See, for example, Morison, 424-43, and Richard N. Current, *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1954), 114-39.

[29] Stimson Diary, June 19, 1932, and *passim*. ". . . I am firmly convinced," Norman Davis wrote Stimson on Dec. 28, 1932, "from the talks I have had with the President and with the President elect, that there is no difference between them as to the desirability of cooperation in dealing with some of the difficult problems with which our country is now faced and that whatever difference has arisen is merely a matter of method. This difference is more the result of misunderstanding than anything else and a reconciliation of views would most probably result from free and frank conversations." Davis to Stimson, Dec. 28, 1932, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

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tied reparations reduction to cancellation of all intergovernmental debts, Stimson counseled Hoover against a strong statement for the reason that the agreement at Lausanne might stimulate a price recovery. When Hoover told Stimson that he ought not to be his adviser in view of the great disparity in viewpoint, Stimson retaliated that "people we trusted most, like George Harrison, believed that it might be the beginning, and probably would be the beginning now, of a real recovery." Thomas Lamont confirmed this view for Stimson in November: "Tom Lamont called me up from New York. . . . He is very much worried over the fear that we may not grant the British demand for a postponement of the payment on December 15th, and that it will cause dire consequences to the cause of recovery."[30]

Lamont and Stimson were agreed that the French were quite able to pay, whereas the British were entitled to some concession. On November 28 Stimson had a long talk with Lamont who "had been in communication with the Morgan representatives both in France and Great Britain, and they had been doing all they could to work along the same line which I had just been arguing with the President, namely, to produce a compromise which would save a default. . . ." A week later Hoover "called up Lamont in my [Stimson's] presence and talked with him about the general situation. Lamont, of course, is trying to get the President to consent to the suspension of the December installment."[31]

Stimson's motives were stated in his diary on December 13, 1932:

> I am pushing as hard as I can to get the Government actually committed to these [debt] negotiations, so that when Roosevelt comes along there will be nothing else for him to do but to go ahead with them. The President's plan . . . is as soon as these debt installments are paid, to write a letter to Roosevelt . . . pointing out the seriousness of the situation and the emergency, and to suggest that Roosevelt

[30] *Ibid.*, July 11, Nov. 17, 1932. See also "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary Stimson and Mr. Thomas Lamont," Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[31] Stimson Diary, Nov. 28, Dec. 3, 1932.

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> approve some appointees for a conference with Great Britain particularly to refund the debts, or rather to initiate negotiations on the subject of the debts.

Roosevelt's rejection in December of Hoover's proposal for joint appointees to a debt conference made it all the more important that Stimson reach Roosevelt directly. The opportunity came when Frankfurter called. Yet Stimson would not consent to a meeting with Roosevelt until Hoover reluctantly gave his approval.[32]

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Henry L. Stimson first met in the woodpaneled library at Hyde Park on January 9, 1933. The talk began at 11 A.M., lasted through luncheon, and continued on late that afternoon as the two were driven to New York City. In the process Roosevelt, without prodding, approved Stimson's Far Eastern policy, in fact commenting

> that his only possible criticism was that we did not begin it earlier . . . . I found that Roosevelt had a personal hereditary interest in the Far East. He told me that one of his ancestors, I think a grandfather, had held a position there and that his grandmother had gone out to the Far East on a sailing vessel and had very nearly been captured by the *Alabama* . . . . I told him of the present ticklish situation . . . that it might be advisable for me to make another statement as to this Government's position. I said to him, "I do not wish to ask any commitments from you but I certainly do not wish to make any such statement and then have you immediately afterward come out with a contrary position or statement." He replied, "You need have no fear of that."[33]

In other areas Roosevelt "approved of our [disarmament] policy" but in Stimson's judgment did not grasp the full implications of the Day-Williams report on their first preparatory conference at Geneva for the World Economic Conference.[34] Stimson emphasized

[32] *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1932, Jan. 3, 4, 5, 1933.

[33] *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1933.

[34] *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1933. Moley apparently did grasp the meaning of the report: "The moment I saw the report of Day and Williams to the State Department . . . I was alarmed. The report indicated that out of the meeting of experts was to come an internationalists' agenda—a program for a return to an international gold standard, for the sharp writing down of international debts, and for measures of international 'cooperation' wholly incompatible with the inauguration of the New Deal's domestic program." Moley, *After Seven Years*, 86.

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"the psychological importance of the debt question as a barrier to the Economic Conference, telling him how all experts had agreed that the first step toward recovery was the monetary stabilization of those countries which were off the gold standard; that the most important of these countries was Britain, owing to the wide influence of sterling, and how Britain was unwilling to return to the gold standard until she felt certain she could stay on it and she did not feel certain she could stay on it until she had better marshalling of her obligations, including debts."

Roosevelt, in turn, stated his objections to the immediate appointment of commissioners to begin negotiations on debts, disarmament, and the Economic Conference.[35] First, "such selections would be misinterpreted as Cabinet selections. Second, because his experience in the campaign made him believe that he could get the necessarily unpopular debt settlement through Congress and through the country better if he did it himself rather than through a commission." Roosevelt suggested that Stanley Baldwin be invited here to begin the ground work on debts and Stimson promised to discuss the proposal with Hoover.[36]

When Stimson and Roosevelt conferred again by telephone on Sunday, January 15, 1933, Roosevelt acquiesced in the Stimson point of view on the relationship between debts and monetary stabilization and indicated a willingness to avoid a race for national inflation. Stimson advised that "even if the debt negotiations were handled separately from the Economic Conference," as Roosevelt had previously insisted, "nevertheless Mr. Roosevelt would want to be sure in advance of British cooperation in the conference before he would be willing to agree to definite debt

[35] Hoover, in a memorandum to Stimson, insisted that direct communication with Roosevelt not be reopened unless the President-elect appointed "three or a minimum of two men of eminence" who "shall come to Washington and shall sit in with the responsible Cabinet officers for the formulation of a definite and positive organization of the machinery for handling the Arms Conference and the negotiations on the debt. Furthermore, such organization must take the form of the appointment now of some of the delegates to the Economic Conference, who should be empowered to carry on preliminary conversations with debtor countries. . . ." "Confidential Memo—H.S. from H.H." In folder, Jan. 1933, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[36] Stimson Diary, Jan. 9, 1933.

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settlement." Such cooperation would consist of assurances by Great Britain "that she would stabilize sterling as a means of raising world prices. . . . unless our nation proposed to join in the race which is now going on among the nations." Roosevelt asserted that "he did not want to join in any such race." Stimson argued then that unless Britain agreed to stabilize beforehand "we would not want to give up our debts beforehand. He agreed with us."

Roosevelt agreed also to the Hoover proposal that Great Britain be allowed to "send out several men" rather than one person; that Hoover representatives would merely lay the groundwork for Roosevelt's negotiators; and that the British should get here after March 1 so that the new Secretaries of State and Treasury could enter into the negotiations. Roosevelt offered no counter suggestion. On the contrary,

> He [Roosevelt] told me that he had been having a conference with Russell Leffingwell [of J. P. Morgan and Company] and that Russell Leffingwell had pointed out substantially what I said in my first point of the interconnection of debts and the problem of the Economic Conference. He said that Leffingwell had used the illustration that you couldn't tell which was the hen and which was the egg.[37]

Roosevelt consented also to meet Hoover later in the week and asked Stimson to come to the Mayflower Hotel where he would be staying. ("I think we have now got pretty good teamwork going," Roosevelt told Stimson.) And it was stipulated, too, that Stimson, Mills, and Moley would serve as seconds to the principals.[38]

It is an amazing fact that only two weeks later Roosevelt would tell Carter Glass, through Moley, who served as intermediary in Cabinet negotiations, that Russell Leffingwell would be unacceptable as Under Secretary of the Treasury because "we simply can't tie up with '23' [J. P. Morgan and Company]" and that so far as inflation was concerned "we're not going to throw ideas out of the window simply because they're labeled inflation."[39]

[37] *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1933; see also "Memorandum for the Secretary of State," Jan. 15, 1933, signed H.H., Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[38] Stimson Diary, Jan. 17, 1933; "Memorandum of . . . Telephone Conversation between Secretary Stimson and Governor Roosevelt," Jan. 17, 1933, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[39] Moley Diary, in Mr. Moley's possession, Jan. 27, 28, 1933.

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Since Moley and Stimson recorded contradictory attitudes on the part of Roosevelt in diaries written at the end of the day's activities—therefore precluding the possibility of faulty memory—two possible explanations emerge. One is the customary one that Roosevelt was all things to all men, able to adopt completely contradictory stances at the same time. It is more plausible, however, to conclude that in the interval he altered course and returned to the intranationalist approach. Close scrutiny of the diaries of three of the principals—Stimson, Moley, and Tugwell—indicates that the turning point was the Hoover-Roosevelt meeting of January 20, 1933.

When Moley and Tugwell got wind of Roosevelt's endorsement of the Stimson-Davis policies they bridled, Moley more than Tugwell. Tugwell had come to a more compromising position on debts,[40] but opposed bitterly Roosevelt's endorsement of the Stimson policy on Manchuria. "I had my first real difference with F.D.R. last night," Tugwell wrote on January 17: "I firmly believe it is a commitment which may lead us to war with Japan. I said so and registered a vigorous dissent from any such position." But Roosevelt

> seemed very pleased at Stimson's cooperation with him; says he called him on the phone every day lately and says furthermore, that he is quite prepared to see the policy through. He has strong personal sympathy with the Chinese; and this added to a sudden trust in Stimson has carried him over. He admitted the possibility of war and said flatly that it might be better to have it now than later. This horrified me and I said so . . . and that we had better lean over backwards not to be provocative. . . . My arguments, I am afraid, had no effect.[41]

Moley was angered by more than the Manchurian endorsement. He was "furious . . . with the disgusting way Williams is behaving in Geneva. He is acting as though he were F.D.R.'s representative and prattling on about the debts probably having to come up

[40] "[Roosevelt] would reduce interest for all debtors to about ½ of 1%—which is needed for costs. I [Tugwell] said some such formula was needed and that we could not *settle* the thing but ought to look forward to flexibility and negotiation. He is certainly going about this in an extremely intelligent way." "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 5, 1933.

[41] *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1933.

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for discussion at the Economic Conference.[42] He was angered by the attachment of the debts question to the Manchurian problem and by the "termites [who were] continually working" to undermine the Roosevelt policies.[43] Davis, particularly, in constant contact with Stimson, was receiving a huge play in the press and in Moley's judgment the two were pushing Roosevelt into an impossible position. "The dangers of contradictory commitments were already apparent."[44]

Moley concluded, on the eve of the second Hoover-Roosevelt conference, that "the damage, so far as the Manchurian and arms-embargo policies were concerned, had been done. There remained the debt and [Economic] Conference policies to fight for. And, at the moment, there was born in me a blazing determination to fight for them."[45]

Battle lines were formed on January 19. Roosevelt, at the last moment, invited Davis to accompany him to Washington with Tugwell, Moley, and Will Woodin. The smoldering conflict erupted that evening and the next morning at the Mayflower Hotel when Davis, Tugwell, and Moley "heatedly disagreed on the question of whether debt conversations and discussions of the other matters should be linked." When Davis requested that he be permitted to attend the White House Conference, Roosevelt, to Moley's chagrin, replied "Yes, come along."[46]

"The crux of the difference" between Moley and Davis, Tugwell observed, "was that Davis wanted to trust matters to the present administration. He [Davis] would have forced a single conference covering all subjects immediately." On the other hand, "Moley was determined that nothing but preparation should take place before March 4, and that there should be no suspicion of concession on the debts. Davis represents Wall Street, the State Department, and the cancellationist attitude." Both Tugwell and Moley were aware

[42] Moley Diary, Jan. 10, 1933.

[43] Index, Moley Papers, Jan. 19, 20, 1933; Moley Diary, Jan. 10, 1933.

[44] Moley, *After Seven Years*, 95. Tugwell was concerned that Davis was about to "supplant Moley"; "Diary," Jan. 22, 1933.

[45] Moley, *After Seven Years*, 95-96.

[46] *Ibid.*, 97-98; Moley Diary, Jan. 21, 1933.

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of the fact that "in time the debts are going to be whittled away to nothing." In the meantime,

> It is political dynamite. The Hoover administration is putting on pressure for immediacy which we suspect. If we let them move into commitments we will have to hold the bag with a hostile country and congress after they are gone. Davis is playing their game and Moley resents it bitterly.[47]

IV

Accounts of the second Hoover-Roosevelt confrontation on January 20, 1933, vary considerably in detail. Yet the participants, Moley, Davis, Stimson, and Ogden Mills, were aware of Roosevelt's "wobbly attitude"[48] and of the issues at stake. Detailed contemporaneous accounts are to be found in the Moley, Stimson, and Tugwell diaries. Hoover's account of the meeting can be found in the Stimson diary following the entry of January 20, 1933. Tugwell's account, of course, was, as he states, second-hand.

Hoover opened with a discussion of the "Far Eastern matter," then quickly passed to a statement on debts which tied them to the broader issue of international economic recovery and cooperation and which called for a quid pro quo for debt reduction. In Hoover's own words:

> . . . I stated that I was convinced that the debt question was but a segment of the whole international economic problem, and that if we were to make any sacrifice in connection with debt it must be made in exchange for positive quid pro quo. . . . (and I repeated this several times) for any adjustments or concessions made in respect to the debt; that it was impracticable to discuss the debt without discussing these compensations; that among those compensations were many of the problems which were before the World Economic Conference. . . .[49]

[47] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 22, 1933. Moley commented in his own diary that "agreement as to the necessity of permitting the British to present their case was unanimous." But he insisted that no concessions be made beforehand and was convinced that Davis, Hoover, and Stimson were "vastly sympathetic to the Wall Street game" and attempting to force Roosevelt into an untenable position. Moley Diary, Jan. 21, 1933.

[48] See Stimson Diary, Jan. 19, 20, 1933.

[49] "Memorandum of Conversation between President Hoover and Governor Roosevelt," Jan. 20, 1933, written by President Hoover, Stimson Diary, following Jan. 20, 1933.

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For a considerable time Moley single-handed put up a last ditch battle against the internationalist point of view while Roosevelt sat silently and observed. Stimson, Mills, and Hoover hammered away. "Roosevelt became rather wobbly again," Stimson wrote, "and we all took a hand, principally myself," presumably in educating Moley and Roosevelt as to the facts of the situation. Stimson and Mills cited cables from Frederic M. Sackett at Geneva and Owen D. Young "to the effect that the British were going to try to make a bargain without any compensation in regard to their attitude on the gold standard or other matters."[50] What they could not understand evidently was the fact that Moley held little regard for Owen D. Young's views. As Moley saw it, Stimson, Hoover, and Mills, with Davis as an accomplice, and the House of Morgan in the shadows, were trying to put "the new administration into a terrible hole" and, at the same time, benefit the Wall Street interests.

"The discussion was long and hard," Moley recalled. "Stimson started off by assuming that F.D. had indicated last week to him that debt conversations and economic matters were to be considered together." Evidently Moley was unaware of Roosevelt's telephone commitment to Stimson the previous Sunday evening, though he had his suspicions. As a result Moley

> carried on what was a lone battle against Hoover, Mills, Stimson, Davis—with certainly no help at the beginning from F.D.—for having debts and economic questions separately considered, albeit, perhaps, concurrently. . . . The battle was difficult in the extreme. God knows what F.D. had indicated to Stimson—although it may well be that there was intentional misunderstanding on Stimson's part. In any event the Governor was silent for a long, long time. . . . Then he backed him [Moley] up—as against the Hoover crowd and Davis.[51]

[50] Stimson Diary, Jan. 20, 1933.

[51] Moley Diary, Jan. 21, 1933. The barrage to which Moley was subjected is evident from the following sequence recorded in the Hoover "Memorandum": "The Secretary of State reaffirmed that no concessions on the debts should be made until he [Roosevelt] had secured a quid pro quo . . . and that both subjects should be dealt with together, whether by separate delegations or by one . . . . Mr. Mills stated again that he could not then separate the discussions. Norman Davis agreed that they could not be separated." Tugwell concluded (Diary, Jan. 22, 1933) that "Moley saved the day there, insisting on separate meetings against Davis and Stimson and even against F.D.R."

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Stimson regarded this as a reversal on the part of Moley and Roosevelt, attributing Moley's insistence upon (and Roosevelt's final acquiescence in) a distinction between the two sets of negotiations to "some relics of the campaign in the shape of positions which Roosevelt may have taken." It was a "highly foolish position to take." Hoover was similarly inclined to believe that "it was now a question of saving the Governor's face in view of his public statements." Apparently neither took seriously the Moley attempt to disassociate debts from the Economic and Monetary Conference. Thus, the Hoover Memorandum states: "Finally, the formula was agreed to. The result is to state *our appearance* [my italics] of separation to the public; but a consolidation of them in fact in British delegations."[52]

Stimson, too, either misunderstood what had been stated by Moley and Roosevelt[53] or, as Moley claims, "was clearly [trying] to put over a sharp and fast one."[54] For that afternoon, after Roosevelt had entrained for Warm Springs, Stimson, Moley, and Tugwell "had a battle royal again over the separation of the two discussions,"[55] with Herbert Feis and Harvey Bundy present. Stimson's proposed message, to be handed to Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador, in Tugwell's words, "completely ignored the points which had been established at the morning conference; it provided for a common meeting, it identified the questions and it clearly held out concessions on the debt as a return for currency stabilization."[56] Tugwell's appraisal was correct, for the Stimson draft stipulated that

> any sacrifices to the American people [on debts depended upon] compensations which the British Government will offer in return for such sacrifices. For that purpose it is evident that it will be necessary for the two Governments to discuss at the same time the world economic problems and other questions in which they are mutually interested.[57]

Moley refused to abandon the victory he had won that morning and rejected the draft. "Stimson was irritable." And when Tugwell

[52] Stimson Diary, Jan. 20, 1933; Hoover "Memorandum," Jan. 20, 1933.
[53] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 22, 1933.
[54] Moley Diary, Jan. 21, 1933.
[55] Stimson Diary, Jan. 20, 1933.
[56] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 22, 1933.
[57] "Draft of Proposed Aide Memoire for British which was rejected by Professor Moley, January 20, 1933," Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

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insisted that "the Secretary did not seem to understand our reasons for the separation of the two issues" Stimson, indignant, turned on him "and denounced me as trying to tear down everything he had been working for throughout his term. The connection was not clear. But evidently his little outburst was an accumulation of irritation at not having his way all day and at having to deal with people who must to him, have seemed like sheer amateurs and upstarts."[58]

According to Stimson, Tugwell and Moley "never gave us any clear reason as to why they wanted the separation, but they were insistent on it as Roosevelt's wish."[59] According to Tugwell, "I tried to explain." It would appear that he did:

> Stimson said that in all his conversations with the Governor there had been a clear indication of intention to deal with both at once. Moley pointed out that they had been separated in the morning conversations and said that he had not understood what F.D.R. meant by saying that the sentences mentioning the "debts" and "other matters" were "twins." But that he could now see that he meant them to be treated at the same time but separately and that this must be adhered to. I explained to Stimson that I had begun to talk with F.D.R. about the debts months ago and had first taken the position that not only debts but disarmament should be linked to other economic matters. . . . That is the approach an economist would make. But F.D.R. had immediately objected and had always maintained his objection. . . . I went over F.D.R.'s arguments:
>
> 1. To lay the debts on the table would be to admit that concessions were to be made.
>
> 2. Public opinion both at home and abroad was singularly determined; on the one side not to cancel, on the other not to pay. This made temporizing necessary. The realities would have their way in the long run, but political considerations had to be taken account of.
>
> 3. Other arrangements—monetary matters, tariffs, etc.—required very different handling of public opinion and might be worked out whether or not the debts could be reduced as rapidly as everyone hoped.
>
> 4. The kind of negotiations were different . . . . and the rate of progress might be different.

[58] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 22, 1933.
[59] Stimson Diary, Jan. 20, 1933.

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> I said that there seemed to be a fundamental misconception; that there was no hurry and that if necessary we could consult him before talking to Sir Ronald Lindsay.[60]

But Stimson would not be delayed and a compromise was reached after several hours of wrangling. (At one point Moley asserted that "his . . . say would have to be final" and Stimson countered that "he would have to be governed by his own interpretation of Roosevelt's wishes, since he believed he knew them.") Moley remained firm and Stimson finally gave in, writing a note to the British "in which it was indicated that the things were separate"; that a "representative or representatives of the British Government" were to be sent to discuss the debts, and "representatives should be sent" to discuss other related matters of mutual interest.[61]

V

The Moley-Tugwell victory was not clear cut. Stimson had his way to the extent that Roosevelt would soon be discussing debts with Britain's Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay;[62] and Davis had won commitment to an early summer meeting of the Economic Conference. Yet the balance, at least in the short run, had swung to intranationalism.

On Tugwell's advice, he and Moley called Roosevelt who agreed with their conduct vis-à-vis Stimson and placed the matter in their hands.[63](Very shortly, of course, Tugwell would concentrate his efforts on agriculture and Moley would assume responsibility for the debt negotiations.) Further, Roosevelt agreed to leave "Davis out of it entirely." Moley, angered by what he regarded as Davis' meddling on behalf of Wall Street, as well as by a spate of newspaper stories suggesting that Davis had replaced him as Roosevelt's

[60] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 22, 1933.

[61] *Ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1933; Moley Diary, Jan. 21, 1933; "Copy of Final Aide Memoire given to British Ambassador," Jan. 20, 1933, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library. One copy is initialed by both Moley and Stimson.

[62] This was agreed upon by Stimson and Roosevelt on January 27, "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary Stimson and Governor Roosevelt," Jan. 27, 1933, Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[63] Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," Jan. 23, 1933.

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chief adviser on debts, secured from Roosevelt the pledge that he was "through with Norman Davis."[64]

The major attainment in the interregnum struggle for intranationalism was Roosevelt's commitment to a domestic priority in late January and early February 1933, as he and Moley worked on the original drafts of the inaugural address.[65] That commitment, uttered in the first inaugural, was translated into legislative history in the Hundred Days.

> Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first. I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic adjustment, but the emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment.
>
> The basic thought that guides these specific means of national recovery is not narrowly nationalistic. It is the insistence, as a first consideration, upon the interdependence of the various elements in and parts of the United States. . . .[66]

[64] *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1933; Moley Diary, Jan. 22, 1933. See *New York Journal of Commerce*, Jan. [?] 1933 (article in Moley Papers); and Chicago *Tribune*, Jan. 21, 1933.

[65] "Original Notes, Inaugural Address," Moley Papers; Moley Notebook, Feb. 12, 1933; Moley Diary, Feb. 13, 1933.

[66] Rosenman, II, 14.

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Book Reviews

Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa *edited by James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg Jr. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964.—xi, 730 pp. $10.00.*

Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 *by Dennis Austin. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1964.—xiv, 459 pp. $10.10.*

American political scientists have become the chroniclers of the African revolution. Suckled by Ford and Fulbright, nourished by a vigorous tradition of empirical enquiry, encouraged by generous leave from the world's most prosperous schools, they have penetrated the jungle of African parties and returned with material enough for a major thesis and for contributions to the rapidly increasing flow of symposia that span the continent.

The Coleman and Rosberg volume follows the general pattern of such collections, a series of lengthy descriptive essays from the helots, an abstract think-piece from the masters. These individual essays are grouped around either countries or topics, and it is the latter that are much the most successful, especially the contributions of Wallerstein and Lloyd on Voluntary Associations and Traditional Rulers. For the potted pieces on a particular country often make tedious reading, partly because they are not focused on specific problems, and partly because the intricacies of party alignment are hardly rendered more engrossing by the constant recourse to initials; there is scarcely one page in seven hundred that does not have its full quota of SLIPM, PDG, UNIP, NEPU, NCNC, UGTAN, FGTC, though the trend toward one-party states will soon solve this particular problem. Hodgkin and Morgenthau do present a thesis on Mali, concerning the influence of pre-colonial political structures and ideas on

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modern forms of organization, and their essay is the more interesting for it, even though the contention is almost certainly wrong.

The most valuable part of the book is the editors' concluding think-piece, covering the two main topics embodied in the title of the book, that is, one-party states and national integration. Their first problem is to explain the predominance in Africa today of one-party regimes, which vary between what, with the characteristic new brutalism of the social sciences, they refer to as the pragmatic-pluralistic (Senegal) and the revolutionary centralizing (Guinea) types. The reasons, perceptively argued if inelegantly phrased, they find in the variety of tasks ("functional load") falling upon the government after independence, in the autocratic character of some traditional and all colonial regimes, in the "aura of legitimacy" bestowed upon the party in power by the transfer of independence itself, but mainly in the "political culture" of the new elites. By this they mean the "elitism" that arises from the educational gap, the "statism" of colonial and communist models, and the "nationalism" generated by the process of creating and developing a new nation.

The years that have elapsed since the publication of Coleman's earlier analysis in *The Politics of Developing Areas* (1960) has seen a marked change in the African political scene and the virtual dominance of the one-party state. And the editors go on to examine the mechanisms by which this has been achieved, "opposition conversion" by punishment and patronage, the "associational integration" of trade unions, youth movements, and the like with the ruling party, the introduction of constitutional changes, and lastly the evolution of "ideological rationalization" to explain what is happening.

The second main concern of the authors has to do with the integration of communities of an oligarchical kind (Liberia or Rhodesia), and the incorporation of differing ethnic groups into a centralized system which the increase in the scale of political units so often makes an essential part of the process of state formation in Africa today. And one-party systems are seen as playing an important role in the attainment of an integrated polity.

Finally the authors take a tentative glance at future trends, the increase in the centralization of one-party states, the move toward the no-party (or administrative) state, and the spread of military rule.

In this last respect, their predictions have been overtaken by events. Over the past twelve months there has been a steady increase in the part played by the military in African states; Algeria, Nigeria, Congo, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and others have all moved in this direction, a turn of events for which the analyses presented here do little to prepare the reader. Not that one expects an extensive discussion of the role of the military in a symposium on political parties. But the fact that the military

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gets hardly a mention in most of these essays perhaps indicates a wider limitation of approach. For the amount of attention devoted by some authors to the analysis of voting figures, and the comparative neglect of any treatment of what the act of voting means, the pressures to which it is subject, seems to reflect the social and academic background of the authors rather than the African political scene. Stress is placed on function rather than force, and on positive function at that. If the costs of single-party systems were analyzed as clearly as the gains, then some reasons for the resort to force might become clearer. This failure is partly a matter of academic background and theoretical approach, but any student of African affairs should ask himself how far the direction of his work and the nature of his analysis may be unwittingly influenced by his desire to return to the scene of his research. And his reader would be advised to bear this concern in mind.

Mr. Austin, I take it, has no such plans, for his interesting and detailed narrative (the word is his) ends on a somewhat sour and even abusive note.

Unlike his American counterparts, Austin deliberately eschews any attempt to find "the universal characteristics which each particular nationalist movement in Africa and Asia has seemed to possess." He presents instead "an extended essay in Ghanaian history," but one directed to answering a particular question, "why did a colony apparently so well endowed in its national life as the Gold Coast . . . suddenly enter a period of violent conflict . . . until by 1960 (after three years of independence) the new republic was ruled by a single-party regime whose leaders turned increasingly to harsh methods of control 'of a totalitarian kind.' " After four hundred pages of well documented and lucidly written narrative, he concludes: first, "the principal source of anxiety" was "the volatile, unpredictable nature of Nkrumah himself, who fashioned the myth that Ghana was engaged in a perpetual revolution against hidden enemies"; second, the ruling party, a commoners' movement led by elementary school leavers, was unable to cope with the situation that followed the dissolution of the opposition and hence pushed all decision-making on to the leader; third, the measures demanded by the accumulated difficulties of the republican era, plots, falling cocoa prices, internal squabbles.

His account of Ghana is certainly more readable than most of the contributions to the Coleman-Rosberg symposium, and he makes good use of the technique of switching from macroscopic analysis to the discussion of specific local elections. But the attempt to provide an answer to his opening question is hampered by a lack of theoretical reference and comparative framework. Speculations about Nkrumah's personality go no way at all to solving a general problem of African politics. With all its glossy functionalism and irrefractable phraseology, the symposium pro-

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vides very much more convincing answers. Indeed, one sees the reasons, foundations apart, why American political science has presided over European decolonization.

JACK GOODY
Legon, Ghana

French Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity *edited by William H. Lewis. New York, Walker, 1965.—xii, 256 pp. $6.50.*

Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government *by Clement Henry Moore. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965.—xiv, 230 pp. $6.00.*

French-speaking Africa, long neglected by American specialists on Africa, is now finally coming into its own. These two volumes are valuable additions, one as a collection of papers to the existing literature, one as a specialized study.

Professor Lewis has edited a selection of the contributions to a conference on French-speaking Africa held in Washington in 1964. The papers cover a wide variety of topics with, as might be expected in such a volume, varying degrees of adequacy. Of particular interest is Michael Crowder's paper on independence as a goal in the two decades preceding independence in French Africa. In it he points up the cultural as well as the economic factors which made the demand for independence less urgent for the French-African leaders than for those in the British colonies. Among other chapters of more than routine interest might be picked out those of Professor Mark Karp, on the legacy of French economic policy, and of Professor William Zartman on the characteristics of foreign policy in the French-speaking states. Both provide useful background for an explanation of the conduct of these governments after independence. Willard Johnson's study of the Cameroon as an experiment in the unification of two colonial systems is of real value, although the topic deserves much fuller treatment than he is able to give it here.

One or two of the papers included in the book appear to have a curious lack of relevance to the subject. Professor Gus Liebenow's comments on the one-party system, while accurate, do not treat the peculiarities of this phenomenon in French Africa. One of the most insightful of the contributions appears to be tacked on at the end of the volume with little or no connection to the topic. This is Professor Eisenstadt's chapter on

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social change and modernization in Africa south of the Sahara. It is claimed by the editor to be a "theoretical framework"; so it is, but not to the chapters that precede it.

Clement H. Moore's study of one-party government in Tunisia is an exceptionally worthy addition to the series of single-country monographs on French-speaking Africa which has been appearing over the past few years. He deals in depth with the historic background out of which the Neo-Destour party developed, with its organization, and with the ancillary groups which played a role in decision-making at the national level. To an even greater degree than is true of parties elsewhere in Africa, the Neo-Destour is the product of the leadership of one man and two chapters are devoted to an analysis of the consolidation of his personal power.

Dr. Moore makes a distinction between the single party of the Guinean or Malian type (which he calls the Neo-Leninist type) and the Neo-Destour (the "permissive" single party type). He argues the "Neo-Leninist pattern would tend to pursue the political priorities of modernization at the expense of the technical ones, whereas the permissive model would sacrifice political fervor for administrative efficiency." For the new states of Africa, Dr. Moore quite correctly argues that there is an inherent danger in both types. As the Guinean example abundantly illustrates, too rigid adherence to doctrine has a stifling effect on economic progress. The "permissive" party requires a supreme leader who will protect the system from those seeking power; yet in doing so he prevents the establishment of institutionalized forms of factional protest which become the foundations of democracy.

The African leaders today all face the dilemma of the growing power of the bureaucracy. Where, as in Kenya, the party has been subordinated to a reasonably efficient bureaucracy, there is a constant risk of mass political apathy, although the functions of government may be carried on in a satisfactory manner. Where the party overshadows the administrative structure, as in Guinea, it may be easier to maintain mass involvement in politics, but the concrete accomplishments of government toward modernization will be correspondingly less evident.

The volume suffers from an excess of academic paraphernalia but in its coverage of the Tunisian system it will be of lasting help both to the North African specialist and to the student of the political process everywhere in independent Africa.

L. GRAY COWAN
Columbia University

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Magna Carta *by J. C. Holt. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—xv, 378 pp. $11.50.*

It is sixty years since McKechnie's *Magna Carta* first appeared, and there must be many who have longed for something as learned, but more up-to-date, to place in the hands of their students. Here at last is a full-length study which incorporates the findings of the best scholars of those sixty years, but adds fresh interpretations, based on close and penetrating research into the new material that has become accessible since McKechnie wrote. Professor Holt writes, in his own words, as a historian, not, like McKechnie, as a lawyer, but no study of Magna Carta can be irrelevant for a student of the law. His book is a remarkable achievement, combining as it does exact scholarship with a lively and vigorous style ("In 1215 Magna Carta was a failure" are his opening words) and a comprehensive grasp of institutional development through the centuries and with an imaginative intimacy with the personalities and the ideas or assumptions of the men of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. And not only of Englishmen, an especially admirable feature of the book is its setting of the English situation in a European background. Parallels or contrasts are constantly drawn with conditions and events in contemporary France, Spain, Sicily, Hungary, the Empire, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, in regard, for instance, to the sale of liberties and the granting of charters (pp. 21, 27, 44, 180-82), appeal to custom (p. 97), disputes on military service (pp. 64-66), the right of resistance (pp. 66-67), the judgment of peers (pp. 63ff.) and the influence of Roman Law (p. 73).

The plan of the book does not include a clause-by-clause commentary like McKechnie's, but there is a detailed examination of its provisions in chapter VIII, and nine appendices (pp. 293-362), including the full text with translation of the charter of 1215, the full text of the final version of 1225, the coronation charter of Henry I, the treaty of London of 1215, and other cognate documents, together with some specimen photographic facsimiles, provide ample material for study of the text in detail. The help given in the index under the heading "Magna Carta" should also be noted.

Professor Holt begins with a history of the document, as a document, down to the seventeenth century. He then gives three chapters to the historical developments, political and institutional, which led up to the crisis of John's reign. "The Charter reflects in its quality the character of the men who achieved it and the nature of the society in which it came about" (p. 18). Two chapters then give the actual events of the years 1212-15. Chapter VII, "The quality of the Great Charter," weighs the evidence for the various interpretations that have been put on the Runnymede document, and maintains that, for all the vulnerability of

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his phrasing, "Stubbs grasped the essentials. Men then believed that liberties had been won, if not for the nation, then for the community or for the realm" (p. 187). Chapter VIII examines the achievement of 1215—the practical bearing of the Charter's detailed provisions, indicating, however, the problems of their enforcement in 1215. Chapter IX "From distraint to war," carries on the narrative, showing the "failure" of the Charter as a settlement of the disputes between the two parties sworn to observe it. The last chapter tells the story of the transformation of the Runnymede Charter into the Charter of 1225, and, in due course, into the first statute on the Statute Book, and traces briefly the growth of the "Myth" whose beginnings, as the author shows, can be assigned to the St. Albans chroniclers of Henry III's reign, but which in its fully developed form owes most to the legal historians of the seventeenth century, above all to Coke. That story has been so well told in Faith Thompson's admirable book of 1948 that Professor Holt needs only to summarize her results (p. 9).

Which side does the author take in the perennial argument of King versus Barons? As he shows, it is not a simple question. The right was not all on one side, however much Magna Carta itself may seem to assume that. With other writers, notably Joliffe, he makes Henry II largely responsible for the conflict as, indeed, contemporary chroniclers observed (p. 98). It was the whole Angevin system that the barons were attacking (p. 34). On the other hand, the immediate grievances that brought their resentment up to boiling point resulted directly from John's determination to recover Normandy after its loss in 1204, and the resulting financial pressure brought to bear on all those who had wealth to be extorted. The barons were far from blameless; nevertheless Holt, as against Norgate, Jenks, Painter, and Poole, sees them as standing for more than narrowly class interests. They were men of their time, and as such, though we need not regard them as political theorists, they had inherited political traditions and had learned from political experience. The antithesis between "law" and "will"—the arbitrary action of the king who controlled the machinery of government and was at the top of the feudal ladder—was part of "the every day thinking of the articulate layman" (p. 76), and Holt finds evidence of this in official and unofficial records. Richardson and Sayles have shown that the baronial class was by no means illiterate, and the London version of the *Leges Edwardi Confessoris*, with its definition of the limits of monarchical rights (p. 79 f.), was certainly an element in the political atmosphere. The coronation charter of Henry I, whose confirmation was part of the program of 1214, was annexed to the *Leges* in the London manuscript. The principle of the rule of law, enshrined in clause 39 of the Runnymede Charter, had been

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expressed in the judgment on Longchamp in 1191 (p. 103); "no dispossession without judgment, and the judgment that of the King's court," was a familiar idea before John offered it to the barons, at Pope Innocent's suggestion, a month before Runnymede (pp. 146, 226-29).

"The demands and concessions of 1215 were not a sudden jump, but the last stages of a long journey" (p. 48), a journey taken by both ruler and ruled. Henry II had not only built up a mighty system of government, he had taught his subjects what to expect from it. "The Crown's routine convenience was converted into the subjects' customary right" (p. 96). Furthermore, as Powicke pointed out in *Stephen Langton* in 1928, he had had to employ his subjects' counsel and service to make the machinery work. "One of the main effects of the measures of Henry II and his sons was to educate their subjects in government" (p. 40). Magna Carta gives ample evidence that the barons valued the royal system of justice and demanded that it should operate efficiently.

Magna Carta, in fact, itself safeguards other interests than those of the barons. In comparison with the charters of liberties granted by French, Hungarian, and Sicilian rulers to their subjects, "Magna Carta assumed legal parity among all free men to an exceptional degree" (p. 185). Holt denies the validity of McKechnie's rigidly narrow interpretation of the term "free man" as referring only to members of the baronial class. "Magna Carta was a grant to all free men throughout the realm" (p. 184).

Holt shows that much can be said on John's behalf. He was an able and efficient ruler, appreciating and indeed respecting law and custom, but he could not be relied on. "In a society which increasingly required settled forms of legal procedure . . . there was less and less room for a Crown which provided all this, and yet reserved to itself the right to break, ignore, withhold or suspend these very rules at its own convenience" (p. 29). In the Charter, "the pupils were teaching the master the lesson he had taught them" (p. 30). Though in the short run the Charter failed of its object, it was so solidly based on tradition, so practical in its provisions, and, above all, so adaptable to the growing needs of the country, that it not only came to life again after John's death but established itself as a lasting safeguard against the dangers of arbitrary rule.

It is its masterly setting of the Great Charter in its place in English history, together with its exact scholarship and rich illustration from the sources, that makes this book so notable a contribution to the history of political thought in action.

HELEN CAM
Sevenoaks, Kent, England

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The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 by Lawrence Stone. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965.—xxiv, 841 pp. $16.80.

For nearly a generation the historians of the English seventeenth century have been engaged in acrimonious and extended debate on the social and economic origins of the English Civil War. Most of the work has been in the form of articles, some brilliantly speculative, others informative but only in limited areas. One of the contenders in this debate has now produced a full-scale study, buttressed by an exhaustive body of evidence, and boldly assertive in its conclusions. Professor Stone has set up a landmark from which all future discussion of seventeenth-century problems will have to start. The book, of course, deals with more than the question of revolutionary origins. It is social history in the grandest sense, a comprehensive study of the highest stratum of English society at a signally important period in its development.

"Aristocracy" is defined by the author as the peerage—just under sixty families in 1558 and about double that number in 1641. However, the line is only roughly drawn and much of his evidence and some of his conclusions apply to at least the upper ranges of the gentry as well. Roughly, the scope of the work covers three major areas. The first deals with the question of power, both in its largest and most general social dimensions and in the more particular political limits of office and honors in court and government. Secondly, the author examines in full detail the economic position of the aristocracy; lastly, there are sections dealing with "mind and manners"—marriage, education, and religion.

As the title implies, Professor Stone sees this as a century in which an ancient aristocratic way of life was undergoing rapid change, severe stress, and eventually—in the Civil War—catastrophic breakdown. This is a central theme, but it draws in many related questions and the book reaches out to include all the major socio-economic phenomena of the age. Full attention is given to the much-vexed issues of the sources of aristocratic wealth, the pattern of its consumption, and its redistribution in this period as well as the related problem of the profits of office-holders. The abundance of data presented here means that the onus of discussion will henceforth center on interpretation of data rather than on broad speculation. Perhaps the most original and most penetrating discussion is that on public order. Professor Stone here maps out a crucial change in England's most basic political habits—the disappearance of naked and unrestrained violence in the conduct of ordinary political life. In these years the state at last won its final victory in the age-long struggle against private political violence. The section on education is equally illuminating; it needs to be read in conjunction with the author's important article on this topic

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("The Education Revolution in England, 1560-1640," *Past and Present*, XXVIII [1964], 41-80).

This book is based on a monumental body of research; mountains of documents in the Public Record Office and in local and family archives were utilized, as well as many volumes of contemporary social comment. This material is organized skillfully and intelligently, and there are over fifty tables, charts, and lists appended to provide statistically ordered data for handy reference. Nevertheless, the main criticism which will be leveled at this work is that not enough of the apparatus is made available to the reader. Many statements will be challenged, not necessarily because they are inaccurate but because the crucial supporting data are not fully laid out. Much of the data available is by its very nature unsatisfactory; seventeenth-century records are so often incomplete or bafflingly unclear to the modern researcher that the problem of interpretation of sources is a major one. Professor Stone has every right to speak with authority in his judgments, but he will not satisfy his critics unless he displays some of his evidence more fully. It may fairly be argued that this would have made an already long book hopelessly unmanageable, but one hopes that in journals or elsewhere more of the apparatus of research may be made available.

A review of this work should not end on a note of criticism, for this book is a monument in English historical scholarship in our generation. Professor Stone has had the courage and the good sense to be bold in generalization and in interpretation; he will certainly be challenged in many particulars, but his critics will have to display the same massive knowledge and discriminating judgment which he has brought to bear.

WALLACE T. MACCAFFREY
Haverford College

The Pursuit of Certainty: David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Beatrice Webb *by Shirley Robin Letwin. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—viii, 391 pp. $9.50.*

Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals *by Joseph Hamburger. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1965.—xii, 308 pp. $7.50.*

The utilitarian tradition continues—and with reason—to fascinate students of modern politics and historians of ideas. Whether one's interest lies in the domain of pure theory or in the zone where theory blends with

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political action, the utilitarians still raise live issues, however shaky may have been their metaphysics. In these volumes, Mr. Hamburger explores the efforts of J.S. Mill and the Radicals to fashion a party which would hold the balance in the House of Commons and would be the architect of a new, reformed political structure. Mrs. Letwin stays more firmly in the realm of ideas. With her four subjects, all, loosely speaking, in the utilitarian tradition, she inquires into the connection "between changes in the understanding of political activity and in general views of human life"—surely an awesome assignment. All of them, embodying a commonsense, matter-of-fact, concrete approach, stand for a distinctively British element in political thought, but one from which each represents an increasing departure.

Mrs. Letwin's problem is subtle and she prudently warns the reader (and herself) against looking for over-precise patterns. Similarities and differences, schools of thought and types of approach fall into no fixed categories but become overlapping and messy. It is, indeed, one of the considerable merits of *The Pursuit of Certainty* that the author eschews patness and presents her four figures as individuals, with all of the atypical elements, even idiosyncrasies of thought, that thinkers seem to develop when looked at closely. At the outset, she establishes Hume (who next to Mill gets the longest essay) as the fountainhead of the utilitarian tradition as, in fact, the thinker who "more than anyone else has given expression to the peculiar genius of British politics." His indifference toward visions of a better world and ideal schemes of government, his belief that it made no sense to try to choose flatly between liberty and authority, his annoyance with the doctrine of contract which implied that government was produced by magic out of chaos—these notions make good his claim to be a pioneer, perhaps *the* pioneer, of utilitarianism.

In dealing with the four Britons, Mrs. Letwin analyzes skillfully the diverse influences brought to bear on them from their own world as well as the tradition they inherited from the past. Even though the subjects are familiar enough, there are plenty of insights—even a number of new facts, for Mrs. Letwin has worked in the Bentham papers in University College, London, and in Beatrice Webb's diaries—to reward students of modern Britain. For example, the long footnote on pages 146-47 criticizing Halevy's interpretation of Bentham's "natural and artificial identification of interests" is, I think, a significant contribution. Again, for readers who have a taste for gossip, it now appears that Beatrice Webb's love affair with Joseph Chamberlain was mostly her own fantasy. Each paragraph and each chapter come off successfully, sometimes superbly. Yet the book does not quite equal the sum of its parts. Perhaps the thesis was too cosmic, perhaps too vague. At any rate, there is an elusive, indistinct quality

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about the study as a whole which the brilliance of some of the sections does not manage to dispel.

Mr. Hamburger has written what, in a sense, is a sequel to his *James Mill and the Art of Revolution* (1963). In this admirable new study, drawing on a wealth of manuscript material, both familiar and fresh, he examines the ideas and maneuvers of the followers of Bentham and James Mill in the decade after 1832. Unlike most radicals, this group was not to be satisfied with gobbets of reform; nothing would do but to destroy the power of the aristocracy and to establish that, not of the middle classes, but of the "numerous classes." First must come the coalescence of the two aristocratic factions into a single party, to be followed by the creation of a broadly-based party representing the interest of the people. The Philosophic Radical group conceived the conflict between the People and the Aristocracy as a basic feature of the British social structure, and it was the function of the Radicals to manage the triumph of the former.

In retrospect, their aim and tactics seem spectacularly unrealistic. Alone of the group Joseph Parkes had a grasp of the hard, uncertain world of politics. "What Condorcet," he succinctly observed, "dreamed political society *would be*, Molesworth and Co. dream it *is*." The aims of the Radicals were frustrated by the persistent Whig loyalties of the moderate reformers, who preferred to move slowly down the path of reform with the old leaders rather than to cast their lot with those regarded as doctrinaire ideologues. By 1839 the attempt had clearly failed, and the Radical group began to break up. Mill moved toward the Whigs, thinking, perhaps, to be accepted as their philosopher, and Mrs. Grote accepted invitations to Holland House and was even presented at Court.

DAVID OWEN
Harvard University

Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain *by Austin Ranney. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1965.—xiv, 298 pp. $6.50.*

Professor Ranney has described, with a wealth of detail, the methods by which candidates for Parliament are selected in Great Britain. In a system in which the personnel of the House of Commons provides the raw material from which a government must be fashioned, this process is of crucial importance to the quality of political life. Every prime minister naturally tries to pick for office the best members of his party; but he cannot, for the most part, pick anything better than the best that is there.

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Professor Ranney shows how, alike in the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal parties, this critical selection is always made in private, at the local level, and in accordance with the whims of the more active members of the relevant constituency organization. Although both Conservative and Labour headquarters keep lists of officially approved candidates (not so the Liberals, who have to search for candidates and have no surplus to hawk around) the local boys are free, if they wish, to give preference to one of their own worthies who may be totally unknown outside his own area; and this they often do. True, headquarters in both parties retains a theoretical right of veto, but this is very, very seldom exercised.

Professor Ranney has been remarkably successful in peeping behind the scenes to see how this haphazard process really works, and what sort of men and women it eventually puts on offer to the electorate. In all parties, it seems, the tendency is for the selectors to choose people rather above average in social position and education; and in all parties unimpeachable character carries more weight than political acumen, and ability to speak effectively counts for more than the content of speech. In the selection of Conservative candidates particularly, little attention is paid to ideology (or even to ideas). As one successful contestant has put it: "Parliamentary candidates are frequently chosen on an almost alarmingly non-political basis." Labour selectors, however, tend to be somewhat more alive to ideological issues, and especially to the divergence between the party's Left and Right wings. But even so, a predominantly left-wing party may be content to choose a candidate who stands far to the Right. Every local organization in every party is looking, not for the best man, nor for the one whose politics are most sympathetic, but for the man (or occasionally the woman) who they think has the best chance of winning the election.

As between one party and another there are, indeed, certain differences in the most favored types. As might be expected the Conservatives like farmers, landowners, and substantial businessmen, and above all the products of the English so-called Public School. Among Labour candidates, on the other hand, at least two distinct streams are discernible. Labour candidates who are sponsored (that is, paid for) by their trade unions constitute a distinct class of their own, composed mainly of manual workers or union officials, generally with little formal education; whereas unsponsored Labour candidates tend to be middle class people who would not feel socially out of place on the Tory benches. Indeed Professor Ranney finds that this distinction between sponsored and unsponsored candidates within the Labour party is more striking than any of the differences between Conservative and Labour candidates generally.

This scholarly book will rank as an outstanding contribution in a field

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much neglected by British political writers. All that can be said by way of criticism is that, having presented all the discoverable facts, the author is over-scrupulous in withholding any subjective judgment upon them. Maybe he felt that so delicate a matter should be left for the natives to explore?

BARBARA WOOTTON
House of Lords, London

British Politics in the Collectivist Age *by Samuel H. Beer. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.—xii, 390, xiii pp. $5.95.*

Professor Beer's attractive and readable book concerns British "political parties and interest groups and how they affect public policy." He believes that the post-World War II period has seen a new phase in the development of these institutions; the "Collectivist Age" is foreshadowed in such things as the evolution of producers' pressure groups in the later nineteenth century, or the commitment of the British Labor party to a socialist program in 1918, but it has only arrived in mature form since the war. To demonstrate this he introduces a schematization involving five types of politics: Old Tory and Old Whig politics, Liberal and Radical politics, and Collectivist politics. His definition of collectivism appears somewhat wavering. At first he dismisses the traditional definition, going back to Dicey; the later nineteenth century saw "certain exceptional acts of state intervention" in economic affairs, but these did not constitute collectivism because they were "not an effort to reshape the economic system as a whole or alter its foundations" (p. 67). Yet later he appears to accept a more limited view, in which mid-twentieth century Tory politics are collectivist just as much as Labor's socialism, however much the two may differ in their social and political ideals. It is difficult to see Mr. Heath's Conservative party working hard "to reshape the economic system as a whole or alter its foundations," and even dubious how far Mr. Wilson's team would go in this direction if freed of the shackles imposed by the tenuousness of its majority in Parliament.

In sketching the evolution, however, wherein progressively larger and better articulated economic units have grown parallel with progressively more disciplined and highly organized political parties, the author has interesting observations to make at various points. His analysis of the changes that took place in the Labor party during (and as a result of) the First World War is stimulating and convincing; the crucial factor, he argues, was the growth in trade union strength and self-confidence. He

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notes perceptively the partial conflict within the Labor party between the ideal of intra-party democracy and that of socialist ideology, though here as in some other sections he rather exaggerates the newness of what he sees. He underplays the dissensions in the Labor party between the wars; reading his description of intra-party consensus (p. 156) it is hard to recall that the period being described saw the indignant protests first of the ILP, later of the Socialist League. On the other hand, Beer analyzes effectively the complexities of British Conservatism, with its baffling ability to move with the times while retaining strong elements of the old Tory outlook.

Perhaps the most interesting sections of the book are the chapters on the last two decades; the subject matter is fresher, the insights more arresting. Professor Beer emerges as a critic, albeit a temperate one, of R.T. McKenzie's *British Political Parties*, concluding "that in practice as in theory, in the actual distribution of power as in their reigning conceptions of authority, the two parties [Conservative and Labor] were deeply opposed" (p. 388).

RICHARD W. LYMAN
Stanford University

Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic *by Andreas Dorpalen. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—xiii, 506 pp. $12.00*

Hans Delbrück once called him "The Great Old Zero" and Friedrich Meinecke said of him that his greatness consisted of "allowing himself to be shoved with dignity." History has proven these two contemporary observers partly wrong. True, Hindenburg was infinitely smaller than the giant idol into which he had been molded by nationalist propaganda. But he was no zero either. This ignorant, selfish, cold, indolent, and constantly worried old man had his will and his ideals and he steered Germany in the direction of these ideals whenever he could overcome his mortal fear of taking a decision. He remained a faithful servant of the Weimar Republic for the first five years of his presidential term only because there was hardly anyone in his entourage to encourage him to act differently. (In the late nineteen-twenties even Schleicher recommended to him the strictest constitutionalism.) Yet he began to violate the constitution systematically when, after 1930, he became convinced that such a step could be taken without prejudice to Germany or to his own reputation. Hindenburg was, of course, tremendously influenced by

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his political advisers, and even more by his Junker friends, but the decision to engage on the road of "presidential government" was his own and it stemmed from his convictions. In the light of this, the successive dismissals of Groener, Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher—men whom he had trusted but who failed to live up to his expectations—were no acts of ingratitude but logical steps in the course of a rightist policy of "national revival" at the end of which stood the appointment of the greatest nationalist leader, Adolf Hitler. If it took Hindenburg so long to make up his mind about Hitler, this was not so much because of the lowly origins of the "Czechoslovak corporal," his bloodthirsty program, or the rowdiness of the SA, but because the appointment as chancellor of the leader of the greatest German political party threatened to bring about a return to party politics and parliamentary government and an end to the president's authoritarian program. Only when Hitler proved to be strong—which his predecessors were not—and also a man above or against the parliament and the parties, did Hindenburg feel entitled to his well-deserved retirement. He left Germany as he always wanted her to be: united, vigorous, "national," and authoritarian. In return for all this he gladly condoned the "little bloodletting," inevitable in times of a national revolution.

It is to be hoped that these conclusions are accurately drawn from Professor Dorpalen's exposé since the reader has the benefit of neither introduction nor conclusion—nor even of a page given to the summing up of Hindenburg's policy or ideas. Worse still, there is no attempt to arrive at a characterization. Even if he had no access to Hindenburg's personal papers—Walter Görlitz was definitely in a better position—the author surely could not have waded through so much other material without having formed some definite image of the private life, the thoughts—if any—and the passions of the old Field Marshal. But no such image is perceptible and Professor Dorpalen's book becomes then not a biography—if that is what he meant it to be—but a history of the Weimar Republic with its focus on the sayings and doings of the president's councillors. And while the personalities of Groener, Meissner, Brüning, Oscar Hindenburg, Papen, and Schleicher emerge from this book with a good deal of clarity, that of the central figure remains as inscrutable, or rather as dull as it ever had been. A valuable study, indeed, but by no means the final answer to the riddle of Germany's "Wooden Titan."

István Deák
Columbia University

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The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria *by Peter G. J. Pulzer. New York, London, and Sydney, John Wiley and Sons, 1964.—xiv, 364 pp. $5.95.*

The German-speaking countries of the nineteenth century produced an anti-Semitism which had political platforms, social respectability, and intellectual support. As such, it was a movement more pointed and pronounced than similar stirrings in other countries. However, it was no towering structure of doctrinal thought and, more important, it had almost died when the German anti-Jewish destruction process began in 1933. In retrospect, the anti-Semites of the nineteen hundreds were men of murky ideas, clumsy in speech and ineffective in action. It is difficult to write an important book about such petty figures without linking them to a larger framework or wider context than the political arena in which they functioned with so little consequence.

Pulzer's book provides no connection between that anti-Semitism and the larger problem of modern Germany. The unclarity which pervaded the utterings of the anti-Semitic propagandists affects the book itself. Its statistical compilations, citations of party programs, references to Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, do not help. The reader will still be bewildered.

Twenty years ago, Waldemar Gurian wrote a penetrating article on the development of German anti-Semitism, published in a collection edited by Koppel Pinson, *Essays on Anti-Semitism*. If one can dispense with details, here is the essence of the story, from the sixteenth century to the rise of Nazism. In 1949, Paul Massing described the nineteenth-century anti-Semites in a detailed work, *Rehearsal for Destruction*. Fifteen years later, Pulzer added little more than afterthoughts. The interested reader should tackle the three monographs in the order of their publication. If, after absorbing Massing's book, he wishes a more complete picture, he might well peruse Pulzer. His efforts will not be as productive if he reads Pulzer first.

The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism is thus no standard work. Despite its length, it flows from no embracing thesis. Despite its title, it does not reconstruct a history. In essence, it is a series of short essays. Some of them contain interesting items such as the involvement of a number of anti-Semites in spiritualism or the attempt by Bernard Förster, brother-in-law of Nietzsche, to establish a *judenreine* colony in Paraguay. The collection of these anecdotes, the quotations from speeches, and the tabulations of political data are Pulzer's principal contribution.

Reading about this period, one is driven to seek the mysterious links between the anti-Semitic incompetents and the incomparably efficient outburst of the Nazi bureaucrats just a few decades thereafter. Pulzer has not

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helped in the formulation of an underlying causal pattern for the two movements, but reading his material we can discern an important difference between them. The anti-Semites were dabblers. The Nazis—as they have so often reminded us in the last twenty years—were no anti-Semites.

RAUL HILBERG
University of Vermont

Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945 *by Wolfe W. Schmokel. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964.—xiv, 204 pp. $6.00.*

This extremely able study can be regarded as a natural extension of the 1930 classic, *The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918*, by Professor Mary E. Townsend. Moreover, Mr. Schmokel, who is an assistant professor of history at the University of Vermont, has also made an unusually fine contribution to the study of Nazi statecraft. Armed with hitherto untapped archival material, Professor Schmokel has lucidly demonstrated that the commonly held view that *Ostpolitik* was the major foreign policy goal of the Third Reich is in need of reappraisal. He submits that the principal aims of that foreign policy were *Ostpolitik und Kolonialpolitik* and that these aims were complementary rather than conflicting ones. *Ostpolitik* would naturally provide *Lebensraum* for the "excess" German population, while the acquisition of colonies in Africa —originally the ones taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles but later enlarged to form a *Mittelafrika* reminiscent of German foreign policy aims in the First World War—would furnish the raw materials and tropical resources for Greater Germany.

That the Third Reich took *Kolonialpolitik* seriously is shown by the fact that, under the guidance of an "old colonial hand," General Ritter von Epp, an extremely elaborate apparatus (the *Kolonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP/Staat*) was developed to draft plans and train colonial cadres for the administration of the new German Africa. Considering the customary jurisdictional battles and bureaucratic rivalries in Nazi Germany and the obvious fact that it had only imaginary territory to administer, it is remarkable that General Epp's office remained intact and continued to function until 1943. Dr. Schmokel's description and analysis of the structure and functions of the *Kolonialpolitisches Amt* is the first such published account, and it is undoubtedly the most original as well as the best part of his book.

Earlier portions of the book include the activities of colonial interest

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groups in the Weimar Republic and Third Reich, a lengthy account of Allied-German negotiations regarding the possible return of the League of Nations mandated territories to Germany, and an exegesis of the arguments utilized by German publicists and statesmen for the return of such territories. Here the author breaks relatively little new ground, for much of this had been very ably covered twenty-six years ago in a little-known American doctoral dissertation by Gerhard E. L. von Glahn (Northwestern University, 1939) entitled *The German Demand for Colonies*. Unfortunately, Professor Schmokel overlooked this source, and, in his discussion of Allied-German *pourparlers* and formal conferences, makes no reference to the French *Journal Officiel* (nor, for that matter, to any French language sources) or to the British *Hansards*. In some instances, citations from these primary sources would have been preferable to those from secondary sources. Furthermore, he could have profitably used the findings of the 1946 South African Parliamentary Select Committee regarding the conversations between a German agent, Mrs. Denk, and a future Prime Minister, Dr. Daniel F. Malan, in 1940. This document sheds considerable light on Nazi Kolonialpolitik in the early years of the Second World War.

In general, the book is well conceived, superbly researched, and lucidly written. Indeed, it is an indispensable book for scholars working in the area, and it will be some time before it can be surpassed or before it becomes obsolete. Aside from the flaws mentioned earlier, the book could be improved by the use of chapter subheadings and by the inclusion of a chapter giving a brief resumé of German colonial history prior to 1919, such a chapter to include the findings of two recent doctoral dissertations in the area: Richard V. Pierard's *The German Colonial Society, 1882-1914* (University of Iowa, 1964) and Alfred W. Lever's *The British Empire and the German Colonies, 1914-1919* (University of Wisconsin, 1963). Finally, some consideration ought to be given to the activities of the *Volksdeutsche* living in the former German African colonies. In Southwest Africa, for example, they were a threat to state security, so much so that General Smuts, the Minister of Justice, had to employ armed force to thwart an alleged *Putsch* in the territory in the spring of 1939.

RICHARD DALE
Northern Illinois University

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The European Right: A Historical Profile *edited by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965.—vi, 589 pp. $9.50.*

A collaborative volume is always a tricky enterprise: easy to conceive, difficult to carry to a successful conclusion. As a rule, some of the contributing authors go shooting out of orbit, or fuzz up the central focus of the separate essays. The danger is particularly great when the chosen topic is the European Right. To compare *any* given phenomenon in countries ranging from Britain to Russia is a challenging problem; it becomes even knottier when the phenomenon in question bears the imprecise label "the Right."

Confronted by these pitfalls, editors Rogger and Weber have pulled off the task with remarkable success. To be sure, Weber confesses in his introduction that "the more we have inspected the image of the Right, the less sure we have become of what it is"; and Rogger, in a concluding essay, admits that not all of the contributors accepted the same definition of "Right." Perhaps a preliminary conference of the participating authors might have given the book as a whole more coherence, more structural unity. Yet in another sense one is grateful to the editors for their tolerance of some diversity. To impose a rigid uniformity of pattern upon countries and movements of such varied nature would surely have produced the kind of distortion that humanistic scholars claim to find in certain ultra-systematizers.

The editors have chosen as their topic not the Right in general, but that particular segment of it often called the extreme or radical Right. They have specifically ruled out examination of radical Right movements that attained power, on the ground that success produces a sea-change. The radical Right phenomenon, as they see it, is a fairly recent one, confined to the postliberal and postindustrial era. Partially rooted in the older (conservative) Right, it differs by being more violent and by adopting some of the techniques and appeals of the Left. The editors contend that the radical Rightists were more numerous and more influential than has often been thought, and that their doctrines "both reflected and affected the world in which they lived." They find the fatal flaw of the radical Right in its mood of pessimism, its nihilistic despair of the modern world, its infantile yearning for protection against the dark forces that lurk everywhere. Added to this neurosis was its lack of doctrinal clarity and social homogeneity. Because the radical Right movements were socially eclectic and intellectually confused, they almost everywhere tended to be "marginal and volatile" in character.

It would be unjust to single out for special mention any of the eleven

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essays on individual countries. Since the editors have assembled an excellent team, the caliber of the entire book is high, even though the approaches vary from the theoretical to the narrative-analytical. Many readers are likely to find the chapters on Eastern Europe of special interest, in part because most of us know less about it, in part because certain activists there served a necessary function as social critics, in the absence of an effective radical Left. There are also some interesting parallels with nationalist movements in the new African and Asian states.

Every student of modern European affairs will find this collection informative and stimulating. All it lacks is an index.

GORDON WRIGHT
Stanford University

A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History *by A. James Gregor. New York, Random House, 1965.—xiii, 370 pp. $4.95.*

Stalin's Russia: An Historical Reconsideration *by Francis B. Randall. New York, The Free Press and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1965.—328 pp. $6.95.*

To most students who are brought into first contact with Marx, Engels appears merely as his hyphenated extension, quickly to be forgotten in the linkage Marxism-Leninism. Engels is cited for the financial support he extended to Marx, his self-effacing devotion to *der Alte*, and for his collaborative effort which left him without distinct personality and contribution.

It is one of the merits of Gregor's book that he has tried to establish Engel's specific contributions: the "dialectics of nature" and the "Darwinian supplement to classical Marxism," that is, Engels' effort to accommodate Darwin's evolutionary theory to the Marxian theory of history. Although others have dealt with contributions of Engels, Gregor's survey of Marxian philosophical developments from Engels to Lenin through the contemporary Soviet scene is compact, heavily documented without detracting from its readability, and in its analysis suggestive and occasionally provocative.

In his assessment of Marxism today Gregor follows what seems to be a trend: saving Marxism in spite of itself. Thus, though "there is much in the rich heritage of Marxism that is suggestive of lines of inquiry and

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techniques for study" (p. 282), "its most serious shortcoming is its evident addiction to Hegelianism" (p. 283)—to dialectic analysis. Which is saying that Marxism is useful to social science when it is stripped of its most characteristic feature, namely, its conceptual repudiation of repressive social institutions. The two-fold irony of Gregor's objection to the dialectic is not intentional, for when he goes on to say, ingenuously, that "most men, Marxist or non-Marxist, seem committed to essentially the same values" and that "differences are differences which turn on facts, concerns with how best to achieve the truly human social order. . ." (p. 289), he seems to be throwing out "facts" along with the dialectic. To accommodate Marxism to contemporary empirical science, whose practical application increasingly enhances the efficiency of social controls, is not to render any service to the "rich heritage" but rather to vitiate the very thrust of Marxism: the creation of a truly human social order. But this carping over interpretation should not detract from a good and useful book.

Stalin's Russia presents the "hero in history" line of analysis, arguing that Russia is what it is largely because of Stalin, and of a Stalin to boot who was ideologically committed, a "true believer." Without necessarily accepting Randall's contention that "Stalin was probably the most important man who ever lived" (pp. 1, 294), it may be agreed that a lesser or different man would not have left the imprint on Soviet society that Stalin did. Moreover, in fairness to the author's purpose, which is to argue Stalin's individual responsibility for making the Soviet Union what it is—in reaction to the "social forces" line of analysis—mere overstatement of the thesis would not be bothersome. But to play down the options open to Stalin, the influences of international politics, and the domestic power struggle, to cite only a few considerations, is surely to oversimplify the presentation. As the late Otto Kirchheimer pointed out in discussing Stalin's collectivization policy, "What matters . . . is the interrelation between socio-economic conditioning and the discretionary element left to the decision of the regime." ("Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review*, LIX [1965], 965.) To insist, moreover, as Randall does, that the key to understanding lies in Stalin's ideology, to define this ideology as the Marxist-Leninist doctrines and sentiments that Stalin inherited together with "all the new doctrines that he worked out and new sentiments that he adopted in the course of the crisis of the first twenty years of his rule" (p. 293), and to conclude that this doctrine "had the structure of a paranoiac delusion—systematized megalomania and belief in plots and persecutions, motivating violence" (p. 293) is not to offer a useful operational conception of "ideology." In short, the personal-ideological thesis is carried too far, obscuring

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the role of the "conditioning" elements which the author systematically plays down in favor of the "discretionary" elements.

BERNARD S. MORRIS
Indiana University

Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, *1953-1963 by Sidney I. Ploss. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.—312 pp. $6.50.*

Doubtless there are several enduring truths of Soviet leadership politics, but at least two are incontestable: that the decision-making arena is permeated with conflict of the most intensive and abrasive variety, and that agricultural policy has remained a continual concern and source of conflict for the leadership. In this volume Sidney I. Ploss proposes to illuminate the former by examining the latter in the years 1953 to 1963. The result is a convincing and instructive case study on the nature of Soviet politics.

Focusing on the leadership's need to resolve pressing questions of agricultural policy, Professor Ploss traces the rise of Khrushchev and his efforts to establish for himself an ever-widening freedom of policy action, and the equally persistent emergence of coalitions of opposition designed to limit the first secretary's powers, though not necessarily to depose him. One mark of the book's success is that although it was completed prior to Khrushchev's fall, it is instructive on the events leading to the *coup* of October 1964. Until 1959 Krushchev concentrated on partial reforms. His record was one of half-successes and outright failures. From 1959 to 1963 "he aspired to major reform of domestic policy and was effectively opposed."

The author's judgment of the period will interest students of comparative politics. He finds "a genuinely oligarchic procedure for policy-making, and its most outstanding feature is conflict." The point here, though not explicitly made, is that while some Western systems are experiencing an expansion and strengthening of the executive's power, the reverse process has been under way in the U.S.S.R. This system of "checks and balances," which has developed "willy-nilly," demands our increasing attention.

Professor Ploss' impressive research and sound conclusions noted, two reservations remain. The first is a by-product of the methodology. It is, of course, Kremlinological (a word he properly avoids), a misfortunate misnomer for a legitimate aspect of inquiry into any political system.

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The introductory chapter is a model presentation of the opportunities and problems of studying Soviet materials (reading the "language of conflict"); but on occasion Professor Ploss has not resisted the temptation to extrapolate beyond the limits of the *cited* evidence. Was Kozlov "allowed to pick the successor to Belyayev" (p. 155)? Possibly, but the evidence (p. 181) is inconclusive. Was a "Khrushchev-Kozlov-Suslov 'troika'" a "prototype" of the Soviet proposal for reorganizing the UN directorate (pp. 191-92)? Conceivably, but the evidence is circumstantial.

The second reservation concerns the author's casual use of historical analogies and fondness for the term "Neo-Stalinism." He suggests that the Left-Right division of opinion in the nineteen-fifties conformed to the pattern of the nineteen-twenties (p. 102). Surely the difference is that the previous bifurcation existed in the context of twenty-five million individual peasant undertakings, while the later case involved a recalcitrant peasantry producing within an inefficient system of collective farms. To be sure, there were similarities, but there was a vast dissimilarity of circumstances and options. More bothersome is the concept of "Neo-Stalinism" as a description of opposition to Khrushchev. Professor Ploss does elaborate on this "nostalgia" in his conclusion, but he seems to have in mind "leaders who were relatively more austerity-minded and disturbed over the implications of Khrushchev's inchoate welfare program for industrial expansion and social values" (p. 208). To equate this mood with Stalinism, even as it is defined in the good chapter on Stalin's legacy, is questionable.

There is a final impression to be gained from this book. Khrushchev's failures were dazzling, and very often he reigned while he did not rule; but he was a remarkable, if transitional, political figure, whose legacy eventually will be recalled more favorably than that of Stalin. Professor Ploss sees it this way: "Over the long run, expanding the arena of conflict by familiarizing the public with the nature of some policy differences may have been Khrushchev's most important contribution to the betterment of his countrymen."

STEPHEN F. COHEN
Columbia University

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Local Government in Japan *by Kurt Steiner. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965.—ix, 564 pp. $10.00.*

In the context of many of the recent studies of local government in the United States, many political scientists are likely to construe the title of Kurt Steiner's new book as referring to an analysis of community power structure, or the decision-making processes of community governments, or politics and policy formation at the local level. And, in fact, the book does illuminate all these subjects; its title is not misleading. But they are not its main focus. Most political scientists will classify it as an inquiry into intergovernmental relations.

Professor Steiner, of the department of political science at Stanford University, set two tasks for himself. One was to find out, "How much local autonomy actually exists in Japan today?" The answer to that question is given in unequivocal terms: very little. Tracing the history of local government from feudal times to the end of the Occupation, Professor Steiner concludes, "Local autonomy did not fail in Japan; it was never fully established." The Occupation authorities attempted to introduce it, but they made only modest headway; as soon as they left, the conservatives in political power and the national bureaucracy reversed whatever gains had been made. By a detailed review of constitutional, statutory, administrative, financial, and organizational relationships among the levels of government, Professor Steiner marshals an impressive array of evidence to buttress his judgment that local units of government in Japan are little more than outposts of the national government.

His second objective was to determine whether great local independence promotes or hinders the development of democracy in a modernizing nation. The answer to this question is less clearcut. Using election statistics and opinion polls as evidence of popular participation in local government, he finds that the usual arguments about the democratizing impact of strong local political institutions do not hold in Japan. Blind obedience to traditional authority rather than competitive politics in the Western sense characterizes much of Japanese local politics, so local politics does not socialize the populace to democratic political practices and does not prepare a reservoir of future democratic leaders for the national arena. Moreover, the weakness of local governmental institutions renders them ineffective as training grounds for future national administrative officials. The author hints, but he does not say, that local government in Japan may in fact engender political practices and attitudes *hostile* to democracy, in which case strong local units might be *inimical* to democratization. He also intimates they might resist the disruptions generated by economic development, so that national leaders intent on modernization

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could not afford to allow them too much independence. He obviously believes the day has come in Japan when these fears are no longer justified; "just as too much autonomy granted too soon may retard development," he observes, "so too little autonomy granted too late may do the same. . . . There may well be a time when it becomes of advantage to replace local subordination with local cooperation." But though his own predilections incline him this way, and though he applauds the efforts of the Occupation authorities to strengthen the localities, the data he arrays cast a cloud on the optimistic answer to his question about the relationships of local autonomy to democracy. The implicit challenge to the usual assumptions about the benefits of local autonomy is disturbing and important.

Professor Steiner, in order to keep his book within manageable bounds, does not attempt to compare Japanese intergovernmental relations with the experience of other countries. But the parallels and contrasts cry out for analysis; he has done all students of comparative political institutions and behavior a great service in providing so much of the information they will need. For example, I find myself wondering uneasily about some of the similarities between the defenders of local autonomy in Japan and the proponents of local "home rule" in the United States; by the criteria he uses, local independence may perhaps prove not much greater in America than in Japan. A book that is both a valuable reference work about the local governmental system of a single country and a stimulus to speculation and discussion must be counted a significant contribution to its own and related disciplines.

HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University

Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya *by K. J. Ratnam. Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1965.—viii, 248 pp. $7.70.*

The most extraordinary feature of Malaya is not that communalism has survived but that, despite communalism, Malaya itself has survived as little battle-scarred as it has. In a book well documented with facts and figures, K. J. Ratnam, a lecturer in political science at the University of Singapore, has explored the major issues involved in Malayan communalism and the means by which the country has been held together. With the two admirable attributes of modesty of purpose and of general absence of jargon, he has set out, as he puts it, to present "the communal problem as it exists in the Federation of Malaya," forswearing any attempt to make a direct theoretical contribution or draw explicitly on current con-

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cepts and terminology. If most of the ground which he covers is familiar to students of Malaya, he has pulled together and effectively organized a valuable mass of material and thrown considerable light on how it is to be interpreted and evaluated.

As the title indicates, the book concentrates on Malaya, with only incidental mention of Singapore and none whatsoever of the complications of Malaysia and Sukarno's confrontation. The fundamental questions which Malaya poses are, of course, whose country it is and what kind of national identity, if any, will emerge from its domestic confrontation of races. The Malays continue to cherish the forlorn hope that it may still turn out to be a Malay country, but the immigrant peoples, having largely shed their migratory character, are not prepared to contemplate absorption into the Malay culture with its firm Islamic roots, even though they have reluctantly accepted Malay as the national language. As Dr. Ratnam brings out well in his detailed review of constitutional development and party politics both before and after independence, no significant aspect of political life in Malaya is free of communal implications: the political process consists "largely of an attempt to establish and maintain a viable equilibrium between the different communities."

The two key phrases around which he sees much of the country's politics revolving in recent years are the "special position of the Malays" and the "legitimate interests of the other communities." These obviously lend themselves to very different interpretations and can as well serve to define the issues about which the battle is being fought as to lay down the guidelines for harmonious settlement in terms of an assumed common national interest. A determining element for the future may be the author's finding that among the Malays, politically insecure and economically depressed after independence as before, there are some who seek to translate their "special rights" into "natural rights" which should be increased rather than melted down into the general national pot.

Dr. Ratnam judiciously avoids moving far into the realm of prophecy in a concluding chapter which realistically examines Malaya's prospects. He sees no present likelihood of a disappearance of communalism and warns against putting faith in the emergence of political leaders who would stand above the communal cleavage. At a number of points he calls attention to the communal extremists in the several camps, and his final paragraph warns that the present ruling elite of the Alliance may fail adequately to take into account the unreadiness of the communally divided masses to accept partnership.

RUPERT EMERSON
Harvard University

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The Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life in Contemporary Burma *by Manning Nash. New York, London, and Sydney, John Wiley and Sons, 1965.—viii, 333 pp. $6.95.*

A decade ago there was high expectation that Burma, following its own independent course and blending versions of socialism, democracy, and traditionalism, shortly would be thriving on novel and happy solutions to the problem of modernizing old societies. These hopes now have been completely shattered as Burma, under the grip of military rule, seems to be pulling back into isolation and away from modernity. The tragedy and fascination of the Burmese story is that everything appeared to favor progress: her leaders seemed sincerely committed to justice and a better life for all, the road was not blocked by reactionary power elites, the land was not over-populated, and the economy appeared to have a strong base in its huge rice exports.

Clearly the problem of Burma has been the human factor. The Burmese spirit somehow failed to support that first postwar effort at modernization, and if we are to forecast subsequent attempts we must know a great deal more about what moves the common people of Burma and how they are likely to respond to their changing lot.

It is in providing understanding about all dimensions of life in rural Burma that makes this extraordinarily detailed study of Manning Nash's so valuable. He has captured to a remarkable degree the flavor of life in two Burmese villages—one a mixed dry-crop farming community, and the other an irrigated rice community. In a manner that should be a model for all anthropologists Nash systematically records the objective factors in the two environments—he learned the price of everything and the holdings and incomes of all the people—and then treats in equal detail the more subjective worlds of human feelings and religious beliefs. With a sure hand he leads us into that fascinating world of the Burmese spirits or *nats*, and his sections on witchcraft, divinatory systems, astrology, and alchemy surpass the work of J. S. Scott. Nash's reporting on traditional Burmese medicine breaks completely new ground and suggests some interesting connections with traditional Chinese medicine.

In my judgment this work is destined to become a classic in the field of Burmese ethnography. Although Nash suggests that more such studies should be made before we begin to generalize about Burmese developments, this is not likely to happen. First, Burma is now closed to social science research, and, second, it is hard to imagine other anthropologists wanting to risk comparison with Nash's work; he has set such high standards that only fools are likely to rush in.

On the larger issues of Burma's prospects for modernization the book

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unfortunately fails to provide much guidance. We would be completely content to accept his work as a fascinating and valuable description of village life, but Nash himself suggests that the work should have broader implications. His title implies a basic interest in modernization and in his introduction he raises all the ground issues about political and economic development in the new states. But at the end of the volume he has no explicit answers to Burma's national policy problems.

The reader of this study can thus expect to be sensitized to the subtle realities of Burmese peasant life, but left insensitive as to what the leaders of Burma should do to ensure that it follows the "golden road to modernity."

LUCIAN W. PYE
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Springtime of Freedom: The Evolution of Developing Societies *by William McCord. New York, Oxford University Press, 1965. —xi, 330 pp. $6.00.*

In this thoughtful, sobering, but fundamentally hopeful analysis Professor McCord advances a two-fold theme: (1) that political tyranny and economic centralization are not the only paths for the developing nations, and (2) that political and economic "pluralism" is a more desirable and feasible alternative. His case against the authoritarian model is persuasive. A centralized state with dictatorial powers does not necessarily facilitate economic development, eliminate political instability, or magically dissolve into democracy after the crisis of transition. Authoritarian arguments have been too quickly accepted by a small intellectual elite in the developing lands. This elite, and those of a similar persuasion elsewhere, have too speedily and too uncritically concluded that the absence of assumed prerequisites for democratic genesis and growth (economic abundance, literacy, national unity, cultural homogeneity, urbanization, among others) dictates an authoritarian solution. McCord's conclusions flow from a sympathetic but candid assessment of the social, economic, and political challenges of the developing lands. In the context of the struggle for bread *and* freedom McCord reviews the dilemmas facing those engaged, for example, in the battlefields of freedom in such countries as India and Bolivia, as well as the experiments of those who have succumbed to authoritarian solutions, as in China, Ghana, or Indonesia.

If McCord's analysis of the challenges confronting the developing lands is keen, and his rejection of the authoritarian solution is sound, the implementation of his own "pluralistic" solution, as he himself concedes, is

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in doubt. His social, economic, and political prescriptions are splendid: alter the debilitating feudal structure without destroying sound cultural tradition; control the birth rate; produce a skilled and literate populace; bring the masses and classes closer together; encourage agriculture and village life; stimulate light, decentralized, consumer-oriented industries; accumulate capital without compulsion; accept higher taxes and facilitate higher savings; diversify exports; plan for steady, efficient growth; obtain aid from the richer nations; encourage healthy modernization; decentralize power and preserve liberty but maintain national stability, unity, and consensus; maintain a pluralistic social structure but undermine stupid conservatives and blind reactionaries; inspire individual confidence but accept leadership from above! But, alas, the ability of leaders of his "pluralist" persuasion to carry out these ideas is open to question.

Professor McCord is certainly right in calling our attention to the lasting significance of authoritarian or democratic commitments reached *now* in the crucial and formative years of a developing nation's history. His emphasis on creative courage and responsible action is a welcome relief to the voices of gloom and doom. To the extent that McCord has forced all of us to reconsider our own too easy acceptance of dominant authoritarian trends and ideology in too many of the new lands, we are in his debt. But we must still ask: Will awareness of his pluralistic alternative, and appreciation of his eloquent plea for choice *now* of this option, render this option feasible?

If McCord is right, the answer may rest with millions of thoughtful uncommitted persons in the developing lands. Let us hope that they and a few thousand other influential leaders will read and be convinced by this provocative book.

NEAL RIEMER
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

International Relations: A General Theory *by J. W. Burton. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—viii, 288 pp. $7.50.*

I approached this book with the belief that grand theory-building enterprises in the field of international relations are likely to prove less successful and profitable than more modest efforts to theorize about limited aspects of the subject, and that the direct and deliberate pursuit of theory is less promising than the study of particular problems and phenomena, with the intent to exploit any theoretical insights that may arise out of such study. According to this view, those who hunger and thirst after theory may not be filled, whereas those who seek first to analyze sub-

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stantive issues that command their interests may find that theoretical blessings are added unto them.

Burton's book offers little to challenge this preconception. The label, "a general theory," is perhaps misleading, since the author treats it as a license to present a miscellany of viewpoints about international relations. Some of these are quite interesting and provocative; his thoughts about nonalignment strike me as the most valuable feature of the book. If the devotion of considerable attention to the recognizably Big Questions of the field qualifies a book as a general theory, then the book has some claim to the label. However, I do not find here a systematic and coherent analysis of the broad and complex field of international relations, an organized set of ideas conducive to making sense of the field as a whole. Instead, I find a collection of material that provides some indication of the Burtonian outlook upon and approach to international affairs—and the resultant impression is not very favorable. Confusion, contradiction, and even incoherence are more characteristic of this volume than clarity.

Burton is critical of the emphasis upon the concept of power in analysis of international relations, but his call for a challenge to that orthodoxy appears to be more an expression of his ideals than a denial of its descriptive accuracy (pp. 31, 68). Moreover, he does not succeed in clarifying the meaning or establishing the applicability of his alternative to the power model, which he describes variously as a communications model, a cybernetics model, or a decision-making model. He attributes to Kenneth Thompson a passage which the latter quoted from Walter Lippmann (p. 111). More seriously, he pictures Hans Morgenthau as "turning away from a power concept" (p. 149) and as advocating a system based upon a "nationalistic universalism" that he takes to mean the identification of national interest with the general and long-term development of international order (pp. 90, 110-11, 149). Only an extraordinary carelessness can explain Burton's failure to understand that Morgenthau treats nationalistic universalism as a deplorable and dangerous phenomenon, a crusading and aggressive brand of nationalism. Burton proclaims that "the term 'aggression' is one which has no useful place in a description of relations between States" (p. 41), but he regularly gives it a place in his analysis. He apparently leaves no room, though, for aggression as a spontaneous expression of national ambition, for he defines it generally as a frustrated response to the imposition of intolerable conditions (p. 148).

An American can hardly escape noticing that Burton describes regimes supported by the United States as "unpopular" and "repressive" with a regularity and automaticity that rivals the adjectival attachment

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of "damn" to "Yankee" in traditional Southern folklore. Conceding that the United States *has* supported some regimes of that sort, I nevertheless marvel that the author finds no occasion to note that it has bestowed its blessings upon more respectable regimes as well, or to consider the possibility that aid has been given to disreputable regimes despite, rather than because of, their unworthiness. Forgiving Burton for the ideological rigidity that makes him exaggerate the ideological rigidity of American policy, I find in this phase of the study one of the author's most intriguing theses. He suggests that unpopular regimes in new states seek alignment with the United States precisely because they covet American intervention, thinking that the ally will protect them from domestic upheaval in order to safeguard the alliance, while regimes in tune with domestic political and economic aspirations opt for nonalignment because they do not need external support and can therefore safely avoid exposure of the fledgling state to external intervention. If this is valid, it would provide some basis other than the assumption of American preference for undemocratic and non-progressive regimes for explaining American attachment to governments of that character. Burton does not really tackle the problem of evidence, but his argument should provoke research on the question of the correlation between the political insecurity of governments in new states and their option for alignment or nonalignment. The researcher should not, however, adopt Burton's assumption that only stubbornly right-wing regimes resistant to liberal reforms are likely to confront internal challenges that stimulate their desire for external support. It is no more true that domestic rebels are always crusaders for democracy and social justice than that international aggressors are always innocent victims of intolerable discrimination by the masters of the global *status quo*.

Unfortunately, most of the questionable assertions to be found in this book are more disquieting than stimulating. On balance, I cannot rate it a particularly valuable addition to the literature.

INIS L. CLAUDE JR.
University of Michigan

Reforming the World's Money *by Roy Harrod. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965.—viii, 181 pp. $5.95.*

This study, by one of Britain's most distinguished economists, should be required reading for every official concerned with international monetary organization. It is a scholarly, subtle, and valuable contribution to one of today's great problems.

Harrod's central thesis is that the world's monetary reserves are gross-

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ly inadequate, and that quite rapid future expansion must be maintained if the objectives of sustained economic growth are to be achieved. Most academic economists agree, I think; certainly I do. But many central bankers and Treasury officials do not, and it is fair to say that Harrod never really offers conclusive proof with which to convince them. He relies chiefly on comparisons of reserves with import volumes, but does not show why this or any other objective criterion should be compelling. Hence his and other students' difficulties with the more conservative officials, who fear inflation.

Taking this major premise for granted, however, Harrod explores four major ways to increase world reserves or to diminish the need for them. The first is his old favorite, raising the national-currency price of gold by some large amount. Few agree with him here, however—though one can only admire the romantic appeal of pages 173-74. Second is the adoption of a regime of flexible but controlled exchange rates. This device he rejects because he believes it would increase rather than reduce instability, and would require larger rather than smaller or zero reserves. He might also have stressed the inability of such a regime to deal adequately with the recurrent disequilibria due to governmental aid programs. Third is the present structure of mutual currency arrangements and modifications thereof, which he rightly regards as valuable but incapable of dealing with protracted deficits and a general loss of confidence in a particular currency.

Last is his own proposals, to which he attaches prime importance, to recast the International Monetary Fund. This he would do primarily by transforming all the drawing rights of each member, which were still unused at the starting date, into IMF "deposits." These deposits would then be counted as part of the member's own primary reserves, and would be utilized on a par with gold or holdings of other members' actual currencies to make inter-member settlements. At any one time the total of such deposits held by members in the aggregate would hence constitute a "closed circuit" of fixed total quantity. The IMF itself would cease to hold currencies, and except in certain specified circumstances would not lend to members—would not "create money." These changes would hence be tantamount to converting the IMF into a limited form of central bank, with mainly payment-clearing and advisory functions alone. They would increase world reserves at once by the initial conversion of unused drawing rights into reserves, and subsequently by increases in members' quotas.

But would the new IMF deposits be accepted for making payments? Clearly if all members agreed to do so, that would be the end of the matter. The proposed system, however, would be in essence simply a device

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for placing an IMF validation stamp on particular amounts of particular national currencies; and these currencies differ widely both in their own present strength, and in the prospects for the future maintenance of their stability and convertibility (even with guarantee clauses). The new deposits, though they are somehow to be kept at par with gold, would not even be gold-convertible; and it is not clear what the IMF validation would really be worth, nor how backed. It is hence also not clear that the stronger nations would agree to accept such arrangements. The case should be argued at far greater length, the more so since the Collective Reserve Unit scheme, though limited as to proposed membership, is in a number of ways more attractive and in some variant now seems likely to be adopted. Or, alternatively, Harrod should go the whole way and advocate a true International Central Bank.

Indeed, the principal defect of this book is that it does not really examine in detail any of the other reform proposals. Harrod's critiques of them would surely have been most enlightening; and we may hope that he will soon fill this gap.

JAMES W. ANGELL
Columbia University

Foundations of Historical Knowledge *by Morton White. New York and London, Harper and Row, 1965.—299 pp. $6.95.*

Mr. White's book comments from the point of view of critical philosophy on three main aspects of the work of historians. First, on historical explanation, about which the author seeks to rehabilitate and defend the traditional empiricist view that there is no difference in principle between explaining in history and explaining in the natural sciences. In each case reference is needed to some general law to "cover" the explanation, and the fact that we can put our fingers on the required laws more easily in the scientific case is testimony to the unsatisfactory character of many historical explanations, not to their having a different nature. White admits that historians may not be able to construct the deductive arguments needed to justify their particular explanatory statements, but says that it is enough if such an argument *exists*. Historians can usually advance considerations which support the required argument; where they cannot, we have no reason to accept their explanations.

Next White passes to the question by what criteria it is decided in history that something or other is *the* cause of a given phenomenon. Rejecting Mill's view that any such ascription must be wholly arbitrary, he argues with R. M. MacIver and Hart that *the* cause is always, or almost

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always, the abnormal or unusual feature of the situation. There is no categorial limitation on what this feature may be; it can be an event, but equally it can be an underlying state; it can be, as Collingwood argued, a thought, but it need not be. What it is may well vary from person to person according to his interests and point of view, as happens in the parallel cases in everyday life.

Lastly, White discusses the logic of historical narration, and here he argues that other considerations besides considerations of fact come in, for we require the historian to tell us not what things happened, but what *memorable* things happened. Many attempts to say that historians must bring judgments of value to bear in history are mistaken; it is not, for instance, true that reconstructing an agent's rationale involves importing them, for here they are not so much used as mentioned. It remains true, even so, that history proceeds on the basis of value judgments in so far as it singles out what is significant, and hence the case for a form of historical relativism is justified. But to proclaim oneself an historical relativist in this sense is not to argue that there is no place in history for truth.

White has the gift of writing about complicated matters clearly and simply. He is not shy about introducing logical symbolism to clarify a distinction or point an issue, but he never gets lost in logic for its own sake. Historians may think that he works with models which are sometimes unduly simple, but if they consider them carefully they will see that the simplicity has its point. The many references to the writings of major historians will show them that White is by no means ignorant of their subject, and indeed it is clear that he has firsthand experience of at least one branch of it, intellectual history. Philosophers may feel dissatisfaction with particular arguments or conclusions; I myself am not happy at the suggestion that we can choose at will, according to our point of view, whether to make particular events or underlying conditions *the* cause of a given historical phenomenon. The notion of a *deeper* explanation, one which makes appeal to *theory*, should surely be considered here. But philosophers and historians must agree that the book as a whole is both lucid and continuously stimulating. It constitutes the best advanced treatment of the main issues of critical philosophy of history so far produced.

W. H. WALSH
University of Edinburgh

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Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View *by Lewis A. Coser. New York and London, The Free Press, 1965.—xviii, 750 pp. $6.95.*

Professor Coser has written a stimulating and most useful book on a subject about which there is much occasional writing today but little systematic treatment. He is here concerned with the total situation in our society of the "intellectuals," his "men of ideas." His preface must not be skipped, for in it he comes to grips with the necessary task of defining his use of that nowadays cant, and of course imprecise, term "intellectuals." Substantially he accepts the use Benda makes of *his* term *clercs*, but without Benda's insistence of the "treason" of *clercs* who try to influence, to get something done in, the everyday world of vulgar activity. Indeed he comes close to using throughout the term in the familiar sense of the pre-1917 Russian "intelligentsia," that is, to apply mostly to writers in rebellion against the establishment, but with auxiliaries among artists, musicians, and their audience.

With ample empirical material from his wide reading in history and literature Professor Coser first deals with samples of "settings for intellectual life," going back to the French salons and English coffeehouses of the eighteenth century and coming down through the nineteenth-century involvement of the writer in the market for his writings to modern Bohemia and the little magazines. A second part is made up of two case histories of intellectuals in power, the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks, followed by other examples of the relation of intellectuals to political power and its problems. A final long section deals with the intellectual in contemporary America, a subject on which Professor Coser displays commendable moderation and good judgment, taking a position a bit nearer the pole of Seymour M. Lipset than the pole of the late C. Wright Mills.

Professor Coser makes excellent use of a wide variety of sources, but this book is by no means a compilation. It succeeds in rousing in the reader a very great number of questions on which he can take leads from Professor Coser for his own thinking on the whole subject, which is indeed vast, and asks for a lifetime of work, and no doubt for much cooperation among specialists. Professor Coser has every right to define his subject as he does: he basically understands by "intellectuals" writers on man as *politique et moraliste*, writers who take a position contrary to that of the run of men and women in their societies, who are dissenters, dissenters especially from the "establishment" and from the "mass culture" that has grown so great, so unavoidable, since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

There is something to be gained by a special use of a term like "intellectuals" for such a specifically modern phenomenon as the one he here

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discusses. But surely in a wider perspective in time and space there are not wholly dissimilar social groups which can profitably be compared with our modern intellectuals—and no doubt contrasted. For one thing, "men of ideas" at certain times even in the West as in the great classic age of the France of Louis XIV have been supporters of things-as-they-are, not attackers. Have the mandarins of China nothing in common with our intellectuals? What has happened in Soviet Russia itself to the term "intelligentsia"? Was Socrates an intellectual? Aristophanes? How "normal" are the present relations between intellectuals in Professor Coser's sense and other groups in the United States? All this is not the complaint that Professor Coser has written a quite different book from the one that the reviewer thinks he ought to have written. Quite the contrary, it is rather to emphasize the value and importance of what he has written. He has helped our command of a wide field, one on which historians and political scientists as well as sociologists should be able to work with profit.

CRANE BRINTON
Harvard University

The Politics of Reconstruction, 1863-1867 *by David Donald. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1965.—xviii, 105 pp. $4.00.*

At a recent session of the American Historical Association political historians discussing the uses of quantitative data generally agreed that calculations of roll calls and election returns yielded valuable results. Still, there were those who cautioned that many capable historians, inadequately trained and unaccustomed to these materials, would not profit from the approach. The potential abuses frightened them. Since I did not share this pessimism I am unhappy to report that the publication of David Donald's Fleming lectures confirms their every fear. Traditionalists suspicious of methodological innovations can find here ammunition for a decade.

Donald sets out to answer an intriguing question. There were well defined Radical and Moderate Republican factions in Congress during Reconstruction, but what brought a man into one camp or the other has not been satisfactorily explained. Certain that historians have been unable to distinguish Radicals from Moderates in terms of "personality, ideology, geographical origins, or social and economic status" (p. 27), Donald suggests that the solution to the problem can be found in politics: practical considerations, the need to be re-elected, determined who would be Moderate and who, Radical.

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On the basis of six roll calls in the Thirty-ninth Congress (1866-67) Donald divides House Republicans into seventy-two Radicals, thirty-two Moderates, and thirteen Conservatives. At first glance he thought that Radicals won election by particularly large margins, making it tempting to argue that the more heavily a district voted Republican, the more likely its representative would vote Radical. Unfortunately after computing all the data it turned out that Radicals and Moderates captured their places by almost identical percentages—59.3 to 59.2. Undaunted Donald scrutinized the returns and decided that the margin of victory in 1864 or 1866 was not necessarily the best indicator of the safety of a seat. In Pennsylvania, he believed, even a congressman who received a fifty-one per cent margin could still feel confident that the powerful Republican state machine would insure his re-election. Thus Donald concludes that Radicalism was indeed a function of party strength. The original hypothesis only had to be amended to read: when a district "over a long period of time" was doubtfully Republican, its representative tended to join the Moderates or Conservatives. "But when there was a consistent degree of high Republican strength in a district, its Congressman usually belonged to the Radical faction" (p. 44).

The effort to substantiate or apply the formula reveals its serious inadequacies. To maintain his propositions Donald is forced to resort to a "cake and eat it" approach. A Radical's election by a large vote is prima facie evidence of a safe seat. But when Moderates take office with large margins Donald introduces the realm of psychology, that is, his guess as to how secure the congressman felt. The reader is left not with a careful plotting of districts' party history, but with Donald's assumptions as to a man's confidence. The results are strange. When New York's S. T. Holmes achieves a 59.9 per cent victory, he is free to vote Radical; when his colleague A. H. Laflin receives 56.4 per cent of the vote he joins the Moderates, for ostensibly the New York Democratic machine was too powerful to allow him comfort. Donald is thus spared the necessity of consistently defining what percentage of victory leads to political security. When Henry Dawes, a Moderate, wins in Massachusetts with a fifty-eight per cent vote, we must assume this is too small a margin; yet when G. S. Orth, an Indiana Radical, receives 52.2 per cent of the vote, this apparently offers sufficient leeway. There is no shortage of ingenious explanations here, but there seems to be little sense in accumulating data only to shuffle and disregard it.

We encounter further confusion when trying to grasp the mechanics of the process. Why should a secure seat have promoted Radicalism on Reconstruction? On the one hand Donald tells us that all Republicans were Radical, and if left to their own devices Republican congressmen would

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vote Radical. But then he adds that Republican constituencies, irreconcilably Radical, compelled their representatives to vote Radical. In the end we are left without a satisfactory explanation. If all Republican congressmen from safe districts preferred Radicalism we would like to know what influenced their predilection; since they were not under constituents' pressures, their attitudes must be the result of their ideas or some other factor that Donald does not discuss. Yet if the case was that constituents forced congressmen to vote Radical, then we are left with the paradox that the wider the margin of victory, the more a representative was under the thumb of the voters.

Donald's thesis regularly offers no help in clarifying why men voted Radical or Moderate. In New England, for example, a safe Republican section, only half of the twenty-six representatives joined the Radicals. Why should the others, almost all elected by wide margins, have turned to the other camps? Then, too, Donald argues that Moderates voted the middle path for they wished to be re-elected. But what are we to do with the fact that of the seven Moderates elected in 1864 but not re-elected in 1866, six chose not to run again. If they were about to resign surely they could have voted their own Radical convictions. Moreover there is nothing to prevent us from arguing that Donald has the equation reversed. Perhaps Moderates were elected by small percentages of the votes because they were not Radicals. Had they adopted a firmer stance, they would have enjoyed large pluralities. To eliminate this possibility Donald would have had to examine Moderate congressional constituencies to discover whether they were in fact composed of Republicans and Democrats. Instead he simply assumes that a lower percentage of votes for a Moderate Republican is evidence for substantial Democratic strength.

Finally, we are not wiser for having read Donald's essays, for at best he has simply pushed the inquiry back one step. Even if we agreed that congressmen were Moderate when constituencies were divided, we would still have to know why some districts were solidly Republican and others were not. Was it their geographical location? Their economic status? In short we are back where we began with the very same questions. I have no doubt that quantitative analyses would help shed some light on the answer. Hopefully future practitioners will not be discouraged by the results here.

DAVID ROTHMAN
Columbia University

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Wilson: Campaign for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 *by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.—xiv, 464 pp. $8.50.*

At the outset of the 1916 electoral campaign, American public opinion was overwhelmingly neutralist. In the words of the contemporary British ambassador: "It is extremely unlikely that America will go to war against the Allies. But it is not at all unlikely that there will be a violent diplomatic campaign against Great Britain." The Americans were outraged by Great Britain's stand in Ireland, and complained of the Entente's lack of enthusiasm for Wilson's mediation proposal. What events took place to alter this climate of public opinion to the point where, in April 1917, the United States entered the war? This is the problem which Arthur Link has undertaken to solve in Volume V of his vast study of Woodrow Wilson.

Having studied the existing sources of information more exhaustively than any of his predecessors, Link has contributed a wealth of valuable and precise details to this period's history, whose main currents are already well known.

Wilson was re-elected at once because he championed a progressive program for domestic social reform (the Adamson Act establishing the eight-hour working day was signed on September 2, 1916) and because in matters of foreign policy he remained a confirmed neutralist. Doubtless Lansing and House, each in his own fashion, were enthusiastic partisans of the Entente. Link goes as far as to accuse them of lacking in "loyalty to their superior." But Wilson maintained his firm control of the international political situation, and was well able to resist their influence.

Wilson's peace proposal of December 1916 had been suggested to him, in part, by the German government. Whereas France was inflexibly hostile to this proposal, Great Britain's attitude was subject to numerous considerations. Link points out that in London, economist John Maynard Keynes and Foreign Minister Edward Gray were well aware of the Entente's financial dependence upon the United States: "Our real danger is irritation of American Public Opinion operating against our loans" (p. 181). The United States thus possessed an effective means of coercion. But should it then be concluded, as Link has done, that Wilson "had the power to force the Allies to go to the peace table"? He appears to minimize the fighting spirit of the British—a spirit which asserted itself decisively with the accession to power of the Government of National Union headed by the dynamic Lloyd George.

It is well known that Germany—unwilling to see Wilson named mediator of the peace conference—was, more than any other power, responsible for the failure of Wilson's proposal, and that on January 31, 1917,

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she declared to the world her fatal decision to engage in all-out submarine warfare, in which not only enemy but neutral ships as well would be destroyed.

At this point emerges the newest and most original thinking in Link's volume: he argues convincingly that Wilson was less shocked by the decision of Germany than has been commonly believed heretofore. Until the very end, he sought a possible compromise, in opposition to Lansing, who clamored for an immediate declaration of war. When Wilson finally was brought to make the declaration of war, it was not "because he thought that the Allies were about to lose and a German victory would imperil American security," but rather "because he could see no other way to protect American national rights and shipping on the high seas . . . and because he believed that the war was in its final stages and American participation would hasten its end."

JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE
The Sorbonne, Paris

The White House Years. Waging Peace: 1956-1961 *by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1965.—xxiii, 741 pp. $6.95.*

This book has been much criticized for its blandness, its easy rationalizations, and its blurring over of the more vivid and controversial episodes during President Eisenhower's second term. It does read a bit like a staff report—perhaps because it was largely put together by a staff. I think the criticism overdrawn, however. The book is immensely revealing if one uses it to enter Eisenhower's (and his staff's) perspective and to see the swirl of events through the lenses of the White House occupants. Eisenhower's perception of his political role suggests the value of the book.

In his admirable study, *The Chief Executive*, Louis Koenig notes that "Eisenhower resolutely, but not always successfully, shied away from partisan political duty," and that the Republican President, "whose temperament was bipartisan, or perhaps more accurately apolitical, was forced by circumstances into assuming a highly partisan role in election years and a bipartisan role in between in his relations with a Democratic Congress." This is an accurate summation from the outside; but from the inside Eisenhower feels that he did indeed meet his obligations as Republican party leader. Thus he traveled ten thousand miles and made forty speeches, he notes, for Republican candidates in 1954; dominated Repub-

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lican party platform writing in 1956 (to the extent of threatening not to accept renomination unless the tariff plank was changed to his liking); warned Republican congressmen that he would not support them in their re-election fights if they opposed his program; brought personal influence to bear on Congress in various and sundry ways; tried to revitalize the Citizens for Eisenhower organization that had been active in his first presidential campaign. Yet he achieved small results from even this modest effort, for his party lost the congressional elections three times in a row, and he had to cope with the most obdurate opposition from congressional Republican party leaders such as Senators Knowland and McCarthy.

What was the trouble? Why, with his immense personal popularity and his recognition of his duties as party leader, was Eisenhower not more effective as Politician-in-Chief? The answer lies, I think, less in a failure of will or of sense of duty, than in a lack of comprehension of the strategic political situation. The President knew that he must be political to some extent but he never was very sure whether or not he should be fundamentally and consistently partisan. He says at one point, in describing a meeting with congressional leaders over a Mideastern crisis, that he told congressional leaders

> that I would do my best to get along with the Congress and that in the matters we had discussed this afternoon, no question of partisanship would move me an inch—although I had, of course, to remind all that I hoped my own party, by its excellence of performance, would command the favor of the American people (p. 179).

He denies (p. 375) that the "Republicans were a deeply divided party" (it was the Democrats who were really divided—into two parties—he declared in a 1958 campaign speech). But in his afterthoughts in this book he states (p. 652) that he wanted to unify and strengthen the Republican party but that his success was slight. And he now favors four-year terms for representatives, congruent with the executive, and other measures to improve "one-party responsibility" and party discipline.

"The older I grow," Eisenhower says (p. 226), "the more I come to respect balance—not only in budgets but in people." This is perhaps the most revealing statement in the book. Not that the President always practiced this doctrine; in his effective fight for reorganization of the Defense Department he explicitly rejected the notion of checks and balances in the Pentagon. But the concept of balance enabled him to straddle harsh intellectual and political dilemmas, like that of his party role, to take the slack middle way, to favor both the welfare state and a balanced budget. Still, Dwight Eisenhower was neither the first, and doubtless will not be the

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last, president to meet failures as a result of an inadequate comprehension of the opportunities and problems of the presidency.

JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS
Williams College

Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion *by Elmer E. Cornwell. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1965.—x, 370 pp. $6.95.*

Professor Cornwell here attempts to fill what he terms "a long-standing vacuum in the literature about the Presidency". He explains that his volume follows in the recent tradition of Neustadt and Fenno, rather than emulating the example of earlier authors of general studies on White House leadership.

Given his concern with public opinion, Cornwell naturally gives major attention to the development of the White House press conference as an instrument in communicating the president's ideas to the public. He traces the chronological development of the press conference as an institution of growing importance, from the time of Theodore Roosevelt through the end of the Kennedy administration. He does not make detailed observations about President Johnson, nor can he fairly be expected to, but his tentative assessment is favorable.

Mr. Cornwell observes in introducing his work that the President's present position does not present "a clear and present danger to American democracy." Pluralism in American society prevents this, Cornwell holds, along with a president's competition from many other news sources. It seems implicit in the author's view that the present power situation in American politics has not basically undermined traditional "checks," though he speaks in more general terms.

For the student of content analysis, Cornwell's most interesting investigation in this work is his study of the educational function of the press conference by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934-35, prior to passage of the Social Security Act. This holds particular interest with Medicare now a reality; the obvious merit of a parallel study suggests itself, even though it was not possible for Cornwell. The author finds that coverage from June 8, 1934, through August 14, 1935, when the President issued a statement at the signing, totaled 902 column inches out of a total of 1,526 column inches devoted to President Roosevelt's activities on the days when social security legislation was in the news. Cornwell

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also presents a careful analysis explaining how this material reflects Roosevelt's role.

Other comparative data presented include figures on front-page news conference coverage, two complete-year sets of tabulations for press releases, and finally a two-month period tabulation of space in the New York *Times* devoted to press releases published in February and March for Roosevelt in 1935, Truman in 1949, Eisenhower in 1957, and Kennedy in 1962.

The final major topic dealt with is the increasing use of television, and Cornwell makes the inevitable comparison between Roosevelt's use of the "fireside chat" and President Kennedy's use of the televised press conference. Special attention is paid to improvements pioneered by James C. Hagerty during Eisenhower's tenure.

The main shortcomings of the volume derive from the same source as its strengths, its focus on a relatively restricted topic. It is incisively written and deserves the close attention of students of the modern presidency as well as of public opinion.

WILLIAM C. SPRAGENS
Michigan State University

Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs *by Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.—xii, 356 pp. $7.50.*

This is the third volume in a significant and well-received series from Dartmouth College on the military and modern education. It is the result, in part, of a grant which enabled the authors, a historian and a political scientist, to visit many of America's major centers and institutes engaged in the research and teaching of subjects related to a relatively new academic field, national security affairs. Their conclusion is that by refusing to alter the traditional academic framework to include these studies, most of the nation's colleges and universities are failing to come to grips with some of the most vital and complex problems of the nuclear age. There is no longer, we are told, a "clear-cut division between war and peace or between foreign and military policies." And "it is, indeed, the acceptance of national security studies by the established disciplines that is the most serious objective to be achieved in the goal of a total intellectual response to the cold war."

The heart of the book, and surely its outstanding feature, is the descrip-

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tions of the programs and institutions currently dealing with the general subject matter. Highly informative views of the Foreign Policy Association, the Hudson Institute, and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, among others, are supplemented by a perceptive analysis of the present education of scientists, lawyers, and businessmen in relation to elements of national defense. Though relevant materials were in some cases difficult to acquire (RAND operates in semi-secrecy), the authors' diligence in research has provided us with a valuable contribution to our knowledge of current affairs.

And yet the book should attract few scholars to the authors' cause. Though surely possible, the limits and proportions of national security studies are not defined. What, approximately, should be taught and studied and by whom? Current experiments vary widely and there is no suggestion of a practical prospectus. Simply listing the titles of programs at Harvard or citing the latest work on the inadequacies of our present defense spending, for example, is insufficient. It begs the question to plead that "the real task for the academician is to integrate the relevant elements into his own discipline and to apply the methods and concepts of his training to those aspects of national security in which he is interested."

Nor can one be confident, to say the least, that such endeavors would make the world a safer place in which to live. Any unilateral action, we read, by the United States "to reduce the possibility of the use of armed force to resolve international disputes" is simply "in opposition to the advocates of the strategy of deterrence" and would presumably warrant little thought. Almost nothing positive is mentioned of world government or peace; baubles such as "national purpose" and "national goals" appear frequently but go unexplored. These are failings common to ROTC manuals and some of our professional "nuclear strategists."

It may well be that scholars, in their quest to create creditable publications within their specializations, overlook crucial and basic issues of war and peace which would provide the public and the federal government with a healthy variety of alternatives on which to base future decisions. What is needed to make the point, however, is a series of concise, tightly-reasoned, detailed proposals based on first-class studies of the intellectual and moral demands of cold war military and diplomatic strategy. Partisans of the widespread consideration of national security courses may wish to apply for further grants.

THOMAS C. REEVES
University of California, Santa Barbara

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The United States in World Affairs: 1964 *edited by Jules Davids. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1965.—viii, 386 pp. $6.95.*

Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1964 *edited by Jules Davids with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1965.—vi, 460 pp. $7.50.*

"The Johnson administration entered a new year of great turmoil," declares this annual summary of major developments in American foreign policy (*The United States in World Affairs*). The "crisis of NATO," the conflict on Cyprus, the further disintegration of the Soviet European satellite system, Red China's acquisition of nuclear weapons, the dispute between Panama and the United States, the deepening American involvement in Vietnam—these events were at the forefront of American global concern during 1964.

Now edited by Jules Davids, these two annual volumes issued under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations continue to provide excellent, up-to-date, and objective coverage of contemporary American foreign policy. The *Documents* supplies a convenient, well-chosen selection of official speeches, statements, communiques, treaty texts, excerpts from hearings, and the like, setting forth the American position in 1965 on everything from dissension within the Western alliance, to the dismissal of Khrushchev, to the crisis in Southeast Asia. No significant dimension of American foreign policy is slighted. On the basis of space allocated in this key compilation, it is enlightening to note the evolution in America's external concerns. The East-West conflict, for example, is treated directly in some fifty-six pages (although admittedly it is treated indirectly in many more); some forty pages are devoted to problems in Africa; Communist China and Asia need seventy-three pages; while the United Nations, international economic questions, and the peaceful applications of nuclear energy demand eighty pages.

Such tendencies are in keeping with what Davids and other commentators have identified as an inclination for the cold war to recede as the paramount issue confronting American policy-makers. If the underlying conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is in some respects basically undiminished, its arenas and modes of competition at least have changed radically in recent years. This fact has, in turn, as Davids accurately and interestingly records, engendered new, infinitely more complex patterns of relationships among great and small powers alike, as revealed in developments like the Cyprus dispute, rising levels of East-West trade, Peking's diplomatic offensive among the nonaligned nations, and Japan's changing attitudes and orientations in foreign affairs.

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Professor Davids is to be congratulated for ably continuing the tradition long associated with this estimable series. Together, the two volumes before us provide the student or researcher with as useful, readable, and dispassionate analysis of recent developments in American foreign relations as he is likely to find. As always, the notes and accompanying chronology are valuable aids to further research. If the interested student were required to limit his sources to the two latest installments in this yearly series, he would have difficulty selecting better choices.

CECIL V. CRABB JR.
Vassar College

The Scientific Estate *by Don K. Price. Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965.—xi, 323 pp. $5.95.*

Changes within science, changes in the role of scientists as advisers in and out of government, and the changing impacts of science and technology might well be considered revolutionary. Dean Price is particularly interested in what he sees as the "radical" effects of science and technology on our political institutions. Already, in his view, the scientific revolution has: (1) helped move the public and private sectors closer together; (2) brought a new order of complexity into the administration of public affairs; and (3) upset our system of checks and balances (pp. 15-16). To some, this may be too extreme a diagnosis, but almost everyone would agree that many of the old and traditional political safeguards no longer seem adequate either practically or theoretically.

The fundamental question to which Dean Price addresses himself is: "how is science, with all its new power, to be related to our political purposes and values and to our economic and constitutional system?" (p. 3.) It is clear that scientists are increasingly on top, as well as on tap, but no one should reasonably expect that science can provide all the answers or, even more important, that science is always likely to ask the most important and relevant questions. Science is increasingly a significant element in an ever widening spectrum of national policies, but it is only one element.

If we have not yet worked out the most satisfactory mechanisms for using science in the formulation of national policies, we have made much more progress in devising ways of supporting science in the style to which it is fast becoming accustomed. Despite the increasing centralization of financial support, with the federal government the single largest and most significant patron of research, controls have been largely decentralized

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and science has been able to continue to enjoy and retain a large measure of its autonomy.

There are many difficulties and some dangers. We are certainly having to reformulate some of our notions regarding conflicts of interest, as scientists are often simultaneously involved as beneficiaries of federal largess, as advisers on how this largess is to be distributed, and as advisers on how science impinges upon other national policies and goals.

While Dean Price regards science as a new establishment, he finds it even more useful to go back to the notion of the medieval estates in trying to understand the relations among scientists and other groups in the body politic. Scientists, along with administrators, professionals, and politicians, are identified as the four important estates in our society. They are distinguished largely on the basis of their skills and expertise rather than on their claims to tangible property or to traditional symbols of status. At one end of the spectrum, the political estate is concerned primarily with power and with purpose or value. At the other end, the scientific estate is concerned with truth to the exclusion of purpose as such. In between are the professionals and the administrators who assist the politician in translating the fruits of science into national purposes and policies. The underlying principle which seems to be (or is it should be?) operating here, according to Price, is that:

> (1) the closer the estate is to the end of the spectrum that is concerned solely with truth, the more it is entitled to freedom and self-government; and (2) the closer it gets to the exercise of power, the less it is permitted to organize itself as a corporate entity, and the more it is required to submit to the test of political responsibility, in the sense of submitting to the ultimate decision of the electorate (p. 137).

In Dean Price's view, the effective use of science and technology in a free society is probably dependent on developing an effective system of checks and balances among these four estates. This is not easily accomplished, as Dean Price illustrates in an incisive analysis of the difficulties experienced in trying to achieve a national program in oceanography. The tendency to search for new administrative gimmicks, as exemplified by the suggestions for a new Department of Science or even in an Operations Research Organization for the President, are essentially unsatisfactory precisely because they blur the distinctions between the concern for purpose and the concern for truth.

Dean Price would be the first to deny that he has provided the final answers. His real contribution is that he has begun to frame what seem to be some of the more significant questions for which answers must be sought. Much has been said and written in the last decade or two on the relation of science and public policy—much of it by the physical scientists

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speaking *ex cathedra*. Social scientists generally, and political scientists in particular, have a substantive contribution to make, but for the most part they have ignored and neglected the opportunity. This new and highly original study by Dean Price renews the challenge for all of us and removes whatever flimsy excuses we may have had for continuing to ignore these vital questions. A new and more vigorous effort to develop both theory and research in this fledgling field of the "science of science" has been greatly facilitated by Dean Price's pioneering contribution.

NORMAN KAPLAN
The George Washington University

Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change *by Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1965.—xvii, 284 pp. $9.75.*

Stereotypes about Negroes are found not only among prejudiced whites, but also among those who have failed to keep up with the dramatic changes affecting Negroes. The Taeubers have now brought together a truly impressive amount of data to set us straight on what has been happening in Negro housing and segregation in cities throughout the United States. Even though residential segregation is perhaps the most unyielding aspect of the "problem" against which the Negro "revolution" is being fought, there have been some noteworthy changes since 1950.

In the first place, while housing segregation rapidly increased from 1910 to 1950, it has been slightly reversed in Northern and Border cities since 1950. Using an index of housing segregation based on block statistics, the Taeubers show, for example, that the index for Camden, New Jersey, stood at 89.6 per cent in 1950 and fell to 76.5 per cent in 1960; and for Sacramento, California, it fell during the decade from 77.6 to 63.9 per cent. (This represents the proportion of non-whites who would have to be moved in order to even their distribution throughout the city.) While the segregation index did not fall as rapidly in other Northern and Border cities, it did fall in practically all of them to some extent. Even in Detroit, it fell 5.4 per cent from the late nineteen-forties until 1960. On the other hand, housing segregation has continued to increase in the Southern cities until in 1960 it was generally higher there than in the North. In Shreveport, Louisiana, it reached 95.9 per cent in 1960, and in Jacksonville, Florida, it went to 96.9 per cent. No Northern city had so much segregation.

What happened to the older Southern pattern of Negroes living on the

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"back street" adjacent to the houses of their white employers? To a slight extent it remained in the very old and relatively stationary Southern city, such as Charleston, South Carolina, where the index was only 79.5 per cent as late as 1960. But in the newer cities which developed since the Civil War, and in the older Southern cities which have experienced considerable growth since that event, segregation has been almost complete. This means that residential segregation is rapidly on its way to restore by "*de facto*" means in the South what it lost when the Supreme Court in 1954 outlawed school segregation by state law or school board decision!

In the Northern cities, most of the breaking out of the ghettoes is by middle class Negroes, so that today in mixed areas or areas of Negro "invasion," Negroes have about as high an educational status as their white neighbors. (They do not have as high an occupational status, perhaps because of job discrimination.) This might suggest that the middle class Negroes were moving into areas inhabited by lower class whites. But no; the Taeubers show that the newly mixed areas of Northern cities tend to be the "better" neighborhoods for whites also. The Negro in-migrants to cities include a large and growing proportion of the middle class, and they are distributing themselves throughout the city more than the Negroes already resident there.

The Taeubers attribute the Northern change to two factors: a movement of some of the better-off whites to the suburbs, and a loosening of the housing market from the tight conditions which prevailed in the nineteen-forties. They neglected to examine the possibility that there might be some effect from the Supreme Court decision of 1948 making the restrictive covenant unenforceable in court and from the "open occupancy" statutes passed by Northen state legislatures since 1957.

The Taeubers show a good deal of ingenuity in their analysis, and they have read some of the vast literature on the Negro's situation before doing their statistical analysis. They show, for example, that the inter-city variation in segregation during the nineteen-forties was to be explained by the presence or absense of new construction during that period of tight housing; whereas during the nineteen-fifties the inter-city variation was to be explained by changes in the size of the non-white population and the occupational structure. They indicate, contrary to the statements of less careful authors, that Negro poverty has not been a major factor in segregation; it has been a function mainly of racial discrimination. They show that there *is* class segregation *within* the Negro ghetto, although less than that which exists in white neighborhoods. They go back into history to gain perspective on the present situation of Negro segregation, showing, for example, that the Southern trend to-

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ward housing segregation began almost as soon as the Civil War was over.

This is an unsentimental, hard-fact study. Yet it is well written and scholarly. There are convenient summaries of the findings and interpretation is not avoided.

ARNOLD M. ROSE
University of Minnesota

Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection *by Joel B. Grossman. New York, John Wiley and Son, 1965.—xii, 228 pp. $6.75.*

That the federal courts are partly political as well as judicial institutions and that the selection of those who sit upon the federal benches is an intimate part of the political process constitute the major premises of Professor Grossman's book. Its scope is limited, however, for little discussion is devoted to the way in which judicial candidates generate grass roots support for their cause and secure access to critical power centers in the legislative and executive branches of the national government.

Instead, the focus of this significant study is on the growth, especially during the last fifteen years, of the American Bar Association's role in the selection of federal judges. Bar participation in the appointment process, according to the author, permits the legal guild to influence the "initial act" in the socialization of federal judges. Interaction of judges and lawyers in courtrooms, at the annual judicial conferences in the circuits, and on committees studying procedural and administrative reforms later provides the bar with additional opportunities for influencing judicial behavior.

Representing the ABA's interests is that organization's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. Its endorsement procedure and its changing relationships with other variables in the selection process such as the president, the attorney general, senators, sitting judges, and assorted pressure groups are carefully analyzed by Professor Grossman. In so doing, he queries the degree of authority accorded, or which should be accorded, the committee's endorsements by politically responsible agencies of government.

A self-proclaimed guardian of judicial integrity, the committee promotes a traditional goal of the ABA—de-politicalization of the federal judiciary. Yet its endorsements are not necessarily "neutral." Committee members and those whose attitude toward various judicial candidates are

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polled by the committee comprise a special breed among lawyers generally. They are the legal elite whose preferences incline toward candidates with high professional rather than political standing. Over time, contends Professor Grossman, the real or perceived capacity of the organized bar to influence judicial appointments may profoundly alter the kind of credentials offered by aspiring judges with subtle implications for the nature of law itself.

Unlike the Eisenhower administration, there is little indication that the Johnson administration is prepared to surrender its appointment prerogative to a politically irresponsible professional organization. The fierce struggle waged by the ABA against the nomination of Francis X. Morrissey achieved success only when its evidence of Morrissey's professional incompetence was augmented by additional evidence of defects in the candidate's character. Had the political branches voluntarily surrendered their appointment roles, then, as Professor Grossman emphasizes, bar influence would also have been decisive.

The author has thus made a timely and important contribution to scholarship on the judicial process. Readers will want to ponder the feasibility of his proposed modifications in the appointment process as well as to consider the desirability of future studies on the Judiciary Committees of Congress and on the ABA's influence in changing federal judicial procedure and administration.

PETER GRAHAM FISH
Oberlin College

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Book Notes

Everyone knows that the move to suburbia converts life-long Democrats into Republicans. A moment's reflection supplies ample causes. Upward social and economic mobility, the predominantly Republican "political climate" of many suburbs, face-to-face pressures from one's new Republican friends and neighbors—to mention but a few examples—function singly or in combination to change one's political beliefs and vote. But hold! What everyone "knows" may, in fact, be quite wrong. At least, it seems to be dead wrong for the people of Westport, Connecticut (a Republican suburban town), whose voting behavior and political sentiments have been intensively and skillfully analyzed in a sobering but lively book—*First Tuesday: A Study of Rationality in Voting* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1964; viii, 328 pp., $6.00) by David Wallace. The study is based on a survey of a sample of Westport's registered voters and it covers, among other things, their voting behavior in five presidential elections, two gubernatorial elections, and two local elections (involving a third, new local political party). Comparisons are made between voters who were constant supporters of their political party's candidates and those who shifted votes to another party under varying circumstances. The analysis considers the relation between voting and such factors as one's length of residence in Westport, parents' voting, political party registration, political partisanship (as measured by a special index), and various social and economic characteristics. The findings provide no substantial support for the "notion that the preponderant Republican environment of Westport somehow erodes incoming Democratic sympathies until perfunctory, at least, Republican voting results" (p. 271). Instead, the evidence indicates that for most people the act of voting is guided by essentially life-long non-rational political partisanship, usually for the same party as one's parents supported, and that a switch to voting for another party occurs only in extraordinary situations. The

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small minority of suburbanites who shifted their votes from party to party in national presidential elections usually had relatively low interest in politics and were relatively less partisan originally. The author discusses the implications of these findings for democratic theory. This brief summary greatly oversimplifies the complex analyses presented in the book; furthermore, it fails to convey the refreshing style of exposition which, together with the researcher's skillful presentation of data, makes reading *First Tuesday* an instructive and enjoyable experience.—CHARLES R. WRIGHT, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The flood of topical books about recent events in the South has been accompanied by a trickle of volumes attempting to reassess the historical position of the South. Dewey W. Grantham's *The Democratic South* (Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press, 1963; xii, 109 pp., $2.50) is one of the most stimulating of these reassessments. At a time when the South is in the news primarily for its conservatism and for its burgeoning Republicanism, Professor Grantham takes as his central theme the "democratic" South, as well as the Democratic South. To many non-Southerners the two may seem antithetical. But Grantham, author of an earlier volume on *Hoke Smith and the Politics of the New South,* argues for the importance in Southern politics of "socio-economic groupings not unlike those outside the section—business-minded conservatives, agrarian radicals, middle-class progressives, and the like" (p. 5). He reminds us that not all Southern politics revolves around the race question, and that it is not always the conservatives who win—the South has its Hills and Sparkmans as well as its Byrds. His graceful analysis, originally delivered in the Lamar lecture series, can be recommended for its style and wit as well as for its tightly packed content.—H. DOUGLAS PRICE, *Syracuse University.*

Dr. Ivo Lapenna, a former Yugoslav jurist now at the London School of Economics, in *State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964; xi, 135 pp., $5.00), presents in very brief compass the main ideas of Marxist political and legal theory as they have been developed in the Soviet Union, with some discussion of Yugoslav writings as well. He does not find substantial differences between Yugoslav and Soviet doctrines, except that the Yugoslavs were almost a decade ahead of the Soviets in calling for the immediate transfer of "state"

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functions to "social" organizations as part of the process of the "withering away" of the state.

The author traces Marxist theory historically, recounting the various episodes in its development. In view of the brevity of the book, this treatment results in a considerable oversimplification of the issues over which Marxists have divided, Also the reader remains mystified as to why theories which, as Dr. Lapenna states at the outset, are remote from Soviet and Yugoslav political and legal realities, should command so much attention from the jurists of those countries.

Dr. Lapenna's principal answer to this question is that because the state in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is hated by the people, the leaders must explain it as a necessary evil destined ultimately to disappear.

Unfortunately, the book deals only cursorily with the debates that have raged in the Soviet Union in the past three years concerning the absence of "legality" from many of the enactments of the Stalinist period. Many of the attacks by Soviet jurists on the political and legal theories of Vyshinsky strongly imply concepts of law which conflict with the "orthodox" doctrine of legal positivism inherited from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Dr. Lapenna shows that beneath the apparent unanimity of Soviet political and legal theory there are some important differences on basic questions, but this reviewer, at least, wishes that he had taken more seriously the tendencies of Soviet political and legal thought to move in the direction of what traditionally has been considered a "natural law" philosophy.—HAROLD J. BERMAN, *Harvard University.*

To the many "Economic Classics" reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley has been added *The Life of Adam Smith* by John Rae; the value of this reprint is greatly enhanced by including as an Introduction a "Guide to John Rae's *Life of Adam Smith*," by Dr. Jacob Viner (New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1965; 145, xv, 449 pp., $20.00). Viner discusses certain "problems wrongly solved or left unsolved by Rae" but is careful to avoid "unjust disparagement." "For what we know of Smith as a person and of the record of his personal life, our major indebtedness is to Rae's *Life* and after that to Dugald Stewart and to W. R. Scott" (p. 16). One part of the introduction deals with "The Relations of Smith with Selected Persons" (Edmund Burke, David Hume, Samuel Johnson, Charles Townshend, among others). Another part deals with "The Scotland of his Time." One section deals with "The Highland Economy"; ". . . the absence in the *Wealth of Nations* of a discussion of the general economic state of

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the Highlands seems as puzzling to me . . . as has been to many readers of that all-embracing book the absence of any general comment on the problem of poor relief" (p. 101). Another section deals with " 'Slavery' in the Scottish Mines"; that Adam Smith never came out strongly against "colliers serfdom" may well, Dr. Viner suggests, have been because "Smith did not have great faith in the efficiency of moral principles when they clashed with economic interest," and because he thought it more effective to persuade the owners that "free labour would be more profitable than slave labour" (p. 116). The final part warns against interpretations of the sources of *The Wealth of Nations* based on our partial knowledge of the contents of the author's library. The *Life* itself needs no description; it is a "classic," well-known, become scarce, now very welcome as a reprint.—VINCENT W. BLADEN, *University of Toronto*

In *Southeast Asia: Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1964; viii, 365 pp., $6.50), Professor Lennox A. Mills dispels the "illusion" of democracy, and reveals the "reality" of oligarchical and dictatorial governments in Southeast Asia, which, lacking prerequisites of Western democracy, are likely to remain so for a long time (pp. 3-15). In making this comparison, he fails to note that democracy and the West evolved after centuries of independent development which, in Southeast Asia, began only after 1946. The author recommends that (1) the West should concentrate aid on countries like India, and (2) the fears and grievances of Western investors should be removed, but recipients should not be asked to forswear socialism and adopt private enterprise in return for aid (pp. 330-32).

Chapters 2 through 6 deal with situations in Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines (but not Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam whose foreign policies only are described on pp. 175-78), international relations, communism, and the Chinese minority. The account of Burma stops at 1962. The chapter on "International Relations," ignores certain important developments in the past two years, like Indonesia's diplomacy of "New Emerging Forces" and the new "Asianism" in the Philippine policy toward Indonesia and the Malaysia dispute. Chapters 6 through 12 concern problems of economic development and the role of foreign aid and private investment. The author's claim that local leaders, without understanding economics, seek industrialization for prestige (pp. 224, 207-08) ignores the "revolution of rising expectations" and lacks credibility. He makes statements without elaboration or reference; for instance, that Sukarno does not want private in-

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vestment but merely large Western grants (p. 224); that the Masjumi party desires Western investment for development (p. 236); that "the improvement of agriculture is the quickest and surest way of obtaining the capital necessary to finance economic development" (p. 207). Of more than fifty pages on foreign aid, barely three deal with Communist aid (pp. 293-94, 321-23), which has influenced politics in Southeast Asia. He finally raises the question of Western aid and population growth (pp. 324-45), but does not discuss the Draper Committee's recommendation in 1960 and President Kennedy's decision in 1963 to use American aid for family planning. Had the viewpoints of Western investors and government officials (p. vii) been compared with those of recipient countries, the author could have presented a more balanced analysis of aid and development.—USHA MAHAJANI, *Australian National University, Canberra.*

The year 1920, a critical one for the United Kingdom in the transition from wartime plans for the Near and Middle East to the definition of viable policies that conformed to postwar realities, is given fresh meaning in *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, First Series, Volume XIII: *The Near and Middle East, January 1920-March 1921* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1963; lxxxiii, 747 pp., 80s, $16.00), edited by Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, assisted by M. E. Lambert. The diplomatic correspondence, military memoranda, and special reports in this volume deal wholly with southwest Asia (Turkey, Persia, the former Ottoman Arab provinces, and the Arabian Peninsula). They reveal, among other things: that the British government had no illusions about the likely fate of the treaty of Sèvres, in advance of its signature, because of the growing vigor of the Turkish nationalists' provisional regime; that the British, while determined to keep the French out of Trans-Jordan after the expulsion of Faysal from Damascus, were nevertheless insistent on doing so without violating the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement; and that even before the Tabatabai government in Tehran in effect repudiated the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement by concluding a treaty with Soviet Russia (February 26, 1921), the British government had already viewed the 1919 instrument as voided by the failure of the Persian legislature to ratify it before the end of 1920. The appearance of the present volume brings to four the number in this series (IV, VII, VIII) devoted to the Near and Middle East. They form an indispensable repository of source materials on the problems attending the Allied settlement in the region at the close of World War I.—J. C. HUREWITZ, *Columbia University.*

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

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

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
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